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2ABSTRACT
Political scientists have been searching for a comprehensive theoretical 
framework to explain the dynamics of European integration since the European 
Communities came into being in the early 1950s. European integration theory was 
dominated by neo-fiinctionalism in the 1960s and by realism in the 1970s and early 
1980s. In the late 1980s these two paradigms were finally confronted. As a result of 
this confrontation, there seems to be an emergence of a new approach based on the 
idea that neither neo-functionalism nor realism alone can explain European integration 
but that each perspective provides fundamental insights. Multi-level governance 
models and even state-centred models tend to recognise that both theoretical 
frameworks have something to offer.
Is it possible to view neo-functionalism and realism as complementary instead 
of competing theories of European integration? If both approaches contain some 
elements of truth but neither taken on its own is sufficient, insights from each may 
be needed to really understand the dynamics of integration. This piece of work tries 
to establish whether the idea that these two explanations need to be combined is 
worth considering at all. This hypothesis is tested in relation to European merger 
policy.
The European Economic Community’s (EEC) Merger Regulation represents 
the single most important extension of Community competition law since its 
inception. Merger control was explicitly contemplated in the 1951 Treaty of Paris but 
the EEC was created in 1957 without any reference to these policy arrangements. For 
the first time in 1973, the Commission submitted to the Council a proposal for an 
EEC merger regulation. Yet it was only after five amendments and sixteen years that, 
in 1989, a merger control regulation was agreed upon. Why was an agreement on 
European merger regulation possible in 1989 rather than before? This research 
addresses this question using both neo-functionalism and realism as explanatory 
theories.
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The European Communities came into being with the Rome Treaties in 1957, 
establishing, in addition to the already existing European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC- Treaty of Paris 1951), a European Economic Community (EEC) and a 
European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). In 1965 an agreement was reached 
to merge the institutions of the three Communities; this came into effect in 1967, 
and, although legally they were still separate entities, it became common to 
collectively refer to them as the ’European Community’(EC) (George, 1991). Lastly, 
in 1991, the Maastricht Treaty created the European Union (EU) establishing a three 
pillared structure, of which the EC is just one, albeit the most important, pillar. The 
two other pillars are: the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Home Affairs 
and Justice Policy.
European integration, from the ECSC to the EU, has implied the development 
of a European legal framework, the creation of new European institutions such as the 
European Council (1974), the reinforcement and democratisation of others such as 
the European Parliament, the entrance of new members such as the United Kingdom 
or Spain, and new transfers of power and sovereignty to the European institutions 
through agreement on new common policies such as the 1989 EEC Merger 
Regulation. For Lintner and Mazey (1991: 1): ’The result has been a complex 
intermeshing of the Community’s and the member-states’ economic, legal, and 
political systems.’ Today’s EU has achieved a strong role both in the world as a 
whole and in the economic, social and political daily life of its member states. As 
Urwin (1991: 245) states: ’...the EC has become a fact of life.’
This growing significance of the EU makes it essential to find a clear answer 
to questions such as the following: Which are the forces leading towards integration? 
Why is integration possible at one moment rather than at another? How do policy 
responsibilities of the European Communities develop? It is only by finding answers 
to such questions that the ability to understand recent Western European history 
becomes possible, and this in turn enables future predictions.
Political scientists have tried to answer these and other related questions by 
identifying constant backgrounds or conditions upon which European integration is 
contingent. European integration theory was dominated by neo-functionalism in the 
1960s and by realism in the 1970s and early 1980s. In the late 1980s these two 
paradigms were finally confronted. As a result of this confrontation, there seems to 
be an emergence of a new approach based on the idea that neither neo-functionalism 
nor realism alone can explain European integration but that each perspective provides 
fundamental insights. Multi-level governance models and even state-centred models 
tend to recognise that both theoretical frameworks have something to offer.
Is it possible to view neo-functionalism and realism as complementary instead 
of competing theories of European integration? If both approaches contain some 
elements of truth but neither taken on its own is sufficient, insights from each may 
be needed to really understand the dynamics of integration. This dissertation tries to 
establish whether the idea that these two explanations need to be combined is worth 
considering at all. This hypothesis is tested in relation to European merger policy.
The EEC Merger Regulation represents the single most important extension 
of Community competition law since its inception. Merger control was explicitly 
contemplated in the 1951 Treaty of Paris but the EEC was created in 1957 without 
any reference to these policy arrangements. For the first time in 1973, the 
Commission submitted to the Council a proposal for an EEC merger regulation. Yet 
it was only after five amendments and sixteen years that, in 1989, a merger control 
regulation was agreed upon. Why was an agreement on European merger regulation 
possible in 1989 and not before? This research addresses this question using both 
neo-fimctionalism and realism as explanatory theories.
This work is presented in two parts. The first part is composed of three 
chapters throughout which European integration theory is reviewed, a tentative 
hypothesis shaped, the selection of case study justified and a methodology proposed. 
In the second part, another set of three chapters cover the description, analysis and 
interpretation of the results obtained from the operationalisation of the theoretical 
hypothesis in relation to the case study. Finally, the dissertation concludes with a
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discussion about possible extrapolations and areas of future research.
It should be noted at this point that the terms EC and EEC will be used in 
preference to EU in this work because both the period under study and the agreement 
on the transfer of the policy examined here predate the creation of the EU. For the 
same reason, the Treaty of Rome numbering is employed in the text. However, 
where the Treaty of Maastricht has modified, removed or renumbered a Treaty 
provision mentioned in this research, the changes are indicated in the footnotes. As 
to the alterations the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam will bring about when ratified, they 
are displayed in an appendix.
PART I. THEORY, IMPORTANCE AND METHODOLOGY
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CHAPTER 1. EUROPEAN INTEGRATION THEORIES: 
SHAPING AN HYPOTHESIS
Political scientists have been searching for a comprehensive theoretical 
framework to explain the dynamics of European integration ever since the European 
Communities came into being in the early 1950s. Two theories, neo-functionalism 
and realism, have been able to capture the complexity of the integration phenomenon 
to the point of becoming, in Kuhn’s terms, ’paradigms’ for this area of political 
science and hence ’the pivot on which the academic debate hinges’ (Corbey, 1995: 
253). Both theories have always been considered as competing perspectives to 
European integration. What is proposed here is to contemplate the possibility that 
they may actually be complementary approaches to integration. This chapter sets the 
theoretical framework of this research reviewing the neo-functionalist and realist 
postulates and recent developments in the theoretical debate.
1.1. THE NEO-FUNCTIONALIST THEORY
After the Second World War, when the nation-state as a political unity was 
at a moment of weakness, different theories of integration were proposed, especially 
by American scholars. According to Milward and Sorensen (Milward et al., 1993: 
1), most of those theories were a direct response to the needs of the United States of 
America foreign policy towards Europe. In their words: ’Once the unity of Western 
Europe became a goal of US foreign policy, political theories which predicted the 
likelihood of that goal being achieved proliferated.’ However, it is the opinion of 
others (e.g. Cram, 1996 or Muns, 1972) that the development of integration theories 
had to be attributed to the desire of political scientists, political leaders and 
intellectuals to create the conditions that would prevent another war, that is a 
community different from the nation-state system (Haines, 1957).
13
In any case, all scholars agree that among the post-war theories of integration, 
’the explanatory theory that dominated studies of the EC in the 1950s and early 1960s 
was neo-functionalism’ (George, 1991: 19). Indeed, whilst other approaches such as 
the federalist or the functionalist, were rapidly dismissed by the factual reality of the 
1940s and 1950s, the neo-functionalist was able to capture a universal recognition as 
the theory of European integration.
The neo-functionalist theory was largely developed by Haas (1958; 1963; 
1968) and Lindberg (1963) in the 1950s and 1960s. It was a theory of regional 
integration based upon a sympathetic revision of the functionalist’s postulates for 
global integration developed by David Mitrany. As Hix (1994: 10) writes, 
functionalism ’was the starting point of modern integration theory in general, and of 
neo-functionalism in particular.’ Although different, both theories have elements in 
common. The following table summarises both approaches.
TABLE 1.1. NEO-FUNCTIONALISM VERSUS FUNCTIONALISM
14
NEO-FUNCTIONALISM FUNCTIONALISM
- ACTORS IN THE PROCESS OF INTEGRATION
* ELITES * CITIZENS
- SOCIAL LIFE IS DOMINATED BY
* COMPETITION AMONG INTERESTS * UNDERLYING SOCIAL CONSENSUS
- INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION NEEDS
* THE EFFICIENT MANAGEMENT 
OF CONFLICT
* CONVERGENCE OF SEPARATE 
PERCEPTION OF INTERESTS
* CONSENSUS BUILDING
* PERCEPTION OF A GENERAL 
GAIN OR COMMON GOOD: 
WELFARE NEEDS.
- ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS IN THE INTEGRATION PROCESS
* THE CHANGING ATTITUDES 
OF KEY ACTORS
* THE FRAMEWORK OF EXISTING 
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES
* THE CHANGING OF POPULAR 
ATTITUDES OR BEHAVIOUR
- A CONSENSUS IS REOUIRED
* A PROCEDURAL CONSENSUS 
(groups are persuaded 
to pursue their interests 
through an agreed framework)
* A CONSENSUS ON INTERESTS
- THE END RESULT
* NEW POLITICAL COMMUNITY * UNIVERSAL SOCIO- 
PSYCHOLOGICAL COMMUNITY
Neo-functionalism and functionalism were both process theories; ’they both 
contained a sophisticated view upon the causal links which were expected to lead 
from one level of integration to another’ (Taylor, 1983: 7). However, as table 1.1 
shows, the two theoretical frameworks attached significance to quite different aspects 
of the integration process. The neo-functionalists stressed the psychology of elites, 
whereas functionalism’s emphasis was on a popular psychological community.
This is a consequence of different conceptions of society. For the neo­
functionalists it is a pluralist community, ’a system of co-existing but different 
interests’ (Taylor, 1983: 3). For the functionalists it is a ’community of beliefs,
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values, attitudes and loyalties’ (Taylor, 1983: 3). Accordingly, each theory saw the 
essence of stability in different elements. The older functionalists pointed to the 
element of agreement, consensus in society, that is, to an underlying homogeneity of 
society. The neo-functionalists, on the other hand, argued that social life was 
dominated by competition among interests. They recognised stability in the efficient 
management of conflict in a pluralist society.
In short, both theories were process theories. However, while functionalism 
was interested in changes in popular attitudes, neo-functionalism focused on changes 
in elite attitudes and expectations. As Lintner and Mazey (1991: 7) argue: ’This shift 
in emphasis marked an important theoretical development in that it introduced politics 
and political conflict as part of the integrative process.’ In the words of Cram (1996: 
45):
Haas did not share Mitrany’s vision of politically neutral actors carrying out 
technical/functional tasks unaffected by political conflict. Less idealistic, Haas’s pluralist-based 
neo-functionalism recognised the continuing importance of national political elites, and 
emphasised the key role played by interest-based politics, in driving the process o f political 
integration.
Another important similarity and at the same time difference between both 
theories, which is not reflected in the table, refers to the inevitability of the 
integration process. Indeed, as Milward (1992; 1993) points out, both saw a linear 
continuum from the functional origins of the state to the point where the continued 
pursuit of its functions would necessarily lead to integration. However, for the 
functionalists the original purpose of creating international institutions was to achieve 
integration, yet the neo-functionalists moderated this view. They confined their 
argument to the premise that once such institutions were established they would 
increasingly tend to seek integrationist solutions even if integration had not been the 
original purpose in creating them.
As to the end result of integration, for both the inevitable process of 
integration was to lead, through a cumulative dynamic, to a form of community that 
would suppose the rejection, or at least transformation, of the nation-state system. As 
Evans and Newham (1998: 358) put it: ’Both theories assume that people’s loyalties 
to their existing nation-states will be steadily eroded as they see that integration has
16
many positive benefits and that these can best be obtained and sustained, by the new 
nexus.’ However, while functionalism ’directly opposed the recreation of territorially- 
based state structures at the European level except insofar as they represented 
unrelated responses to technical self-determination’ (Cram, 1996: 43), in neo­
functionalism ’states were simply to be supplemented/replaced by new territorially- 
based organisations at the European level’ (Cram, 1996: 44). As noted in table 1.1, 
neo-functionalists believed the integration process was to bring on a new political 
community; for the functionalists it was to produce a socio-psychological community.
The neo-functionalists claimed that there was a linear continuum or progress 
leading from the nation-state system towards a terminal condition which they called 
political community. Haas (1958: 5) described political community as ’a condition in 
which specific groups and individuals show more loyalty to their central political 
institutions than to any other political authority, in a specific period of time and in 
a definable geographic space. ’ According to the author, a variety of constitutional and 
structural factors were compatible with this notion (Schmitter, 1996b; Pentland, 
1973; Haas, 1963).
This condition was, for the neo-functionalists, the one towards which the 
process of political integration was supposed to lead to. Lindberg (1963: vii) defined 
political integration as ’the process whereby a number of nation-states come to 
construct a single political community.’ Haas (1958: 16) specified it as:
...the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to 
shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose 
institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states.
The neo-functionalist way of describing the central dynamic of this process 
was through the concept of spillover. The ’logic of spillover’ was ’the motor’ of the 
integration process (Hix, 1994: 4). In Taylor’s words (1983: 8), the term spillover 
summed up the ’subtle relationship between the functional areas within which an 
agreement had been struck and the changing attitudes of actors’ that characterised the 
progress towards political community.
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The concept of spillover had two aspects. ’Functional spillover’ refers to the 
process whereby ’a given action, related to a specific goal, creates a situation in 
which the original goal can be assured only by taking further actions, which in turn 
create a further condition and a need for more action, and so forth’ (Lindberg, 1963: 
10); ’sector integration... begets its own impetus toward extension to the entire 
economy...’ (Haas, 1958: 297). This aspect of the process was based on the neo­
functionalists’ belief that because modern industrial economies were made up of 
interdependent parts, it was impossible to isolate any particular policy sector; 
integration of one sector will succeed only if other contiguous areas were also 
integrated (Lintner and Mazey, 1991; George, 1991). Quoting Lindberg and 
Scheingold (1970: 7): ’Haas reasoned that economic problems were interconnected, 
so that the solution of one by joint action would lead naturally and necessarily to joint 
action on others.’
It is interesting to note that this version of spillover draws from Mitrany’s 
doctrine of ’ramification’ whereby the successful development of collaboration in one 
technical field would encourage comparable behaviour in other technical fields 
(Cram, 1996; Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1990). However, Mitrany’s rather organic 
process focused ’on the very separate demands of different functional tasks’, whereas 
neo-functionalism focused ’on the potential linkages between sectors’ (Cram, 1996: 
47). Furthermore, alongside this technical version of spillover, neo-functionalists also 
identified ’political spillover’, a concept that cannot be found in the non-political 
approach of the functionalists.
’Political spillover’ involved the build-up of political pressures in favour of 
further integration within the states involved. Political actors would ’shift their 
attention and ultimately their loyalties’ from the national to the supranational level 
(Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970: 7). In the words of Greenwood (1997: 244):
In the first instance, business interest groups, in particular, would come to see the value of 
European integration, perhaps from tangible benefits achieved in other sectors, and exert 
demands upon member states for integration at the supranational (European) level. As 
integration initiatives arose, so pressure would build up in favour o f further integrative 
measures, and transnational groups would form to exert demands at the transnational level in 
tandem with those made at the national level, and to form a barrier against the possibility of 
any retreat in integration.
18
Once an area of the economy was integrated, the interest groups operating in that 
sector would have to exert pressure at the European level, that is, on the organisation 
charged with running their sector (George, 1991).
The concept of spillover was reinforced by the neo-functionalist assumption 
that ’integration is a two-way process in which the central institutions affect and are 
affected by the subject groups’ (Haas, 1958: xii; my emphasis). Indeed, by this 
assumption neo-functionalists recognised that supranational institutions had a crucial 
role to play in the determination of common policies. They were to be, given the 
propensity of organisations to maximise their powers, ’agents of integration’ (Haas, 
1958: 29). In the case of European integration, the neo-functionalists concentrated 
upon relationships between national political actors and the Commission. They 
believed that the European Commission was in a unique position to manipulate the 
facts of domestic pluralism and international interdependence so as to push forward 
the process of European integration even against the resistance of national 
governments (George, 1991).
Haas (1963: 11) summarised the relationship between spillover and the central 
(European) institutions in the integration process, when he stated that ’many of the 
decisions are integrative in their immediate economic consequences [functional 
spillover] as well as in the new expectations and political processes which they imply 
[political spillover]. It is this indirect result which is maximised by the mixture of 
institutions [two-way process].’ In other words, for the neo-functionalists, 
supranational institutions helped to maximise the spillover effects.
As to the role of the member states’ governments in the process, Lindberg 
(1963: 11) stated: ’Spillover assumes the continued commitment of the Member 
States to the undertaking.’ Member states must possess ’the will to proceed’ if 
integration is to continue. Nevertheless, Lindberg (1963: 11) further wrote that: ’It 
seems likely, however, that with the operation of the other integrative factors, the 
alternatives open to any Member State will gradually be limited so as to reduce 
dependence upon this factor. ’ Member states or governments were expected to have 
a somewhat passive role in the integration process (Corbey, 1995). As Hoffmann
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(1968: 199) put it:
According to [the logic of integration], the double pressure of necessity (the interdependence 
of the social fabric, which will oblige statesmen to integrate even sectors originally left 
uncoordinated) and of men (the action of the supranational agents) will gradually restrict the 
freedom of movement of the national governments by turning the national situations into one 
of total enmeshing. In such a milieu, nationalism will be a futile exercise of anachronism, and 
the national consciousness itself will, so to speak, be impregnated by an awareness of the 
higher interest in union.
On the whole, the theory had a strong predictive element: it not only promised 
an uncomplicated future for European integration but also gave precise policy 
prescriptions of how to bring about integration. Indeed, as may be inferred from what 
precedes, the neo-functionalist theory argued that integration was a cumulative and 
expansive two-way process or continuum represented by the ideas of functional 
spillover, political spillover as well as the Commission leadership, and leading from 
the nation-state system towards a new form of political community. This strong 
element of prediction and the fact that it was able to explain what was actually 
happening in Western Europe in the 1950s and early 1960s, made the theory very 
attractive not only to academics but also to European policy-makers.
Indeed, the 1950s’ and early 1960s’ factual reality seemed to match with the 
neo-functionalist’s postulates developed by Haas and Lindberg. Haas (1958) had built 
up his theory upon the observed experience of the functioning of the ECSC and the 
integrative attempts that followed; and Lindberg’s (1963) later analysis of the 
workings of the EEC appeared to confirm the validity of the neo-functionalist 
approach.
The EEC (and Euratom) appeared to have been the result of the ECSC success 
(a spillover example); and to have granted the supranational European institutions, 
especially the Commission, the potential to develop as political actors influencing the 
mode of accommodation of decision-making. Actually, as George (1991) points out, 
during the early years of the EEC, the supranational elements contained in its 
institutional structure gave the impression of being increasingly dominant in policy­
making, as national governments followed a strong lead provided by the Hallstein 
Commission and surrendered their control over tariffs on industrial goods and over 
agricultural policy. Last but not least, the validity of the neo-functionalist theory
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seemed to be reinforced by the constitution of several interest groups at the European 
level. According to Mazey and Richardson (1993: 5): ’By 1970 more than 300 Euro- 
groups existed...’
However, in the mid-1960s and 1970s, the theory came increasingly into 
conflict with observed developments. In January 1966, the Luxembourg Accords, 
which brought to an end the crisis in the Communities caused by the French 
withdrawal from participation in the major committees of the Communities in June 
1965 (’empty chair’ policy), confirmed that there would be no movement to majority 
voting in the Council of Ministers, as had been stipulated in the Treaty of Rome. 
This decision had the effect of hastening the development of intergovernmentalism 
in the Communities. In the words of Taylor (1983: 20): ’It meant that the style of 
decision-making came to focus upon building a consensus among governments rather 
than upon building an adequate majority in the Council.’ Or as Wallace (1996: 46) 
states: ’[this decision] began to undermine neofunctionalism and to make 
intergovernmentalism a more common descriptor of the Community’s institutions.’
To make matters worse for the neo-functionalists, three institutional 
innovations in the late 1960s further reduced the Commission’s room for manoeuvre. 
First, the member states developed the Committee of Permanent Representatives. 
Secondly, they created the management committee procedure. Lastly, in 1974, the 
European Council was established. All those institutional innovations were on the 
Council side of the Commission-Council axis, and tipped the balanced further in that 
direction (George, 1991).
There is, therefore, evidence to show that neo-functionalists’ emphasis on the 
role of the Commission in the integration process, did not coincide with the reality 
of the late 1960s and of the 1970s. Yet, this was not the only neo-functionalist 
parameter to be discredited by the reality of that period. The same can be said about 
the interest groups that were formed at European level and about the neo-functionalist 
belief in a linear process of integration.
Neo-functionalists expected European interest groups to develop ’a distinct
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vested interest in increasing their attributes vis-a-vis the national constituted groups’ 
as well as ’participation in them to represent a fundamental restructuring of 
expectations and tactics’ (Lindberg, 1963: 99). In other words, they expected that 
there would be a steady consolidation of European interest groups at the European 
level and a decline in the position of national ones. The reality, however, was that 
’much EC lobbying by national organizations or firms was conducted through 
national political and administrative structures’ (Mazey and Richardson, 1993: 5);
...the Euro-groups were a forum for exchanging information and helped national groups to 
define the positions which they would follow in relation with their own governments in 
national capitals or with their governments’ representatives in Brussels (Taylor, 1983: 42).
Furthermore, neo-functionalists also believed the process of integration to be 
a linear continuum leading from the nation-state system towards a new political 
community. Nevertheless, after the 1966 Luxembourg Accords, European integration 
was stopped in its tracks. Neo-functionalists’ expectations of spillover did not take 
place, ’nothing like an incremental and self-sustaining momentum towards further 
integration could be claimed’ (Greenwood, 1997: 246). All attempts to increase the 
scope and pace of European integration (e.g., Hague summit of 1969, the 1970 
Werner Report on European Monetary Union, and the 1975 Tindemans Report on 
European Union) were halted by decision-making grid-locks and a dysfunctional 
institutional structure. Exceptions to this rule, though, were the rulings of the 
European Court of Justice, yet their impact on European integration received little 
attention from neo-functionalist writers (Leonardi, 1995; Weiler, 1993 and 1991; 
Stein, 1981).
As may be inferred from what precedes, the basic neo-functionalist theory 
components -the role of leadership of the Commission, the shift of loyalties and 
expectations of national groups upon the European institutions and the linear 
character of integration, were refuted by the 1960s and 1970s developments. Why 
did the theory fail to pass the test of history?
The main reason depends upon the neo-functionalist underestimation of the 
role of the state and in particular of its ability ’to stop or to slow down the building 
of a central political system’ (Hoffmann as quoted in Pinder, 1986: 43). Neo­
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functionalism predicted a gradual and inexorable erosion of the powers of the nation­
state in favour of a new political community leading to the replacement of the former 
by the latter. The reality of this first period of integration was, however, a 
continuous increase of the role of the nation-state. Neo-functionalists were predicting 
the replacement of the nation-state at the exact time when European states were 
embarking on unprecedent programmes of intervention, achieving a degree of power 
stronger than in any previous period. As a consequence, they could not forecast the 
reinforcement of intergovernmentalism in EC decision-making, or the strength of 
interest groups’ national loyalties.
This lack of correspondence between the neo-functionalist perspective and the 
reality of the period analysed led to reassessments of the approach by the neo- 
functionalists themselves, and eventually to their abandonment of the theory. In the 
1970s, several publications by the main exponents of the approach reflected their 
internal debate. Namely, Haas’ work The Obsolescence of Regional Integration 
Theory (1975) and Lindberg’s and Scheingold’s Europe's would-be polity: patterns 
of change in the European Community (1970). Lindberg (1994: 82) has recently 
summarised the conclusions of this internal debate:
We were incorporating elements of intergovernmentalism; we were rejecting the automaticity 
of integration in the early theories; we were talking about the symbiosis of supranationalism 
and intergovernmentalism. We had abandoned the idea of linear progression and indeed I had 
projected an extended period of stasis: a plateau o f equilibrium.
In short, they were trying to incorporate the nation-state into their theoretical 
framework recognising that integration was not a linear continuum but maintaining 
the idea that spillover could occur and that supranational institutions played an active 
role in the process of integration.
This line of reassessment has been retaken by scholars in the late 1980s and 
1990s when some of those reverses for supranationalism had themselves been up­
ended.
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1.2. THE REALIST THEORY
The factual reality of the 1960s and 1970s and the problems of the neo­
functionalist theory to explain it, led to the application of realist perspectives to the 
European case. The ’logic of diversity’ seemed stronger than the ’logic of integration’ 
(Hoffmann, 1968: 199).
The realist approach to European integration is an umbrella term grouping 
together related interpretations of EC politics and policy-making (Hix, 1994). Realist 
theories may be broadly defined as those theories which stress relative power (i.e. 
resources, capability for unitary action) and national interests and for which the 
principal actors at the international level are the nation-states, while all the other 
realities are subordinated to them (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1990). In these 
theoretical frameworks, the Community is a gathering of sovereign states, ’an 
international rather than a supranational organization’ (Cameron, 1992: 28). The EC 
is just seen as an instrument of the nation-states, created to assist their regeneration 
and adaptation to the demands of the modern world. Under this view, the EC would 
be ’a forum for facilitating agreements in areas where the interests of autonomous 
states overlap’ (Sandholtz, 1996: 405); ’a passive structure providing a contractual 
environment conducive to efficient intergovernmental bargaining’ (Moravcsik, 1993: 
508).
Among the theories that can be included in this wide-ranging definition, it is 
worth mentioning two recent approaches, one with a historical tendency and the other 
with a political perspective, held respectively by Milward and Sorensen (1993) and 
by Moravcsik (1993).
The theory proposed by Milward and Sorensen argues that ’nation-states 
since the late 19th century have been increasingly held together not by traditional 
symbols of allegiance nor by repressive force but by national policies designed to 
secure material benefits for large social groups’ (Milward e ta l.y 1993: 182). In other 
words, since the late 19th century, nation-state claims to legitimacy have only been 
sustained when they have been able to respond to a greater range of demands from
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their citizens.
These scholars hypothesise that some of the policies selected by Western 
European nation-states in the immediate post-war period, to reassert themselves as 
the fundamental organisational unit of political life, could only be successfully 
advanced through the international framework. Consequently, they argue that:
Integration, the surrender of some limited measure of national sovereignty, is a new form of 
agreed international framework created by the nation-states to advance particular sets of 
national domestic policies which could not be pursued, or not be pursued so successfully, 
through the already existing international framework of co-operation between interdependent 
states, nor by renouncing international interdependence (Milward et al., 1993: 182).
In their view, therefore, historical evidence suggests that the selection between 
interdependence and integration as international frameworks for developing national 
policy choices depends on the nature of these national policies. They conclude that 
integration will be preferred over interdependence when ’similar and reconciliable 
sets of policy choices will be made in sets of nation-states’ (Milward et al., 1993: 
19).
Moravcsik’s Liberal Intergovemmentalist approach builds on 
’intergovernmental institutionalism’. In the opinion of Moravcsik, his approach 
refines former theories of interstate bargaining and institutional compliance, and adds 
an explicit theory of national preference formation grounded in liberal theories of 
international interdependence; hence integrating within a single framework two types 
of general international theory often seen as contradictory. In short, liberal 
intergovernmental ism is grounded in fundamental concepts of international political 
economy, negotiation analysis, and regime theory, having at its core three elements: 
the assumption of rational state behaviour, a liberal theory of national preference 
formation and an intergovernmental analysis of interstate negotiation.
Moravcsik (1993: 474) claims that ’the EC can be analysed as a successful 
intergovernmental regime designed to manage economic interdependence through 
negotiated policy co-ordination.’ Namely,
The liberal intergovemmentalist view seeks to account for major decisions in the history of 
the EC by positing a two-stage approach. In the first stage, national preferences are primarely
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determined by the constraints and opportunities imposed by economic interdependence. In the 
second stage, the outcomes of intergovernmental negotiations are determined by the relative 
bargaining power of governments and the functional incentives for institutionalization created 
by high transaction costs and the desire to control domestic agendas (Moravcsik, 1993: 517).
To sum up, it can be said that Moravcsik’s approach is based on the idea that 
refinements and extensions of existing theories of foreign economic policy, 
intergovernmental negotiation, and international regimes provide a plausible and 
generalisable explanation of the EC’s evolution. ’Although the EC is a unique 
institution, it does not require a sui generis theory’ (Moravcsik, 1993: 474), 
European integration can be explained with reference to general theories of 
international relations.
Thus, these two approaches see the EC as the solution nation-states have 
found to carry on their national policies in a context of economic interdependence. 
European integration does not represent the end of the nation-state but helps the state 
survive. According to both, nation-states still are the exclusive actors both at the 
national and international level and integration will be determined, through bargaining 
in the European Council and the Council of Ministers, by their relative power and 
interests. Only in cases where policy preferences of the dominant, most powerful, 
states have converged will new steps towards integration be taken.
Proponents of realism consider this convergence of preferences may be the 
result of economic upswings or of the internationalisation of the economy (Corbey, 
1995). But the role of supranational institutions and functional spillover as possible 
sources of convergence is dismissed (Sandholtz, 1996; Corbey, 1995). Also, though 
interest groups contribute to domestic preference formation among member states, 
the role of transnational-level aggregations of interests is under-emphasized 
(Greenwood, 1997). For the realists, the domestic and EU arenas ’are nested rather 
than interconnected’ (Marks et al., 1996: 345), governments are ’the sole mediators 
between non-state actors and EC policymaking’ (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 1998: 
18).
Just as neo-functionalism neglected the importance of the nation-state role, 
realist theories disregard the role the experience of integration and the presence of
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European institutions can have oil the integration process. In the words of Greenwood 
(1997: 253), realist accounts fail ’to adequately conceive of the autonomy of 
supranational institutions and the importance of their relationships with non-state 
actors for the development of integration. ’
1.3. SHAPING A NEW HYPOTHESIS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
The dramatic transformation of the political and economic climate in Western 
Europe during the 1980s led to a revival of theoretical debate on the ’whys’ and 
’hows’ of European integration. Neo-functionalists and realists authors (such as 
Taylor, 1991; Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 1991; Moravcsik, 1991; Sandhotlzand Zysman, 
1993; Milward et al., 1993) saw the integration dynamics as providing evidence of 
the validity of their own approach whilst revealing the challenging limits of the other 
(Cram, 1996; George, 1996).
Perhaps these scholars were both right and wrong. Right in finding evidence 
of neo-functionalism or realism, wrong in seeking to offer monocausal explanations. 
In fact, the idea that both theories have something to offer to the understanding of 
European integration has been taking force in the 1990s. The theoretical debate has 
experienced an evolution. From neo-functionalism versus realism, the debate has 
moved to state-centric versus multi-level government models (Sandholtz and Stone 
Sweet, 1998; Armstrong and Bulmer, 1998; Greenwood, 1997; Marks et al., 1996a; 
Marks et al. , 1996b; George, 1996; Sandholtz, 1996; Moravcsik, 1993).1
1 It is worth noting that some of these new models do not try to analyse, as this research does, the 
dynamics of integration but the governance of the EU. There is growing literature examining the function 
of the EU as a polity:
Increasingly scholars assume that some institutional structure is in place and examine what goes on inside these 
structures. Politics and policy-making within institutions have assumed an analytic place alongside the politics of 
institutional change. (Caporaso and Keeler as quoted in Cram, 1996: 53)
When analysing the governance of the EU, scholars tend to draw on comparative politics approaches rather 
than on international relations theories such as the neo-functionalist or realist perspectives used in this 
research. In fact, the claim has been made that while ’the international relations approaches may be 
appropriate for the study of European integration ..., comparative politics approaches are more appropriate 
for the analysis of European Community politics' (Hix, 1994: 22-23; his emphasis).
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’Multi-level government models posit that power has moved away from 
national executives and away from the Council as a plethora of actors mobilize and 
exert influence at various points in the decision-making process’ (Golub, 1996: 330). 
In these models ’the state no longer monopolizes European level policy-making or 
the aggregation of domestic interests’ but supranational institutions and subnational 
actors have a role (Marks et al., 1996: 346). These are post-neo-functionalist 
approaches or, as Pollack (1996) called them, ’theoretical cousins’ of neo­
functionalism.
’State-centric models posit that the Council has retained a monopoly on real 
power and that other EC institutions play either a limited or subservient role in the 
policy-making process’ (Golub, 1996: 330). Yet, although realist, ’the state-centric 
model does not maintain that policy-making is determined by state executives in 
every detail, only that the overall direction of policy-making is consistent with state 
control’ (Marks et al., 1996: 345).
This shift towards multi-level government versus state-centric models is 
significant. It can be seen as a convergence movement between the old approaches. 
Both types of models seem to recognise that the failure of integration theories may 
be attributed to one-sided attention to a single actor or group of actors. Indeed, post- 
neo-fimctionalist models do ’not reject the view that state executives and state arenas 
are important’ (Marks et al., 1996: 346); ’intergovernmental bargaining is an 
ubiquitous feature of supranational governance’ (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 1998: 
25). Also, state-centric models have incorporated societal influence into national 
preferences (Caporaso, 1998); some realists have even acknowledged the growing 
power of supranational European institutions (Pierson, 1998). Can this convergence 
be pushed to its logical conclusion? Can neo-functionalism and realism be understood 
as complementary instead of competing approaches to European integration?
Both realists and neo-functionalists accept economic interdependence is at the 
origin of integration. For the neo-functionalists, on the bases of a first 
intergovernmental grand bargain, economic interdependence feeds the internal 
dynamics of the process of integration creating functional and political spillovers
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which are maximised by the supranational institutions. For the realists, integration 
is a possible policy response by nation-states to rising economic interdependence. 
Integration will serve the interests of member states, especially the most powerful 
ones, and will be controlled by them.
For integration to occur, therefore, the realists consider that such a solution 
should be in the national interest of the most powerful nation-states. They generally 
take the preferences of member states’ governments as given and concentrate their 
analysis on how national executives seek to pursue those preferences. Behind this 
apparent openness, however, they stress the preoccupation of national governments 
with preserving sovereignty and their belief that previous integration does not 
determine national governments’ preferences. On the other hand, neo-functionalists 
claim that the integration process provides for an internal dynamic based on spillover 
and supranational institution’s autonomy. Agreement on an area will spill over on to 
other areas. According to them, member states’ governments will be dragged along 
by the dynamics of the process. They will not be able to offer much resistance.
Following from this, it may be argued that each theoretical framework 
concentrates its analysis on different actors: realists on the governments of the 
member states and neo-functionalists on supranational and transnational actors. If all 
these actors have an autonomous role in the integration process, neither perspective 
is right. Although both approaches would contain some elements of truth, neither one 
on its own would be sufficient. Evoking the well-known story of the blind men and 
the elephant (Puchala, 1972), neo-functionalist and realist scholars would have each 
touched a different part of ’the elephant’ and concluded that ’the large animal’ had 
the appearance of the part touched. To understand the dynamics of integration, 
insights from both theories may be needed.
To see whether the hypothesis that the neo-functionalist and realist 
perspectives need to be combined to offer a more complete picture of the dynamics 
of European integration holds, I propose to go back to the basics. Namely, I intend 
to apply the two ’old’ paradigms fundamental postulates to a case study. The aim will 
be to see which role was played by supranational institutions, functional spillover,
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interest groups and member states’ governments in a specific integration process and 
what were the relationships, if any, between these factors. On the basis of the results 
obtained, the theoretical implications will be discussed.
CONCLUSIONS
The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the understanding of European 
integration by testing a new hypothesis. This new hypothesis considers that in order 
to understand the forces leading towards integration it is necessary to combine neo­
functionalist and realist insights. It is based on the belief that both traditional 
approaches contain some elements of truth but that neither of them on its own 
provides a sufficient explanation of European integration dynamics.
As applying this hypothesis to all European policies is too broad a task, I will 
focus my analysis on one specific area: EEC merger policy. The empirical materials 
gathered will be used as a ’plausability probe’, that is, to establish whether the 
theoretical construct proposed is worth considering at all (Eckstein’s terminology as 
quoted in Sandholtz, 1996: 405). Therefore, although I will only probe the validity 
of the complementarity hypothesis in relation to one case study, I hope it will be a 
step towards the consolidation of a new way of understanding and explaining the 
dynamics of European integration. Indeed, whatever the findings, I believe this effort 
will help inform, by introducing new facts and ideas, the actual search for a 
comprehensive theoretical framework. Nobody, as yet, has tried to apply any of these 
two theories to this particular case study.
Why have I chosen merger policy as my area of study? To answer this 
question it is necessary to explain what is merger policy, which is its role and to 
place this policy within the broader context of competition policy. This will be dealt 
with in the second chapter.
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CHAPTER 2. THE CASE STUDY: NATURE AND 
IMPORTANCE OF MERGER POLICY
EEC merger policy has been chosen as case study to test both the neo­
functionalist and realist approaches to European integration. The purpose of this 
second chapter is to justify this selection. To this end, I have divided the chapter into 
three main sections. The first will be devoted to defining the nature of mergers. The 
second section will look into the nature of merger policy. Lastly, the third section 
will assess the importance of EEC merger policy for European integration. It will be 
shown that the significance of merger policy in EC development makes it a good case 
for examining the explanatory power of European integration theory.
2.1. THE NATURE OF MERGERS
A merger can be defined as a process of integration between two (or more) 
firms -a union of two (or more) formerly independent enterprises. In other words, 
a merger is like a ’marriage’ between companies through which two (or more) 
formerly independent firms come under common control (Ballann et al., 1994; Hay 
and Morris, 1991; Scherer and Ross, 1990; Weinberg and Blank, 1979; Steiner, 
1975; CEC, 1966a). However, it is common practice to use the word ’merger’ to 
also include both take-overs and certain joint ventures.
Regarding the inclusion of take-overs, a distinction can be made between 
’merger’ and ’take-over’, where ’merger’ is used to describe the process of voluntary 
fusion between two (or more) companies, and ’take-over’ means the acquisition of 
control through share purchase without the agreement of the directors of a company 
(Shepherd, 1990; OECD, 1974). However, it is generally agreed (see CEC, 1994c; 
Ballann et al. , 1994; Chiplin and Wright, 1987; Weinberg and Blank, 1979) that a
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clear distinction between a merger and a take-over is in practice impossible to 
establish because many borderline cases exist, for which, even ex post, it is not clear 
if a deal was a simple take-over or a true merger. It has been further argued that, 
from an economic point of view, the difference is of no importance as both types of 
deals have the same structural effects.
Concerning the inclusion of joint ventures, these operations are ’a strategic 
alternative to acquisition’, ’a form of alliance between two (or more) firms for the 
purpose of entering a new market or a new business’ (Pocket Strategy, 1994: 32 and 
114). In other words, the term ’joint venture’ refers to a variety of forms of interfirm 
relationships that, unlike a total merger, involve only a partial and often temporary 
integration of the parent companies’ functions, leaving them free to continue as 
separate operational units. By and large, however, certain joint ventures are subject 
to merger legislation. (Jones and Gonzalez-Diaz, 1992; Brittan, 1991; Rosenthal, 
1990; Shepherd, 1990; OECD, 1986a)
For the purpose of this study and in line with common practice, the term 
’merger’ will be used to describe both mergers and take-overs. In addition, this term 
will be applied to those joint ventures that are subject to the same legislation. In 
short, from now on, I will refer to mergers in a broad sense, embracing the wide 
variety of legal arrangements within and throughout the EC that are covered by 
merger control legislation, i.e. all external growth operations.
Two broad motives can be distinguished to explain why a company should 
wish to merge with, or to acquire control of another company. There can be profit 
motives2: a merger may serve the firm’s objective to gain profits. Certainly, the firm 
that ensues from a merger may have more market power and, thus, can achieve 
higher profitability. A merger can also combine under-used resources in one company 
with complementary under-used resources in another, meeting the so-called ’2 + 2 = 5 ’ 
synergy criteria, i.e. the combined enterprise will produce greater or more certain 
earnings than the sum of earnings of the two companies. Two firms operating under
2 Traditional neo-classical profit maximising perspective or value-maximising approach.
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capacity, for example, can share fixed costs and benefit from economies of scale. In 
addition, mergers may result in several kinds of pecuniary economies, i.e. economies 
that provide money benefits without improving the use of real resources. For 
instance, tax laws and accounting rules may raise the profitability of mergers.
But mergers not always flow from a rational assessment of the economic 
interest of the companies. They may be the product of managerial motives3, that is, 
of the ’acquisitive ego’ of the management (as opposed to owners) of one or both the 
companies. For example, managers may decide to increase the sheer size of their 
firm through a merger in order to add to their sense of status and affluence, rather 
than to achieve more profits. Managers may also choose to acquire or merge with 
another company as it is much more exhilarating than organic growth, rather than to 
maximise returns. (The Economist, 9 Jan 1999; The Economist, 12 Aug 1995; 
Ballann et al., 1994; Bishop and Kay, 1993; Hay and Morris, 1991; Fernandez 
Sanchez, 1991; Sherer and Ross, 1990; Shepherd, 1990; Rosenthal, 1990; Chiplin 
and Wright, 1987; Williamson, 1987; Weinberg and Blank, 1979; Steiner, 1975; 
Scherer, 1974; Manne, 1965)
Whatever their motives, mergers may be generally classified as horizontal, 
vertical or conglomerate, although any particular merger may not be capable of strict 
categorisation. A horizontal merger is a marriage of rivals. It involves the joining 
together of two companies which are producing essentially the same products or 
services, or products or services which, before the merger, used to compete directly 
with one another. A vertical merger occurs where one of the two firms’ involved is 
an actual or potential supplier of goods and services to the other, so that the two 
companies are both engaged in the manufacture or provision of the same goods or 
services but at different stages in the chain of production. Lastly, a conglomerate 
merger is one that brings together firms which do not produce similar products and 
where neither is an actual or potential supplier of the other, i.e. the businesses of the 
two companies are not related to each other either horizontally or vertically. In this 
case, a diversification of product lines occurs. (Whish, 1993; Rosenthal, 1990;
3 This relates to alternative theories of the firm that see the divorce between ownership and control 
as enabling the management to pursue their own personal objectives.
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Shepherd, 1990; Asch, 1983; Weinberg and Blank, 1979; OECD; 1974)
All these transformations, through which two (or more) formerly independent 
firms come under common control, not only change the structure of the companies 
involved but also the market in which they operate. Mergers are particularly 
important market structure-shaping forces (Ballann et al. , 1994; Scherer and Ross, 
1990). Indeed, the structure of a market is defined by its degree of concentration, i.e. 
the extent to which the largest firms dominate an industry, a large sector or the whole 
of the economy (Hay and Morris, 1991; Admiraal, 1990; Shepherd, 1990; De Jong, 
1988; OECD, 1979; OECD, 1974). Mergers have the capacity to alter the ways 
markets are organised, in that they increase industrial concentration by amassing 
resources, assets and economic power in fewer hands. This is why in EC legal terms, 
the word ’concentration’ covers all arrangements whereby one undertaking (i.e. 
almost any independent entity engaged in activities of an economic or commercial 
nature) obtains control of another, including certain joint ventures (Brittan, 1991).
At any point in time, firms will be pursuing one or more (profit or 
managerial) objectives in the face of several constraints such as a given market 
structure and with it the shape and position of the demand curve or a set of cost 
conditions. Active behaviour involves the attempt over time to modify or remove 
constraints, thus permitting greater achievement of firm objectives. Merger’s capacity 
to alter the structure of the market make them a form of active behaviour which can 
be undertaken in order to relax constraints (Hay and Morris, 1991). As Woolcock 
(1989: 1) states: ’Mergers are one of the instruments used by business to adapt 
rapidly to the changing competitive conditions.’ In fact, mergers usually form part 
of the industry rationalisation processes (George and Jacquemin, 1992; Chiplin and 
Wright, 1987). They are one determinant of the changing industrial structure over 
time.
Merger activity in general tends to occur cyclically, that is in merger waves. 
However, this is not a continuous movement, but rather an irregular one (Ballann et 
al., 1994). In the last half-century, three merger waves can be distinguished in 
Western Europe, the last of which is still ocurring.
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The first European wave of mergers took place between 1958 and 1973, when 
trade barriers were lowered significantly following the establishment of the EEC. 
Indeed, although in Europe, the decade from 1958 to 1968 was dominated by United 
States-based corporations’ direct investment, from the mid-1960s onwards European 
companies took the lead. Quoting the European Commission’s Second Annual Report 
on Competition Policy (1973a: 10-11):
Available information shows that the general movement towards industrial combination is 
gathering strength in the Common Market. International concentration operations in the 
Common Market, which showed a marked increase from 1966 to 1970, were even more 
numerous in 1971. While participation of the undertakings of non-member countries in 
international operations remained substantial, it declined as a ratio of the number of 
concentration operations involving only Common Market undertakings.
However, it is necessary to specify that most of that period’s restructuring and 
mergers were confined within national boundaries. This was, as Tsoukalis (1993: 
102) points out, the period that saw ’the emergence of national champions.’ In 
addition, this first European wave was characterised by both vertical and 
conglomerate mergers, though a few horizontal mergers did occur. In those years, 
therefore, firms largely merged to pursue product diversification within a limited 
geographical area. (Micossi, 1996; Ortega, 1996; CEC, 1994b; CEC, 1994c; Ballann 
etal., 1994; Sachwald, 1994; Jacquemin, 1993; Bishop and Kay, 1993; Staple, 1992; 
Tempini, 1991; Bernini, 1991; Jacquemin, 1990; Monopolkommission, 1989; De 
Jong, 1988; CEC, 1976; CEC, 1975; Mazzolini, 1975; Walsh and Paxton, 1975; 
CEC, 1974a; Scherer, 1974; CEC, 1973a; CEC, 1973e; Financial Times, 23 Jul 
1973; Financial Times, 21 Jul 1973; CEC, 1972a; Cunning, 1972; OJ [1971] C 
66/11; Rolfe, 1970; Stacey, 1970)
The second European wave of mergers took place between 1986 and 1992, 
when the single market programme was launched, and benefited from the higher 
capital mobility of the 1980s. This merger wave has been described with adjectives 
such as ’impressive’ (Jacquemin, 1993: 93) or ’by any historical standard... 
enormous’ (Bishop and Kay, 1993: 319). According to Commission data, published 
in its Annual Reports on Competition Policy and based on operations of the EC’s top 
1 000 firms, the total number of mergers rose from 303 in 1986-87 to 622 in 1989-90
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and only began to decline after 1990.4
In contrast to the situation in 1987-88 and earlier, when national merger 
operations were nearly twice as frequent as international ones, in 1989-90 the greatest 
percentage rise was in relation to cross-border mergers among Community based 
companies, though international operations involving at least one non-EC undertaking 
were also a driving force of the wave. In other words, while, on the whole, the lion’s 
share of merger activity in the late 1980s remained at national level, the ratio of 
cross-national mergers, particularly among EC companies, was substantially 
increased. Moreover, this wave was mainly horizontal, with firms looking to 
reinforce their specialisations and market position in the activities in which they 
performed best. Converse to the 1960s and early 1970s, the late 1980s wave of 
mergers was characterised by firms wanting to strengthen their positions in clearly 
defined core businesses and increase their geographical diversification. (Armstrong 
and Bulmer, 1998; Micossi, 1996; Barnes and Barnes, 1995; Ballann et al., 1994; 
CEC, 1994b; CEC, 1994c; Sachwald, 1994; Tsoukalis, 1993; Bishop and Kay, 1993; 
Jacquemin, 1993; Jacquemin and Wright, 1993; CEC, 1993b; Hodges et al., 1992; 
Staple, 1992; OECD, 1992; Downes and Ellison, 1991; Jacobs and Stewart-Clark, 
1990; Jacquemin, 1990; Montagnon, 1990; Jacobs and Steward-Clark, 1990; CEC, 
1990a; CEC; 1989a; Woolcock, 1989; CEC, 1988a; Woolcock, 1989)
Lastly, it may be argued that Europe is witnessing a third wave of mergers, 
which is primarily a cross-national wave. Though the number of national operations 
remains very high, the most dynamic component of this wave are cross-border 
mergers (CEC, 1998; CEC, 1997b; CEC, 1996b; CEC, 1995a). The Economist of 
21 January 1995 evidences that in 1994, for the first time in three years, the number 
of cross-border deals in the EU grew: ’So buoyant has been the recent recovery in 
cross-border acquisitions in Europe, that 1994 had a whiff of the late 1980s about it. 
What is more, the frenzy seems to be a symptom of more than just the cyclical 
economic recovery.’ In fact, Mr. Van Miert, Commissioner responsible for 
competition policy since 1993, let it be known that by the end of 1994, the number
4 These numbers include both pure mergers and take-overs but not joint ventures, which also 
experienced a similar trend.
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of mergers with a Community dimension had practically doubled in that single year: 
’The number of Community-scale mergers has risen sharply, with 66 notifications 
between 1 January and 31 August, as against 39 for the same period in 1993. Should 
this trend continue, some 100 mergers could be notified in 1994 (from an average of 
50 in preceding years)’ (Agence Europe, 13 Sep 1994).5
Since 1994, a growing number of mergers with a Community dimension have 
been notified each year to the Commission; namely, 110 in 1995, 131 in 1996, 172 
in 1997 and 235 in 1998. These statistics show restructuring and mergers on the rise 
again in Europe. Indeed, the scope of Community control being limited to very large 
operations, these figures represent only a small proportion of the total number of 
mergers which take place in the Community. In any case, mergers, and in particular 
cross-border ones, seem to be taking place in areas where privatisation, the evolution 
of the Single Market and the arrival of the Single Currency are exposing firms to 
(prospects of) more competition; examples include the airlines, telecommunications, 
energy, pharmaceuticals and financial services. As in the late 1980s, they tend to be 
both horizontal and swept along by high stockmarket valuations. (The Economist, 9 
Jan 1999; CEC, 1998; CEC, 1997b; CEC, 1997a; The Economist, 18 Oct 1997; The 
Economist, 28 Sep 1996; CEC, 1996b; CEC, 1996c; CEC, 1995a)
The reasons why these waves have occurred are not clear. Although there 
have been speculations, no study has yet been able to explain why mergers do come 
about in waves {The Economist, 16 Sep 1994). However, there is general consensus 
that both the lowering of trade barriers and the economic boom which accompanied 
it, have played an important role in inducing a restructuring of many markets by 
means of mergers in the three cases {The Economist, 21 Jan 1995; Barnes and 
Barnes, 1995; CEC, 1994b and 1994c, Ballann etal., 1994; Tsoukalis, 1993; Bishop
5 Under the 1989 EEC Merger Regulation (OJ [1989] L 395/1; corrigendum in OJ [1990] L 257), 
and until March 1998, when a reassessed EEC merger regulation entered into force (OJ [1997] L 180/1; 
corrigendum in OJ [1998] L 40/17), mergers had a Community dimension when the combined world-wide 
turnover of the parties exceeded 5 billion ECU; at least two of the parties had a Community-wide turnover 
of 250 million ECU or more; and each of the parties did not achieve more than two-thirds of its aggregate 
Community-wide turnover within one and the same member state. In short, the vast majority of cases with 
a Community dimension were cross-border deals and just a minority were large national operations with 
a clear impact in other Community markets.
and Kay, 1993; Staple, 1992; Jacobs and Steward-Clark, 1990). It is worth noting, 
that like the number of cases taking place across national frontiers between 
Community-based companies, the importance of mergers, in terms of the assets or 
employment involved, has tended to increase (CEC, 1997b; CEC, 1996b; CEC, 
1995a; Barnes and Barnes, 1995; Monopolkommission, 1989; Cooke, 1988; 
Jacquemin, 1982). In other words, it seems that European firms have been changing 
their reference market from ’national’ to ’European’ and that, as De Jong (1988: 1) 
affirms, ’merger intensity rises with size-class firms.’
To summarise (see table 2.1), mergers are processes of integration between 
two (or more) firms that can take different forms and are the result of either 
economic based rationale or management ambitions. They usually come in waves and 
have the effect of changing the structure of the market by increasing its degree of 
concentration. Consequently, and as it will be shown in the next section, merger 
activity may affect competition within the market or industry in question.
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TABLE 2.1. THE NATURE OF MERGERS
DEFINITION : A merger is as a process o f integration between two (or more) formerly 
independent firms. For the purpose of this study, the term ’merger’ will be used to describe 
mergers, take-overs and certain joint ventures, embracing the wide variety of legal 
arrangements within and throughout the EC that are covered by merger control legislation.
MOTIVES : Two broad kinds
->  Profit motives (rational economic assessment o f the firms’interest)
->  Managerial motives (management ambitions)
TYPES OF MERGER : Three main categories 
->  Horizontal mergers (between competitors)
->  Vertical mergers (between firms at different stages in the production chain) 
->  Conglomerate mergers (joining together unrelated activities)
MERGERS’ EFFECTS : Structure-shaping forces -they contribute to industrial 
concentration.
EUROPEAN MERGER WAVES : Mergers happen in waves. 
In the last half-century, three European merger waves:
- in the 1960s (primarily within national boundaries)
- in the mid-late 1980s (both across and intra-borders)
- from the mid-1990s (chiefly across-frontiers).
2.2. THE NATURE OF MERGER POLICY
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Merger policy may be defined as both a public and a competition policy that 
aims to prevent anti-competitive market structures (Scherer and Ross, 1990). In other 
words, a government’s merger policy is intended to counter the risk of domestic 
competition restrainment as a result of the modification of domestic market structures 
brought about by a merger. Indeed, like other competition policies, merger policy 
aims to adjust market processes to make producers’ performance conform more 
closely to an ideal standard -competition- so as to secure economic and social goals. 
It is based on the ’presumption that competition is a good thing, and something to be 
encouraged’ (Cini, 1993: 4).
To understand the particular motives for the existence of this public policy, 
therefore, it is necessary to first comprehend the underlying need for both 
competition and competition policy. Regarding the need for competition, a perfectly 
competitive market is considered to be an economic first best in Pareto terms. In a 
situation of perfect competition, firms have no power over market outcomes. It is a 
market condition in which a large number of independent buyers and sellers compete 
for homogeneous commodities, deal freely with each other, and retain the right of 
entry and exit from the market; so that no individual firm finds itself able to affect 
market prices by varying the quantity of output it sells (Cini and McGowan, 1998; 
McGowan, 1994; Neven et al., 1993; Scherer and Ross, 1990). As Shepherd (1990: 
16) writes: ’The essence of competition is the mutual exertion of pressure to perform 
well.’ Standard welfare analysis has proved that perfect competition is Pareto 
optimal: ’...a situation in which the well-being of one or more members of society 
can be improved only by harming the position of some other’ (Asch, 1983: 18). In 
short, the case for competition lies in the argument that competitive markets are the 
most efficient form of industrial organisation, achieving both allocative and 
productive efficiency as well as consumer and society welfare.
Yet, the assumptions on which the optimality of competition is based are not 
always fulfilled in the real world. For example, it is known that the technology of 
some industries requires relatively large plants for efficient operation, i.e. a more
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monopolistic (as opposed to competitive) market structure. Consequently, the utility 
of the perfect competition ideal has been questioned. In fact, the theory of second 
best states that if all conditions for Pareto optimality cannot be met, there may be no 
point in attempting to meet them whenever or wherever possible. Nevertheless, 
universal competition has been maintained as an ideal, though in more operational 
forms such as ’workable competition’6 or ’contestable markets’7, on the grounds that 
some departures from the perfectly competitive norm are not as harmful from a 
longer-run perspective as was supposed. Quoting Goyder (1988: 8): ’In spite of the 
imperfections of the workings of competition in real markets, the presence of 
competition is normally considered by economists to confer real advantages.’ As Cini 
and McGowan (1998: 2) state: ’The belief that economic competition is a good thing 
is something of an act of faith in countries where the economy operates on the basis 
of free market principles...[it is] arguably the most important organising principle in 
the capitalist world.’ {The Economist, 2 May 1998; McGowan, 1994; Neven et al., 
1994; Whish, 1993; Hay and Morris, 1991; Scherer and Ross, 1990; Shepherd, 
1990; Asch, 1983)
Concerning the need for competition policy in general, public control is 
considered necessary because the market fails to provide the degree of competition 
sought (e.g. ’workable competition’):
Ideally, good economic performance should flow automatically from proper market structure
6 This vaguer approach to competition, initiated by J.M. Clark in 1940, contends that both the 
competitive process and its results are important. In other words, rather than chasing perfection, the aim 
should be to seek the best competitive arrangement that is practically attainable, which is a market system 
that is workably competitive (e.g. the number of rivals in the market may be smaller than would be needed 
for perfect competition). Some observers stress workable market structures, whereas others place a higher 
priority on performance or conduct. Following Cini and McGowan (1998), Allen (1996), Whish (1993), 
Goyder (1988) and Lever and Lasok (1986), although there is little agreement about what ’workable 
competition’ implies in concrete policy terms, the EC competition authorities have invoked this idea on 
various occasions.
7 A contestable market is one where entry is completely free and exit is costless. According to the 
theory of ’contestable markets’, in such a market firms will be forced to ensure an optimal allocation of 
resources. For Gilbert (1989: 107), this theory ’asserts that potential competition is as effective as actual 
competition in controlling market performance.’ Entry from outside the market may be decisive, rendering 
irrelevant the market’s internal structure. This theory is quite recent (1980s) and has mainly been developed 
and applied in the United States.
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and the conduct to which it gives rise. But, for a variety of reasons, markets fail, yielding 
performance that falls below norms considered acceptable. Then government agencies may 
choose to intervene and attempt to improve performance by applying policy measures that 
affect either market structure or conduct. (Scherer and Ross, 1990: 7)
Competition policy, therefore, is important as a mechanism for correcting market 
distortions (from competition) and hence may contribute materially to the major goals 
of general economic policy (Cini and McGowan, 1998; Neven et al., 1994; 
McGowan in El-Agraa, 1994; Whish, 1993; Scherer and Ross, 1990; Korah, 1990; 
OECD, 1974). This policy instrument, ’designed to promote the fair play of 
competitors on product and factor markets’ (OECD, 1992b: 97), usually comprises 
two main components: one concerns the control of restrictive practices such as cartels 
and monopolies (policy measures that affect conduct), and the other deals with the 
control of mergers or concentrations (policy measures that affect market structure).
In summary, although it is accepted that perfect market competition is an 
unrealistic objective, the search for market competition is maintained as ideal. 
Accordingly, free-markets failing to provide (enough) competition, competition policy 
is deemed necessary to correct possible distortions. However, what are the specific 
motives for having merger policy? What market or competition distortions can 
mergers produce?
One important motive for merger control is economic: mergers can create 
conditions of dominance or monopoly due to their capacity to alter the structure of 
the market. As mergers contribute to augment concentration, and increased 
concentration may lead to anti-competitive market structures and thus to undesirable 
welfare consequences, some supervision of mergers may be necessary. Indeed, while 
the existence of a high degree of concentration in an industry does not necessarily 
ensure anti-competitive practices, it does bear the potential of certain types of conduct 
and performance which are not usually considered desirable. Monopolistic and 
oligopolistic practices are more likely and competitive behaviour less likely, where 
a few large firms account for the major share of an industry’s output, compared to 
a situation where even the largest firms are relatively unimportant. Through mergers, 
then, firms can reach a market position where they can avoid the pressure of 
competition. In the words of Admiraal (1990: ix), for Jacquemin ’there is an implicit
42
danger that merger activity will restrict market competition by creating dominant 
positions for the combined firms.* (Cini and McGowan, 1998; Whish, 1993; Cini, 
1993; George and Jacquemin, 1992; OECD, 1992b; Hay and Morris, 1991; OECD, 
1979; OECD, 1974)8
However, it is necessary to point out that mergers may also have positive 
effects in the economy or industry. Certainly, as noted above when discussing the 
motives for mergers, they can have a role in securing benefits of economies of scale 
and other economic efficiencies. This possible ’efficiency-increased market 
concentration’ trade-off has led some theorists, such as the ones conforming to the 
Austrian and Chicago Schools, to argue that merger control is not necessary. For 
these scholars, the key indicator of market power is not the structure of the market, 
but rather the performance of firms. Accordingly, it is not the degree of 
concentration in a market that is important but the relative efficiency of firms. 
Concentration may be ’a natural consequence of the process of competition which 
ensures that the most efficient producers survive’; mergers ’are means to adjust to 
continuous changes in global markets’ (OECD, 1992b: 100-101). {The Economist, 
2 May 1998; Sachwald, 1994; Neven et al., 1993; Hay and Morris, 1991; Scherer 
and Ross, 1990; Shepherd, 1990; George, 1989; Gilbert, 1989; Hawk, 1989; Asch, 
1983; Bailey, 1981)
Yet, the evidence of the contribution to social benefits from mergers is not 
greater and nor does the evidence of private benefits suggest that merger is in all 
cases the most efficient way of transferring resources from less to more profitable 
uses. Most empirical research shows that in fact mergers do not produce the 
advantages expected from them. Quoting The Economist of 9 January 1999: 
’Repeated analyses by business gurus, management consultants and investment 
bankers have all reached the same conclusion: in the medium term, fewer than half 
of all mergers add value.’ In the words of Scherer and Ross (1990: 174): ’Evidence
8 Although horizontal and some vertical mergers increase industrial and overall concentration, 
conglomerate mergers only increase overall concentration. To put it plainly, the effect of mergers will vary 
depending on their type: horizontal and certain vertical mergers tend to be more anti-competitive than 
conglomerate mergers.
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supporting the hypothesis that profitability and efficiency increase following mergers 
is at best weak.’ {The Economist, 28 Nov 1998; The Economist, 10 Sep 1994a; 
Ballann et al. , 1994; Whish, 1993; Kay, 1993; Hughes, 1993; OECD, 1992b; 
Admiraal, 1990; Jacquemin, 1990; Asch, 1983; Scherer, 1974)
In addition to this economic aspect, other motives for merger control may be 
socio-political. For instance, merger supervision may be needed to prevent excessive 
concentration of wealth. As Asch (1983: 1) stated: ’A free society tends to distrust 
concentrations of power, whether private or public.’ For Whish (1993: 670): 
’Mergers may be objected to on the ground that they lead to firms of such size and 
with such power as to be antithetical to a balanced distribution of wealth.’9 Mergers 
may also be objected to in some sectors of the economy such as media, oil, banking 
and defence, because these are sectors especially sensitive to concentration for 
national security concerns. However, again, there are other socio-political motives 
in favour of allowing concentration. Mergers may have effects on the balance of 
payments, on industrial policy or on employment that are considered to be in the 
public interest (Cini and McGowan, 1998; Whish, 1993; Hay and Morris, 1991; 
Asch, 1983; OECD, 1974).
The rationale for merger policy is thus complex. On the one hand, merger 
control is deemed necessary for social and political as well as economic motives. On 
the other hand, both groups of motives have been challenged on the basis that 
mergers can also be beneficial to both the economy and the public interest. Although 
economic evidence against having merger control systems has been weak and most 
developed countries have them, this debate has underlined four basic approaches to 
merger policy as described by Chiplin and Wright (1987: 78). At one extreme, ’the 
pro-merger approach’ considers mergers to be beneficial and hence governments do 
not need to control them but perhaps should encourage them by providing appropriate 
tax and other incentives as well as acting as a ’marriage broker’ on occasion. At the 
other extreme, ’the anti-merger approach’ is based on the idea that any merger 
involving companies above a certain size is detrimental to society and governments
9 This was certainly the case in the United States’ competition legislation (Cini and McGowan, 1998; 
Whish, 1993; Scherer and Ross, 1990; Shepherd, 1990).
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should ban them, unless substantial net social benefits can be demonstrated. The two 
other approaches fall between these extremes. The trade-off approach’ favours a 
neutral stance; governments are to compare, case by case, the likely gains resulting 
from a given merger against the possible losses. Lastly, ’the competitive-structure 
approach’ considers that competition has to be the only criteria when judging a 
merger case: all mergers having an adverse effect on the competitive structure should 
be prohibited irrespective of any possible efficiency or socio-political gains.10 
Although in the 1960s and 1970s ’the pro-merger approach’ was followed by most 
European countries, since then almost all EC member states have shifted towards the 
intermediate approaches, i.e. most member countries now have merger control 
systems.
In setting their merger control systems -that is, the rules of the game under 
which mergers take place- governments apply a variety of policy instruments, the 
most important of which is merger laws (or regulations). The way in which these 
laws operate is mainly contingent on the criterion used in judging whether mergers 
are legally acceptable, the choice of criterion depending in turn on the approach to 
merger policy followed.11 Hence, as may be inferred from above, EC member 
states’ merger laws are either based purely on competition criteria, or also take into 
account other objectives. In the first case, the possible advantages of a merger cannot 
be pleaded to offset the disadvantages which could result from increased 
concentration (’the competitive-structure approach’). In the second case, the 
promotion of effective competition is one of a number of other desirable objectives 
such as economies of scale or a certain balance-of-payments (’the trade-off 
approach’). Nevertheless, this distinction is usually not so straightforward. Even the
10 One may argue that a third middle approach exists. Since the Reagan era, North-American 
competition authorities, while still following a pure competition approach, devote more attention to factors 
like threat of entry (Theory of contestable markets) or the possible increase in productive efficiency 
(Chicago School) in assessing merger activity. (123, 1995; OECD, 1992b; Financial Times, 20 Sep 1990; 
Scherer and Ross, 1990; Shepherd, 1990)
11 Although the manner in which any system of merger control works depends above all on the 
criterion used in assessing mergers, in the case of EEC merger regulation two other issues become crucial: 
scope (which merger cases are covered by the regulation) and control (who decides on mergers within and 
outside the scope of the regulation). They must be defined to clarify national and Community jurisdictions 
in merger control.
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European national merger law most strictly based on competition criteria, the German 
one, has a national interest provision which allows the government to overturn the 
’independent’ competition authorities. The British merger law, on the other hand, 
though providing for the flexible and discretionary use of the concept of public 
interest, has been pursued on competition grounds since 1984. (Cini and McGowan, 
1998; McGowan, 1994; Sturm and Ortwein, 1993; Whish, 1993; Schwartz, 1993; 
Bos et al., 1992; Hay and Morris, 1991; Hodges et al., 1991; Dechery, 1990; 
Rosenthal, 1990; House of Lords, 1989; Hawk, 1989; Asch, 1983; OECD, 1974)
In any case, nowadays, most EU member states have merger laws. To be 
more specific, one can distinguish three groups of countries. First, there are four 
countries that have had a merger law since the 1960s-1970s. These are the United 
Kingdom (1965), the Federal Republic of Germany (1973), France (1977) and Ireland 
(1978). Secondly, there are eight countries that have only recently established a 
merger control system. These include Sweden (1982), Portugal (1988), Spain (1989), 
Italy (1990), Belgium (1991), Greece (1991), Austria (1993) and the Netherlands 
(1998). Lastly, Denmark, Finland and Luxembourg still do not have any merger 
control except for operations in some special sectors such as banking and other 
financial institutions.12 In other words, currently, twelve out of the fifteen member 
countries have a merger law or regulation.13 Moreover, after sixteen years of debate 
and negotiations, in 1989, an agreement on EEC merger regulation was finally 
reached, adding a supranational dimension to the increasing number of national 
merger legal provisions.14 15
To recapitulate (see table 2.2), merger policy is a competition policy that aims 
to prevent anti-competitive concentration levels in the market-place. The rationale for
12 The Finnish are in the process of adopting a merger control law.
13 See Annex E.
14 Although the Treaty of Paris explicitly included merger control in setting the competition rules for 
the ECSC, the Treaty of Rome did not refer to this area of competition policy.
15 Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations 
between undertakings (OJ [1989] L 395/1; corrigendum in OJ [1990] L 257). Amended in June 1997 by 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1310/97 (OJ [1997] L 180/1; corrigendum in OJ [1998] L 40/17).
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this public policy is mixed. As a result, different approaches to merger policy and 
thus to merger law stand. Each government has its own approach to merger policy, 
and this approach may or not imply the existence of a specific merger law or 
regulation. Evidence shows that the role and enforcement of merger policy has varied 
over time in Western Europe. Nowadays, however, almost all member states have 
a merger law and an EEC merger regulation has been established. Bearing this in 
mind, why is it relevant to select merger policy as an appropiate case study when 
analysing the European integration process?
/
\
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TABLE 2.2. THE NATURE OF MERGER POLICY
DEFINITION: Merger policy is a competition policy that aims to prevent anti-competitive market 
structures so as to make producers’ performance conform more closely to some ideal standard - 
competition- and, by doing so, to secure economic and social goals.
MOTIVES for having a merger policy:
GENERAL ->  COMPETITION is needed. The more competitive a market is, the more efficient 
it is in welfare analysis terms.
->  COMPETITION POLICY is needed because laissez-faire does not ensure 
competitive results.
SPECIFIC ->  ECONOMIC MOTIVE: mergers may lead to anti-competitive market conditions 
such as oligopoly or monopoly.
HOWEVER mergers may also have positive economic effects.
->  SOCIO-POLITICAL MOTIVES: such as mergers may result in excessive 
concentration of wealth.
HOWEVER they may also accrue benefits for the public interest.
=  =  >  >  DIFFERENT APPROACHES to merger policy:
* ’THE PRO-MERGER APPROACH’: mergers are valuable. No need for merger control.
* ’THE TRADE-OFF APPROACH’: need for a case by case analysis. Need merger control.
* ’THE COMPETITIVE-STRUCTURE APPROACH’: only competition criteria analysis. Need 
merger control.
* ’THE ANTI-MERGER APPROACH’: mergers tend to be harmful. Need merger control.
EC MEMBER STATES’ MERGER LAWS are based either on:
->  COMPETITION CRITERIA or 
->  ’PUBLIC INTEREST’ CRITERIA
MERGER LAWS IN THE EU: twelve out of the fifteen present member states have current merger 
control laws. Since 1989 there is also an EEC merger regulation.
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2.3. THE IMPORTANCE OF MERGER POLICY AS A CASE STUDY
EEC merger policy has been chosen as case study to test whether the neo­
functionalist and realist approaches may be considered complementary. Hence, to 
justify this selection, merger policy has to be a relevant policy in the context of 
European integration. This section will show the importance for European integration 
of competition policy in general and merger policy in particular.
Competition policy has always been an important part of the EEC edifice. 
Quoting Karel van Miert (1998: 1), Commissioner for competition since 1993, ’EC 
competition policy is one of the pillars of the economic constitution established by 
the EC Treaty...’ In the words of the Monopolkommission (1989: 15): ’The 
establishment of the European Community in 1957 was at the same time a decision 
of general principle in favour of a competitive economic system.’ The Treaty of 
Rome clearly reflects that fact through the wordings of Articles 2 and 3, referring 
respectively to the objectives of the Community and to the ways of achieving them. 
In particular, Article 3 (f)16 states that the EEC shall include ’the institution of a 
system ensuring that competition in the common market is not distorted.’ Public 
barriers to trade must not be replaced by private barriers.
EEC competition policy is thus an instrument to an end: to help construct and 
preserve the Common Market so as to reach the Community’s objectives set out in 
Article 2 of the Rome Treaty. Quoting the Commission’s Twenty-Second Annual 
Report on Competition Policy (1993a: 13):
Alongside the establishment of a common market, competition policy is one o f the two great 
strategies by which the Treaty of Rome sets out to achieve the Community’s fundamental 
objectives: the promotion of harmonious and balanced economic development throughout the 
Community, an improved standard of living, and closer relations between the member states.
In truth, as Downes and Ellison (1991: 1) note: ’Competition policy was one of the 
first areas of sustained legal and judicial activity in the European Communities.’
16 Renumbered as Article 3(g) by the Treaty on European Union.
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Its relevance for European integration has been enhanced in the last decade 
both by the ’1992 programme’ and by the Commission’s 1994 White Paper Growth, 
Competitiveness, Employment: The Challenges and Way Forward into the Twenty- 
First Century. The former intends to finish the construction of a unified European 
market by means of the process of competition. The latter, in setting up the EC 
economic strategy until the beginning of the next century, underlines the centrality 
of this policy in the process of European integration. It states that competition policy 
’helps to ensure that the single market is a living reality’ by ’creating as favourable 
an environment as possible for company competitiveness’ (CEC, 1994a: 14). In 
short, EEC competition policy is seen as one of the main policy weapons needed to 
ensure the success of European economic integration and the improvement of 
European firms’ competitiveness. In the words of Sir Leon Brittan, Commissioner 
for competition from 1989 to 1993: ’The continuing integration of the Community, 
and the ever-present need for the protection of the consumer from competitive 
abuses, ensures that competition policy will always play a vital role in Europe’ 
(CEC, 1992b: 2). (Cini and McGowan, 1998; CEC, 1994a; Dinan, 1994; McGowan 
in El-Agraa, 1994; Van Miert, 1993; George and Jacquemin, 1992; Ehlermann, 
1992; Martin, 1992; Korah, 1990; Jacobs and Steward-Clark, 1990; Montagnon, 
1990; Monopolkommission, 1989; White, 1987; CEC’s Annual Reports on 
Competition Policy)
Moreover, competition policy has from the earliest years of the EEC been an 
important manifestation of the supranational powers the European Commission 
aspires to in other areas. Indeed, the Council of Ministers is fairly marginalised when 
it comes to competition matters. The Commission decides on those competition cases 
that are considered to have Community effects, subject only to supervision by 
advisory committees, judicial review by the European Courts and political scrutiny 
by the European Parliament (Gerber, 1994; Hodges et al. , 1992; Brittan, 1991; 
Montagnon, 1990; Allen, 1983; Allen, 1977). As Cini and McGowan (1998: 180) 
state:
The Industry Council does have a role to play in authorising regulations, but with much of 
the legal framework already in place, and with competition decision-taking considered an 
executive rather than legislative function, the policy remains largely in the hands of the 
Commission and the Courts.
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The importance of these powers is highlighted when one takes into account 
what exactly EEC competition policy embraces. Following Dinan (1994: 372), it 
’comprises two main branches, one with regard to the activities of private enterprise 
[the so-called ’anti-trust’ dimension in United States terms], the other with regard to 
the activities of member states and state-sponsored bodies.’ In other words, EEC 
competition policy, contrary to national policies, includes not only Articles 85 and 
86 of the Rome Treaty referring to restrictive practices and the recent European 
Merger Regulation, but also Articles 92 to 94 relating to state aids and even Article 
90(2) concerning public undertakings or deregulation. (Sachwald, 1994;Korah, 1990; 
Rosenthal, 1990; Swann, 1983)
Competition policy, by its economic and political impact, is, thus, a key 
element in the European edifice. Accordingly, it is surprising, as Allen noticed both 
in 1977 and 1983 and McGowan in 1993, that whilst economists and lawyers 
interested in the EC have devoted considerable attention to competition policy, 
political scientists have, generally, preferred to make their observations and test their 
theories of integration in other policy areas such as agriculture or money. In contrast, 
this research will concentrate on using merger policy, one of competition policy’s 
main aspects, as a case study for testing the neo-functionalist and realist approaches 
to European integration. Why choose merger policy as opposed to other competition 
policies?
Merger policy is one of EEC competition policy’s central pillars. Quoting the 
European Commission’s Twenty-Second Annual Report on Competition Policy (1993a: 
22): ’Merger control occupies a central place in Community competition policy.’ 
According to Ehlermann (1992: 268), former Director-General of the Commission’s 
Directorate in charge of EC competition policies (DG IV): ’Merger control is one of 
the key priorities of DG IV.’ Indeed, Montagnon (1990: 3) states that: ’Mergers and 
acquisitions is an area of competition policy that has become what might be termed 
"stress-points" for policy towards competition in Europe after 1992.’ Gerber (1994: 
135) explains that the EEC Merger Regulation ’immediately became the focus of DG 
IV’s own attention, occupying an exceptionally large part of DG IV’s time, 
resources, and interest and shifting attention away from the conventional areas of DG
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IV’s activities.’ It is, as an interviewee put it, ’the jewel of the crown’ (I 5, 1995). 
In other words, merger policy has been chosen from among other competition 
policies because of its actual relevance in this area.
Merger policy’s special position in EEC competition policy in recent years is 
due to different factors. The most obvious is the fact that although merger control 
was explicitly contemplated by the Treaty of Paris for the ECSC, it was not until 
1989, after several proposals by the European Commission, that a European merger 
regulation for the rest of the EC was agreed upon by the then twelve member 
countries. Both the newness of the EEC legal instrument and its difficult birth 
indicate that its implementation is observed with marked attention by both member 
states and European institutions. These two factors also reflect that ’mergers are a 
sensitive issue and not one over which member state governments are anxious to cede 
control’ (Swann, 1983: 184). Mergers have side effects which go beyond the realm 
of competition policy, affecting policies such as industrial or social policy, and, as 
Gerber (1994: 135) notes, ’merger control tends to be the most visible as well as the 
most economically and politically significant part of competition law.’ Therefore, 
transfer of part of merger control power to the EC has focused attention on this 
competition policy. It is the single most important addition to Community competition 
law since its inception.
A further reason why this policy is of particular interest is that it is at the 
centre of present and future developments in the EC. As the EC achieves a European 
single market, moves on towards some form of economic and monetary union and 
expands its membership, a new European industrial map is emerging designed by 
means of mergers. The waves of mergers depicted previously in this chapter, suggest 
that mergers are being utilised by firms as instruments of industrial reorganisation 
thereby becoming one of the most important channels of European economic 
integration. Indeed, cross-national merger activity has been employed as barometer 
of European economic integration. For the European Commission (1994b: 1): ’The 
development of cross-border mergers has become an important indicator of progress 
in Community-wide economic integration.’ (Ballarin et al., 1994; Dinan, 1994; 
Sachwald, 1994; CEC, 1994a, 1994b and 1994c; Jacquemin, 1993; George and
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Jacquemin, 1992; Hodges et al.y 1991; Rosenthal, 1990; Sandholtz and Zysman, 
1989; CEC’s last Reports on Competition Policy)
To epitomise (see table 2.3), competition policy in general and merger policy 
in particular are of leading importance in the process of European integration. 
Competition policy is one of the columns upon which European integration is being 
built on. Without it a single market is not feasible and European economic integration 
will be at risk. Moreover, EEC competition policy is one of the few areas where the 
Commission may act without specific authorisation from member states. The 
supranational control of this policy may have explained the reluctance of member 
countries’ governments to further shift the balance of power between the European 
Commission and the domestic competition authorities by adding EEC merger legal 
stipulations. Indeed, the European Merger Regulation is quite recent and is the result 
of sixteen years of negotiations. The newness of merger legal provisions at European 
level, their difficult birth, and the crucial role mergers and, thus, merger policy play 
in a period of intense industrial restructuring explain the choice of EEC merger 
policy as case study against other competition policies. The selection of a competition 
policy, before other possible policies which are also important for European 
integration, relies on the fact that it has been an area usually neglected by political 
scientists.
TABLE 2.3. WHY CHOOSE EEC MERGER POLICY AS A CASE STUDY?
BECAUSE OF COMPETITION POLICY’S IMPORTANCE FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
->  ECONOMIC REASON =  ’the competition process lies at the heart of the common market and 
is essential in securing all the benefits linked with the single market’ (Martin, 1992: 7).
->  POLITICAL REASON =  competition policy is an important manifestation of the 
supranational powers the Commission aspires to in other areas.
BECAUSE MERGER POLICY IS NOWADAYS A CRUCIAL EEC COMPETITION POLICY
->  POLITICAL REASON =  newness and difficult birth of the EEC Merger Regulation.
->  ECONOMIC REASON =  waves o f mergers - restructuring o f the European industrial map.
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CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has sought to justify the selection of merger policy as a case 
study for testing European integration theory. Towards this end, it has attempted to 
present a clear picture of the nature of mergers and merger policy both in general 
terms and within the EC in the first two sections, so to later show in the third section 
the importance of this competition policy for European integration.
Regarding the nature of both mergers and merger policy, merger activity has 
marked the relatively short existence of the EC: three waves of mergers, the last one 
continuing at the time of writing, have taken place since the 1950s. Mergers, the 
union into one of two (or more) formerly independent firms, have been defined, for 
the purpose of this work, in broad terms so as to include mergers per se , take-overs 
and certain joint ventures. These firms’ strategies, which usually occur in waves, 
affect the structure of markets by increasing the degree of concentration. As a result, 
competition in these markets may be restricted though at the same time the efficiency 
of the firms involved may be increased. Governments approach to merger policy 
depends on the position they take on this trade-off efficiency-competitive structure: 
it may require a merger control system. Most EU member states have recently 
adopted merger legal controls and, since 1989, after sixteen years of negotiations, a 
merger regulation is also at work at the European level.
As to the importance of merger policy for European integration, the vital role 
that competition policy has always played in European integration both for economic 
and political reasons, coupled with the fact that it has generally been overlooked by 
political scientists, have been argued to support the choice made in researching this 
general area of policy. The case for merger policy has been defended on the grounds 
that this policy, due to its newness, its difficult birth at the European level and its 
crucial role in securing European economic integration, is, at the moment, the most 
interesting competition policy to be examined.
EEC merger policy may, therefore, be held to be an attractive case to study 
when trying out assumptions of European integration. Although I will only check the
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neo-functionalist and realist hypotheses on this specific area of European integration, 
I believe it will provide new insights and actual knowledge on the evolution not only 
of this but of other policies as well. Moreover, the study of merger policy in the 
European context may serve to inform the present intense debate on how to ensure 
competition (rules) at the international level (Arhel, 1998; Cini and McGowan, 1998; 
CEC, 1998; Schaub, 1998; The Economist, 4 Jul 1998; The Economist, 16 May 
1998; van Cauwelaert, 1997; OMC, 1997; Baches, 1996; Depypere eta l . , 1996; van 
Miert, 1996; Miles, 1995a; Rakousky et al., 1995; Whish and Wood, 1994; Iwaki, 
1993). For Jacquemin (1993: 100): ’The European experience, with its increasing and 
expanding regional integration, and its transnational competition policy, could be of 
considerable relevance to this challenge facing the wider world.’ Thus, to understand 
how and why, after sixteen years of debate, twelve sovereign countries decided to 
agree on the transfer of part of their merger control automomy to the European 
institutions may provide this international debate with useful knowledge.
The following chapter will merge both the theoretical framework described 
in chapter one with the particularities of this case study. From this, a method to 
establish whether it is possible to dismiss the idea that the neo-functionalist and realist 
approaches are complementary, will be devised.
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CHAPTER 3. SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF RESEARCH AND METHODOLOGY
In chapter one, the theoretical framework of this research was set up. In 
chapter two, the relevance of European merger policy as case study was highlighted. 
This third chapter will attempt to merge theory and case study so as to determine 
both the specific aims of this research and the methodology to be applied. 
Accordingly, this chapter is divided into two sections. The first one specifies both the 
question or problem with which this research is concerned with and the hypothesis 
which is to be tested. The second section defines the research design that will be 
followed so to empirically test the hypothesis.
3.1. SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF RESEARCH
Merger law at European level is a recent development. As mentioned in 
chapter two, despite the fact that the control of mergers was explicitly contemplated 
in the Treaty of Paris of 1951 (Article 66), the EEC when created in 1957 made no 
reference to this competition policy. It was only in 1973 that the Commission put 
forward, for the first time, a proposal for an European merger regulation. Five 
amended drafts were to follow until, finally, in 1989, an EEC merger control law 
was agreed upon.17 Therefore, covenant on an EEC merger regulation was only 
reached sixteen years after the Commission’s first proposal. Yet, in the opinion of 
several academics and European officials, the 1973 proposal was quite similar to the 
1988 proposal which finally led to the agreement (Sachwald, 1994; Woolcock, 1989). 
Why was an agreement in the case of merger policy possible in 1989 rather than
17 The first Commission proposal for a regulation of the Council of Ministers on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings was submitted to the Council by the Commission on 20 July 1973 (OJ 
[1973] C 92/1). The successive drafts were submitted respectively: on 16 December 1981 (OJ [1982] C 
36/3); on 7 February 1984 (OJ [1984] C 51/8); on 2 December 1986 (OJ [1986] C 324/5); on 25 April 
1988 (OJ [1988] C 130/4); and on 30 November 1988 (OJ [1989] C 22/14).
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before?
Authors such as Woolcock (1989), Holzler (1990) or Schwartz (1993) have 
written about the causes that led to the contents of the 1989 Accord. Furthermore, 
there is recent research by Bulmer (1994) and by Amstrong and Bulmer (1998) which 
focuses on the evolution of European merger control from the viewpoint of ’new 
institutionalism’. These studies can help to elucidate why an arrangement was 
possible in 1989, however, they do not offer a comprehensive explanation of why 
agreement on the EEC Merger Regulation could be reached in 1989 and not before. 
Which were the factors present in the late 1980s that were absent in earlier periods 
of negotiation? The solution to this question is the purpose of this research: to 
identify the forces that led to integration in the specific case of European merger 
policy in a systematic and analytical way.
The variable to be explained in this study is integration. By integration I 
understand it to be the process by which national states transfer parts of their 
autonomy to a common institutional framework in order to allow for common rules 
or policies (Corbey, 1995), i.e. the process by which part of the control over mergers 
in the Community was transferred to the European institutions. As seen in chapter 
one, political scientists have tried to identify a constant background or set of 
conditions upon which European integration is contingent, building up the neo- 
functionalist approach and the realist approach. This research intends to establish 
whether it is worth considering these two perspectives as complementary rather than 
as competitive.
Therefore, this work aims to test the hypothesis that although both the realist 
and neo-functionalist approaches to European integration contain some elements of 
truth, neither one taken on its own explains European merger policy pre-1990 
evolution, that is, why an agreement on EEC merger regulation was possible in 1989 
and not before. While both are necessary conditions for integration, neither each on 
its own is sufficient. It is only when they are jointly considered that they help provide 
a sufficient explanation. I will name these two conditions as the neo-functionalist 
condition and the realist condition.
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Regarding the neo-functionalist condition, the neo-functionalist theory 
considers, as discussed in chapter one, that integration is the result of spillover and 
pressure from the European institutions. Accordingly, and as Lindberg illustrates in 
The Political Dynamics o f European Integration (1963), this approach suggests that 
to understand the 1989 Agreement and the failure of previous negotiations, it is 
necessary to examine the following three factors:
First, the position and role o f the EC ’supranational’ institutions: the 
Commission, the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice. For the 
neo-functionalists, these institutions, and in particular the Commission, are in the best 
position to influence policy-making (Webb, 1983). Were they able to push integration 
despite national governments’ resistance in this policy area? Did they press for an 
European merger regulation?
Secondly, whether there has been political spillover. Neo-functionalists 
understand political spillover to be the result of the pressure for integration exerted 
both at the national and European level by the interest groups operating in that sector. 
Did European industrialists lobby for an EEC merger regulation? Were European 
industrialists in favour of European merger control?
Lastly, it will be necessary to examine whether there has been functional 
spillover or a process by which ’a given action related to a specific goal creates a 
situation in which the original goal can be assured only by taking further actions...’ 
(Lindberg, 1963: 10). Was an European merger regulation considered essential to 
ensure any other specific common goal?
Following the neo-functionalist logic, these three factors together constitute a 
necessary and sufficient condition for integration. An agreement on EEC merger 
regulation would have been possible in 1989 rather than before because it was only 
in the late 1980s that the three factors were simultaneously brought together. The 
working hypothesis for this dissertation is, however, that they constitute a necessary 
condition for integration but not a sufficient one. To understand the integration
process the realist condition must also be taken into account.
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Concerning the realist condition, the realist approach states, as shown in 
chapter one, that integration is the result of interstate bargains which reflect national 
interests and relative power. Realists believe these interstate bargains are the only 
necessary and sufficient condition for integration. Following Bulmer (1994), for 
them, policy-making across the full range of EU activity is dominated by national 
governments through the intergovernmental institutions: the Council of Ministers and 
the European Council. Moreover, Moravsick (1991) highlights, within these 
intergovernmental institutions, the three most powerful member states will be the 
ones that will determine the bargaining. Consequently, to understand the 1989 
Agreement on EEC merger regulation and the failure of the previous attempts, the 
realist approach considers it necessary to look at a specific factor: at the positions 
held on this issue by the United Kingdom’s, Germany’s and France’s representatives 
in the EC intergovernmental institutions. It would only be when at least two of these 
member states are willing to have an EEC merger regulation, that real negotiations 
will begin and an agreement would be possible.18 Following from this, the 
Agreement on EEC merger regulation was only possible in 1989 rather than before 
because it was only at that moment in time that at least two of the three largest 
member states wanted such a regulation.
What is proposed here, therefore, is to operationalise both the neo­
functionalist and the realist approaches in relation to one specific case study to see 
whether both perspectives may be jointly considered as necessary for integration or 
if any of the two explanations can be dismissed. The idea behind this analysis is to 
test whether it is reasonable to contemplate the need to combine the neo-functionalist 
and realist accounts to offer a clearer picture of the dynamics of European merger 
policy. For this hypothesis to be credible, an agreement on EEC merger policy 
should have been possible only when both the neo-functionalist and realist conditions 
were fulfilled. The 1989 Agreement on European merger regulation .and the failure 
of previous attempts should be determined by the presence or absence of both neo­
18 See Moravsick (1991; 1993) and his point on ’exclusion costs’.
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functionalist and realist factors. It is only when all these factors occur simultaneously 
that an agreement should be possible.
I will assume that these two conditions, and hence the factors which 
compound them, were affected by the context in which negotiations took place: by 
both international (e.g., an international wave of mergers) and domestic (e.g., 
national approaches to merger policy) pressures. In other words, I will assume that, 
though the different contexts in which the EEC Merger Regulation was negotiated did 
not cause responses, they did pose challenges and opportunities. This is not a strong 
assumption, it has come to be commonly accepted by both neo-functionalist and 
realist scholars (e.g. George, 1996; Bulmer, 1994 and 1983; Moravsick, 1991; 
Keohane and Hoffman, 1990; Sandholtz and Zysman, 1989).
To summarise (see table 3.1), this section has specified the question or 
problem with which this research is concerned with. It has also proposed a suitable 
explanation or hypothesis for the phenomena under study and defined the concepts 
and assumption thought to be useful in this explanation. In short, this section has set 
up the specific theoretical framework of this research. The next section will expose 
the empirical framework, that is, how this research’s hypothesis will be empirically 
tested.
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TABLE 3.1. SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF RESEARCH
RESEARCH QUESTION
Why was an agreement on an EEC merger regulation possible in 1989 rather than before? 
HYPOTHESIS
Integration is caused by the presence'of two different and, at the same time, related variables. These are 
necessary conditions which, in combination, become sufficient for integration. I will call these two 
conditions: the neo-functionalist condition and the realist condition.
VARIABLE TO BE EXPLAINED
INTEGRATION is the process by which national states transfer parts of their autonomy to a common 
institutional framework in order to allow for common rules or policies, i.e. the process by which part 
of the control over mergers in the Community was transferred to the European institutions.
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
THE NEO-FUNCTIONALIST CONDITION assumes the existence of three factors: supranational 
institutions’ pressure in favour of an EEC merger regulation, political spillover and functional spillover.
THE REALIST CONDITION is based on the occurrence of one factor: at least two of the tliree most 
powerful member states are in favour of an EEC merger regulation.
ASSUMPTION
I will assume that these two conditions and the factors which identify them are affected by both 
international and domestic pressures, i.e. by the context in which negotiations took place.
3.2. METHODOLOGY : HOW TO TEST THE HYPOTHESIS
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’Research design is a plan that shows how a researcher intends to fulfill the 
goals of a proposed study’ (Johnson and Joslyn, 1991: 95). Accordingly, a research 
design indicates what data are to be collected and how; how the researcher is going 
to analyse them; how she/he will interpret them; and, last but not least, which is the 
domain of generalisability of the interpretations (Miles and Huberman, 1994; 
Wolcott, 1994; Johnson and Joslyn, 1991; Patton, 1990; Strauss, 1987). These are 
the aims of this section.
General research design
The goal of this research is to test a causal hypothesis, I am concerned with 
finding out what led to what. This means presenting evidence concerning three 
relationships (Johnson and Joslyn, 1991). First, that there is a connection between the 
variable to be explained (i.e. the 1989 Agreement on EEC merger regulation and the 
failure of previous attempts) and the explanatory variables selected (i.e. the two 
conditions). Secondly, that the cause preceded the effect in time. Lastly, that the 
effect was dependent upon or could not have occurred in the absence of the cause. 
As Miles and Huberman (1994: 147) state: ’It is necessary to understand the "plot" 
over time.’
This may be accomplished, in this case, by measuring the presence or 
absence, at different moments in time, of the factors which define each of the 
conditions I use to understand the phenomena, and then by comparing the results. In 
other words, I propose to test my causal hypothesis through studying whether the two 
necessary conditions, and hence the factors which compound them, were present at 
the time of the different European merger regulation negotiations.
With reference to this time-frame, however, instead of dividing my analysis 
into six periods of time corresponding to each of the Commission’s EEC merger 
regulation proposals, I intend to consider three periods. This division is explained and 
supported by the analysis of data. Although the Commission submitted six proposals
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to the Council from 1973 to 1989, it is possible to group some of these proposals as 
corresponding to a particular negotiation. In this way, the 1981 and 1984 proposals 
are part of the same negotiation, and the same can be said about the ones in 1986 and 
1988. What emerges are three distinct periods of analysis: the 1970s, the early 1980s 
and the late 1980s.
To recapitulate, in order to test the accuracy and utility of my causal 
hypothesis I intend to see whether the factors which determine the neo-functionalist 
condition and the realist condition were present at each of these three periods and 
later to compare the results.
Data Collection
To carry out the empirical observations with which to test the research 
hypothesis, two types of data have been collected: interview data (i.e. data derived 
from written or verbal questioning of selected respondents; primary sources of data) 
and documentary data (i.e. data that exists in records; secondary sources of data).
Regarding interview data, the aim of my study led me to ask questions on 
the 1989 EEC Merger Regulation’s past. These questions limited my population to 
knowledgeable persons in the field, that is, to an elite population. Indeed, my 
population is composed of both people who participated in the European Merger 
Regulation negotiations and people who are experts in European merger policy.
Ideally, the inquiry would have targeted the entire elite population, however, 
practical limitations (i.e. time, access, resources, etc.) made this huge task 
impossible. Consequently, and in line with the nature of my population, I focused on 
in-depth, rather than width, and on relatively small purposefully selected samples. 
The logic and power of purposeful sampling lies in selecting information-rich cases 
to study in depth. Information-rich cases are those from which much can be learnt 
from about issues of central importance to the purpose of research. Therefore, the 
size of the sample as well as the specific cases under examination depend on the 
study purpose rather than on probability (SCPR course, 1994; Miles and Huberman,
1994; Johnson and Joslyn, 1991; Patton, 1990).
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To establish whom to include in the sample, my strategy was to follow a 
process of continuing discovery or snowball sampling}9 As Miles and Huberman 
(1994: 28) explain: ’Snowball or chain sampling identifies cases of interest from 
people who know people who know what cases are information rich.’ The process 
begins by asking well-situated people to identify other persons who might qualify for 
inclusion in the sample. By asking a number of people who else to interview, the 
snowball gets bigger and bigger as one cumulates new information-rich cases. The 
chain of recommended informants will diverge initially as many possible sources are 
recommended, then it will converge as a few key names are continuously mentioned. 
(SCPR course, 1994; Patton, 1990; Dexter, 1970)
This sampling strategy has proven very useful. I added and then narrowed the 
sample as the fieldwork advanced. I conducted a total of twenty-three interviews with 
academic and experts in this field from different European countries as well as with 
European officials in Brussels who had direct knowledge. I also made approximately 
ten informal contacts with other informants.20
The elite nature of my sample or population also determined the type of 
questions I could ask. Indeed, elite interviewing usually precludes closed-ended 
questions and favours open-ended questions. This is because as Dexter (1970: 5-6) 
indicates:
...in the case o f elites the investigator has to let the interviewee teach him what the problem, 
the question is. For one thing, a good many well-informed and influential people are unwilling 
to accept the assumptions with which the investigator starts; they insist on explaining to him 
how they see the situation, what the real problems are as they view the matter.
In other words, elite interviewees may resent being asked to respond to inflexible
19 Johnson and Joslyn (1991: 161) note that ’snowball sampling is particularly useful to study a 
relative select population.’
20 I was surprised by the availability of the elites I contacted, only seven out of thirty were not able 
or refused to allow me to interview them. Nevertheless, contacting them was sometimes a time-consuming 
nightmare of phone-calls, double-checking and changes.
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closed-ended questions. Open-ended questions allow respondents to state what they 
know and think, hence allowing them to tell the researcher what they mean, not vice- 
versa.
From the point of view of the researcher, open-ended questions also present 
advantages. As Johnson and Joslyn (1991: 193) point out: ’A researcher is usually 
especially interested in an elite interviewee’s own interpretation of events or issues 
and does not want to lose valuable information that an elite "insider" may possess by 
constraining responses.’ Moreover, these scholars also stress that ’the only way for 
researchers to learn about certain events is to interview participants or eyewitnesses 
directly’ (Johnson and Joslyn, 1991: 193). This was indeed my case.
Last but not least, the nature of my sample or population also influenced the 
type of interview I chose to conduct: a semi-structured interview. As may be inferred 
from the previous point, elite respondents will usually prefer non-structured or semi- 
structured interviews as opposed to structured ones. As Dexter (1970) and Johnson 
and Joslyn (1991) remark, elite resent being encased in structured or standardised 
interviews which they usually detect. Moreover, I believe this type of interview 
brings in the strengths of both structured and non-structured interviews thereby 
limiting their weaknesses.
In a non-structured interview, topics and issues to be covered are specified in 
advance, in an outline form. The interviewer decides the sequence and wording of 
questions throughout the course of the interview. As a result, logical gaps in data can 
be anticipated and closed and interviews remain fairly conversational and situational. 
Yet this flexibility in sequencing and wording questions can also result in 
substantially different responses from different perspectives, thus reducing the 
comparability of responses. To make matters worse, important and salient topics may 
be inadvertently omitted.
In a structured interview, the exact wording and sequence of questions are 
determined in advance. Although each question can be worded in a completely open- 
ended format, all interviewees are asked the same basic questions in the same order.
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As a consequence, respondents answer the same questions, thus enabling 
comparability of responses - data are completed for each person on the topics 
addressed in the interview - and so, facilitating the organisation and analysis of the 
data. Yet, the standardised wording of questions may constrain and limit naturalness 
and relevance of questions and answers, as well as involve little flexibility in relating 
the interview to particular individuals and circumstances.
Semi-structured interviews are a mixture of the above two types of interviews. 
Indeed, in a semi-structured interview, the exact wording and sequence of questions 
are pre-determined. All interviewees are asked the same questions in the same order. 
Also, questions are worded in a completely open-ended format. Yet, depending on 
the answers, the interviewer will decide which questions need to be further probed 
or developed.
As a result, semi-structured interviews provide for both the comparability of 
responses of structured interviews and the flexibility of non-structured interviews. In 
other words, I think this type of interview gathers the strengths of both structured and 
non-structured interviews while limiting their weaknesses (Miles and Huberman, 
1994; Johnson and Joslyn, 1991; Patton, 1990; Gorden, 1975; Dexter, 1970; 
Richardson et al., 1965).
Within this semi-structured mark, however, once the pilot interviews were 
carried out, my interviewing technique followed two stages. In the initial stage, my 
interviews were more structured and mainly based on tape-recording -even though 
a summary sheet was always filled in immediatly after the interview.21 In the second 
stage, my interviews became less structured, more conversational, and I started 
taking some basic notes in addition to tape-recording. This proved to be the best way 
to conduct the interview. I became more relaxed not having to keep everything in my 
mind and the interviewee became more responsive. Moreover, this basic note-taking 
technique allowed me to have a clearer idea of the data I had collected immediately 
after the interview was terminated and provided an extra-security against the
21 See the summary sheet format in Annex A.
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possibility of bad tape-recording. Yet, this second stage in my interviewing manner 
was the result of previous experience and, therefore, of a learning curve. I do not 
think I would have been able to conduct my earlier interviews in this way; I needed 
practice, security and a clearer knowledge of my interviewing skills.
To summarise, this research’s interview data has been mustered from a 
purposeful sample of elite population selected following the snowball sampling 
strategy. Due to the nature of the sample, my interviewing was semi-structured and 
all my questions open-ended.22 I conducted twenty-three interviews with both 
academics and experts in the field and with European officials.23 All my interviews 
were carried out face-to-face and were tape-recorded.
As regards to documentary data, these were gathered from existing public 
written documents (i.e. not produced in connection with my study but relevant to it) 
such as newspapers accounts, journals, magazines, books and European documents. 
I would have liked to have had access to the minutes of the negotiations which took 
place in the Council and in the Committee of Permanent Representatives, but these 
are not available to the public for security reasons.
To select the data, I carried out computer-assisted searches for the 1980s 
periods and ’manual’ searches through printed indexes and bibliographies for most 
of the 1970s period so as to cover as much sources of information as possible.24 All 
written documents directly or indirectly related to European merger policy were 
singled out. The assembling of these data was carried out in various libraries25 and 
through some interviewees. Althought I was not able to locate all the documents I 
looked for, I managed to find approximately eighty per cent of them: seventy-one
22 See the interview guide in Annex A.
23 See the distribution of the interviews’ data between the three periods under study in Annex C.
24 See Annex B for an account of all CD-roms and on-line searches conducted as well as for a list 
of the major journals and newspapers consulted.
25 These include the British Library of Political and Economic Science, other libraries of the 
University of London and the Commission’s central library in Brussels.
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official publications, one hundred and seventy-seven articles and books and one 
hundred and forty newspapers articles.26
The reason for using data derived from both interviews and written documents 
can be summarised in one word : triangulation. Indeed, one important way to 
strengthen a study design is through triangulation, or the combination of data sources 
(or methods, theories, researchers) in the study of the same phenomena. 
Triangulating data sources means comparing or cross-checking the consistency of 
information derived at different times and by different means.
Studies that use only one source of data are more vulnerable to errors linked 
to that particular data (e.g. loaded interview questions) than those that use multiple 
sources of data. In other words, triangulation is a powerful solution to the problem 
of relying too heavily on any single data source, thereby undermining the validity and 
credibility of findings because of the weaknesses of any single source. Furthermore, 
using triangulation is recognition that the reseacher needs to be open to more than 
one way of examining issues. Triangulation of data sources seldom leads to a single, 
totally consistent picture. The point is to study and understand ’when’ and ’why’ 
there are differences. Different results may indicate that different types of data have 
captured different things.
To summarise, triangulation of data sources is a strategy for reducing 
systematic bias in the data and hence of increasing the consistency and validity of the 
findings. The strategy involves checking results derived from one source of data 
against those derived from another source of data. It has meant, in this case, 
validating the information obtained through written documents by checking 
interviews. (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Johnson and Joslyn, 1991; Patton, 1990; 
Gorden, 1975; Dexter, 1970)
26 See the distribution of the documentary data, by type of document, between the three periods under 
study in Annex C.
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Data analysis
To analyse the data, I coded both the documents and the interviews’ 
transcripts so as to disect their contents.27 The aim was to take measurements of the 
factors of interest at several points in time so as to observe changes over time. 
Indeed, I looked for confirmation of the presence or absence, in each of the periods 
under analysis, of the factors which determine the two conditions employed in this 
research to understand why an agreement on EEC merger regulation could be reached 
in 1989 rather than before. In other words, I searched for testimony of:
NEO-FUNCTIONALIST CONDITION:
* Did the EC supranational institutions press for an European merger regulation?
* Were European industrialists in favour of an European merger regulation?
* Was an European merger regulation considered essential to ensure any other 
specific common goal?
REALIST CONDITION:
* Were at least two of the three most important member states in favour of an 
European merger regulation?
After some depuration and selection, I will display the findings in an 
organised and chronological way. To be more precise, I will show evidence of 
whether the factors which identify the conditions were present or not in each of the 
three negotiation periods: the 1970s, the early 1980s and the late 1980s. This will be 
carried out in chapter five after having exposed, in chapter four, the facts related to 
merger policy which characterised each period.
Therefore, the analysis of both the interview and documentary data collected 
will be carried out by means of a qualitative study of their contents. This analysis 
will be both retrospective and deductive in nature. I will see whether certain
27 See coding framework in Annex D.
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antecedent events took place and had clear connections to later outcomes proceeding 
from theory to specific observations. Before such an analysis is attempted, however, 
it is sensible to contemplate the potential findings so as to increase this research 
design’s credibility and validity.
Possible findings and interpretations
For each of the three periods analysed I foresee three possible findings (see 
table 3.2): evidence of the occurrence of the two conditions at the same time; 
evidence that only one condition took place; and evidence that none of the conditions 
occurred. The first possible outcome would mean that all the factors which define the 
neo-functionalist condition and the realist condition were present in the negotiation 
period under consideration. The second, that either the realist factor or at least one 
of the factors which determine the neo-functionalist condition did not occur in the 
period analysed. Lastly, the third possible finding would indicate that the realist 
factor and at least one of the factors which conform to the neo-functionalist condition 
did not take place in that period.
TABLE 3.2. POSSIBLE FINDINGS FOR EACH PERIOD
1970s early 1980s late 1980s
2 CONDITIONS 2 CONDITIONS 2 CONDITIONS
1 CONDITION 1 CONDITION 1 CONDITION
NONE NONE NONE
Following from this and as displayed in table 3.3, sixty-four combinations are 
possible. Only one of these would be consistent with this research hypothesis: 
evidence that the two conditions only took place in the late 1980s. This result would 
mean that there is no clash between evidence and research hypothesis in the case of 
European merger policy. The success of the late 1980s negotiations would be 
explained by the simultaneous occurrence of the two necessary conditions, and
70
Table 3.3. POSSIBLE GENERAL OUTCOMES28
1970s early 1980s late 1980s
2 CONDITIONS 2 CONDITIONS 2 CONDITIONS
2 CONDITIONS 2 CONDITIONS NONE
2 CONDITIONS 2 CONDITIONS 1 CONDITION
2 CONDITIONS 1 CONDITION 2 CONDITIONS
2 CONDITIONS NONE 2 CONDITIONS
2 CONDITIONS 1 CONDITION NONE
2 CONDITIONS NONE 1 CONDITION
2 CONDITIONS 1 CONDITION 1 CONDITION
2 CONDITIONS NONE NONE
1 CONDITION 1 CONDITION 1 CONDITION
1 CONDITION 1 CONDITION NONE
1 CONDITION 1 CONDITION 2 CONDITIONS
1 CONDITION NONE 1 CONDITION
1 CONDITION 2 CONDITIONS 1 CONDITION
1 CONDITION NONE 2 CONDITIONS
1 CONDITION 2 CONDITIONS NONE
1 CONDITION NONE NONE
1 CONDITION 2 CONDITIONS 2 CONDITIONS
NONE NONE NONE
NONE NONE 1 CONDITION
NONE NONE 2 c o n d it io n s
NONE 1 CONDITION NONE
NONE 2 CONDITIONS NONE
NONE 1 CONDITION 2 CONDITIONS
NONE 2 CONDITIONS 1 CONDITION
NONE 1 CONDITION 1 CONDITION
NONE 2 CONDITIONS 2 CONDITIONS
28 Although twenty-seven combinations are shown in this table, it must be remembered that ’1 
CONDITION’ stands for either the realist or the neo-functionalist condition. This adds thirty-seven new 
possible combinations.
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the failure of the previous attempts would be the result of the non-fulfillment of these 
conditions at that time. This outcome would, moreover, indicate that there is a 
connection between the dependent variable and the two conditions, that the cause 
preceded the effect in time, and that the effect was dependent upon, or could not 
have occurred in the absence of the cause. In short, it would provide the evidence 
that the research hypothesis is a causal hypothesis.
From a theoretical point of view, the completion of this hypothesis would 
imply two things. First, in order to explain the 1989 Agreement and the failure of 
previous attempts, both a neo-functionalist and a realist account can be defended. 
Secondly, to unfold this particular process of integration, neither perspective can be 
rejected, as both are necessary. Consequently, the fulfillment of this hypothesis 
would indicate that the idea that these two approaches may be complementary cannot 
be dismissed. It would then be worth studying how these two conditions combine in 
the integration process so as to produce an integrative decision.
Any of the remainder sixty-three possible results, however, would mean that 
there is a clash between evidence and the research hypothesis. This would imply that 
the late 1980s European merger regulation Agreement and the failure of the previous 
attempts are not explained by the two conditions taken together. In this situation, the 
interpretative track would depend upon the outcome. In the event of finding any 
combination in which one condition occurring in the late 1980s did not occur before, 
the interpretative track would be to examine the case in terms of competing theories. 
The objective would then be to see how the evidence gathered helps to rule out one 
of the two conditions and, thus, to enhance the explanatory power of the other. In the 
extreme situations represented by the other possible results, an inductive 
interpretation would be attempted so as to establish which were the forces not 
contemplated by these conditions which led to integration.
To recapitulate, the qualitative analysis I intend to conduct may generate sixty- 
four possible outcomes. In the event of obtaining evidence that the two conditions 
tested only took place in the late 1980s, then my research hypothesis will be 
confirmed and I will proceed to see how these two conditions’ factors interact. In the
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case of any of the remaining sixty-three possible events, the hypothesis will be 
refuted, leading to new tracks of interpretation based on examining the results in 
terms of competing theories or looking for alternative conditions for integration. The 
interpretation of the findings will be carried out in chapter six.
Domain of generalisability of the interpretations
Whatever the findings, the analysis of this case study will help to establish 
whether the idea that the neo-functionalist and realist approaches can be taken as 
complementary is worth considering at all. In the situation where empirical testimony 
cannot be found, the hypothesis will be dismissed. However, should evidence confirm 
the hypothesis, the analysis of a single case study will not allow for generalisations. 
Yet, it may provide useful extrapolations. As Patton (1990: 489) defines them: 
’Extrapolations are modest speculations on the likely applicability of findings to other 
situations [or policies] under similar, but not identical, conditions.’ This author 
further adds that researchers ’extrapolate from their findings in the sense of pointing 
out lessons learned and potential applications to future efforts.’ This will be attempted 
in the concluding chapter.
Conclusion: a qualitative research design
This section has exposed the research design I followed to test whether there 
is any evidence that this research causal hypothesis is confirmed in the case of 
European merger policy. The main features of this design have been summarised in 
table 3.4. The focus of analysis is to see whether the factors which determine the 
neo-functionalist condition and the realist condition, were present in three different 
negotiation periods: the 1970s, the early 1980s and the late 1980s; and to compare 
the results. The data used to make the empirical observations were gathered from two 
different sources -interviews and written documents- to increase the consistency of 
the research. The qualitative method of analysis chosen was both deductive and 
retrospective. There are sixty-four potential findings and, of these, only one confirms 
the hypothesis: evidence that the two conditions only took place in the late 1980s. 
Whatever the outcome, the interpretations will allow for extrapolations rather than
73
for generalisations.
TABLE 3.4. RESEARCH DESIGN
GENERAL RESEARCH DESIGN
To test the accuracy and utility o f my causal hypothesis I intend to examine whether the factors which 
define the neo-functionalist condition and the realist condition, were present in three distinct periods of 
analysis: the 1970s, the early 1980s and the late 1980s; and to compare the results.
DATA COLLECTION
Two types of data have been collected to allow for triangulation of sources.
Interview data: twenty-three semi-structured interviews purposefully selected through snowball 
sampling from an elite population defined by the object of my research.
Documentary data: almost four hundred references singled out through both computerised searches and 
’manual’ searches. Collected from different libraries and from some interviewees.
DATA ANALYSIS
Restrospective and deductive qualitative analysis of both interview and documentary data.
POSSIBLE FINDINGS AND INTERPRETATIONS
- In the event that the two conditions only took place in the late 1980s: evidence confirms the 
research hypothesis, that is, the timing of the EEC Merger Regulation can be accounted for by both 
approaches at the same time. Neither perspective can be discarted as source of explanation. The idea 
that these approaches are complementary cannot be shelved =  =  >  >  see how these two necessary 
conditions combine in this particular integration process.
- In the case of anv of the remaining sixtv-three possible events: evidence refutes the research 
hypothesis =  =  >  >  depending on the outcome, examine the findings in terms of competing theories or 
looking for alternative conditions for integration.
GENERALISABILITY OF THE INTERPRETATIONS
This single case study research does not allow for generalisations but rather for extrapolations.
74
CONCLUSIONS
The specific purpose of this research is to explain why an agreement on an 
EEC merger regulation was possible in 1989 and not previously. My research 
hypothesis is that the timing of this complex phenomena, that is integration, cannot 
be explained by any of the existing main theories of European integration per se. On 
the contrary, what is attempted here is to test whether the neo-functionalist and realist 
approaches may be complementary rather than competing accounts of European 
integration, so that only together do they offer a comprehensive explanation of the 
course of events.
In order to test this causal hypothesis and to determine which were the forces 
that led to integration in the case of merger policy, I intend to measure whether the 
factors and hence conditions which compound the hypothesis were present at three 
distinct periods of negotiations: the 1970s, the early 1980s and the late 1980s. This 
will be carried out in the next two chapters, first by exposing and then by analysing 
the contents of the data collected in a retrospective and deductive way. Chapter six 
will subsequently compare the results and contrast evidence with theory so as to offer 
an interpretation of the results. Finally, this research will conclude with a discussion 
about possible extrapolations as well as pointing out areas for future investigation. .
75
PART H. WHY WAS AN AGREEMENT ON EEC MERGER REGULATION 
POSSIBLE IN 1989 RATHER THAN BEFORE?
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CHAPTER 4. THE FACTS
This chapter intends to expose the facts related with European merger policy 
which characterised each of the three periods under analysis. For this purpose, the 
chapter has been divided into three, each part corresponding to one of the already 
identified following periods: the 1970s, the early 1980s and the late 1980s. Each of 
these three sections will answer the same descriptive question: ’what was going on 
in that period of negotiations?’. Using the data collected both from primary and 
secondary sources, a description of the events and context of each period will be 
provided so as to answer this question.
4.1. 1970s: THE FIRST ATTEMPT
As the Treaty of Paris to the High Authority, the Treaty of Rome gave the 
European Commission specific powers to ensure that competition was not distorted 
in the Community. However, contrary to the ECSC Treaty (Article 66), and despite 
the fact that the 1956 Spaak Report had discussed the need to monitor the formation 
of monopolies and dominant positions, the EEC founding Treaty did not contain any 
mention of merger control (Schwartz, 1993; Brittan, 1991; Dechery, 1990; 
Monopolkommission, 1989; Mestmacker, 1973).
For most commentators, the failure to include specific merger control 
provisions in the EEC Treaty was due to the pro-merger thinking of that time 
(Bulmer, 1994; Schwartz, 1993; Bernini, 1991; Woolcock et al.t 1991; Le Bolzer, 
1990; Woolcock, 1989; Brussels Law Offices, 1988; Lever and Lasok, 1986). In the 
1950s, the priority was not the control or restriction of concentrations but quite the 
reverse. In the words of Banks (in Martin, 1992: 6):
. .omission of a merger control provision from the Treaty is not surprising given the European
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economic thinking at that time. One of the main objectives of the EEC was to bring about the 
economies of scale made possible by an enlarged European market. Mergers -and especially 
mergers across national boundaries- were seen as part of the process of European integration 
and as necessary in order to enable European industry to adapt to the new dimensions of the 
common market and to compete effectively against large foreign (notably American) 
enterprises...the member states clearly did not wish to include in the Treaty any provision 
which might inhibit such developments.
This EEC ’pro-merger approach’ was shared by the six founding states of the 
Community. None of them had merger control laws. After the Second World War, 
the theory of economic growth developed by Keynesian advocates dominated the 
political arena of Western Europe providing an intellectual justification for state 
intervention. As a consequence of Keynes economic postulates and of the fact that 
Europe had been destroyed by the war, industrialisation and full employment became 
objectives of the Western European states leading to a continuous strengthening of 
the role of the state at both the micro- and macroeconomic levels. National 
reconstruction was aimed by building a greater and richer national economy, by 
industrialisation, by modernisation, and by the full utilisation of hitherto idle national 
resources. To this purpose, sets of policies referred to as the welfare state as well as 
industrial policies were established in the different Western European countries 
leading to incomes policies, to extensive nationalisation programmes, to the 
promotion of ’national champions’ and even to the use, in certain cases, of the newly 
evolving domestic competition policies as a tool of industrial policy (Tsoukalis, 1993; 
Milward, 1992). ’These were the high days of optimism about the ability of political 
institutions to guide the "invisible hand"’ (Tsoukalis, 1993: 30).
The industrial policies’ goal was to allow war-ravaged and historically under- 
industrialised Europe to attain American levels of industrialisation by encouraging the 
formation of American-sized industrial giants. In a situation where low degrees of 
concentration were found in most economic sectors, increased concentration between 
undertakings was seen as a process that should be encouraged so to restructure the 
European economy and to produce large undertakings capable of competing in world 
markets (Cini and McGowan, 1998; I 12, 1995; Sachwald, 1994; Cini, 1993; De 
Jong, 1988; Lever and Lasok, 1986; Cunningham, 1973). Quoting Gardner (1990: 
186): ’The pre-war belief that the concentration of firms into larger units would 
increase their efficiency continued to be held by many industrialists and politicians,
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well into the 1960s.’ The tendency at that time among national governments was to 
encourage rather than restrict concentration in European industry. Siekman (1972: 
248) called it ’a fascination with giantism.’
The economic presumption behind this ’pro-concentration approach’ was that 
most mergers were beneficial or, at least, neutral in their effects on competition and 
efficiency (120, 1995; Comanor et al., 1990); ’Mergers were not seen as a threat to 
competition’ (Cini and McGowan, 1998: 117). As Woolcock (1989: 2) states: ’If 
there was any predominant view of merger, it was that these were useful means of 
assisting in European industry’s effort to recover international competitiveness.’ In 
the words of Bernini (1991: 633): ’It was the time in which concentrations were 
blessed... the attitude was entirely pro-mergers.’
To recapitulate, there was in the 1950s a variety of economic and political 
motives for encouraging concentration instead of controlling it. Mergers were seen 
by member states as useful means to promote the formation of industrial giants large 
enough to compete with American firms, and by EEC authorities as a good way to 
achieve integration of the national economies and to promote economies of scale 
deemed necessary to build up the infrastructure of the Common Market. Moreover, 
mergers were thought to have no negative effects upon competition. In this pro- 
merger post-Second World War context what seems strange is not the lack of 
provisions for merger control in the EEC Treaty but rather the inclusion of such 
provisions in the ECSC Treaty.
The ECSC provisions on merger control were the result of the political 
background to the Treaty. Indeed, ECSC competition policy derived from political 
rather than economic motives. Immediately after the Second World War, there were 
fears among the Allied Nations of a resurrection of the German industrial power, 
more specifically that of its heavy industry, key element in warfare. Although 
separated by the Allied Nations after 1945, during the war, coal and, in particular, 
steel industries in Germany had been heavily concentrated. Consequently, the re- 
emergence of German coal and steel giants was feared because it ’could be a 
springboard to rearment’ (Holzler, 1990: 9). Under strong pressure from the United
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States, the ECSC Six decided to include stringent merger control rules in the Treaty 
of Paris to supersede the Allied deconcentration policy in Germany. (I 12, 1995; 
McGowan, 1994; Bulmer, 1994; Bos et al.y 1992; Brittan, 1991; Schmitt, 1982; 
Allen, 1977)
Therefore, the ECSC Treaty contains an explicit system of merger control 
while the EEC Treaty does not due to the different needs and objectives of the two 
treaties. The collective memory of the role of German concentrated heavy industry 
in World War Two along with American pressure created favourable conditions for 
introducing merger control for the coal and steel sectors. In other economic sectors, 
deprived of negative war connotations and where overall concentration was low, 
mergers were deemed necessary in order to foster a healthy economic structure and 
in order not to lose competitive advantage, especially with American industry. In the 
pro-merger context of the 1950s, what was peculiar was the inclusion of merger rules 
in the ECSC Treaty rather than the lack of such provisions in the EEC Treaty.
However, this pro-merger context started to change in the mid-1960s. The 
number of mergers in the Community had been increasing steadily since 1958 partly, 
but not exclusively, due to the ’pro-merger policy’ actively pursued by most member 
states. A process of economic concentration in individual European countries was 
taking place, which saw the birth of many ’national champions’ (Tsoukalis, 1993). 
This led the Commission to issue the first warning against the risks of excessive 
concentration in the Common Market, where, following Article 3(f) of the EEC 
Treaty, competition had to be ensured.
As early as 1963, the Commission asked two groups of independent legal 
experts to consider the possibility of using Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty to 
control mergers (Swann, 1992b; Brittan 1991). Article 85 prohibits agreements 
between undertakings ’which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction 
or distortion of competition within the common market* (Art. 85(1)), unless the 
Commission exempts these transactions (Art. 85(3)). Article 86 prohibits ’any abuse 
by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market or 
in a substantial part of it. ’ These articles apply only to conduct that may affect trade
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between the member states.
On the basis of these groups of experts’ findings, the Commission defined its 
point of view and, in 1966, issued a Memorandum on Le Probleme de la 
Concentration dans le Marche Commun (CEC, 1966a) which was sent to the 
governments of the member states. In this Memorandum, the Commission recognised 
the unsuitability of both articles of the EEC Treaty to the task of controlling mergers 
but did not exclude the possibility of using Article 86 for this endeavour.
Concerning Article 85, although the legal experts consulted had reached the 
conclusion that this article of the EEC Treaty could be, at least in terms of principle, 
an adequate vehicle to control mergers resulting from agreements between 
enterprises, the Commission considered it not to be applicable (Bernini, 1991). For 
the Commission, cartels and mergers required separate policies because of their 
differences. Cartels were the result of agreements or concerted practices between 
undertakings which remained economically independent while mergers supposed 
lasting changes in market structure. Moreover, the application of Article 85 as a 
merger control instrument presented procedural difficulties. The strict criteria of 
Article 85(1) would preclude too many permissible mergers. On the other hand, the 
possible exemptions of Article 85(3) would be under-inclusive. Furthermore, the 
revocability of any exemption granted would upset vested property rights. Last but 
not least, Article 85 would not cover certain mergers capable of damaging 
competition, such as open market purchases of shares, where the difficulty would be 
in identifying an ’agreement’ or a ’concerted practice’. (Schwartz, 1993; Bishop, 
1993; Brittan, 1991; van Empel, 1990; Bellamy and Child, 1987; Barounos et al., 
1975; CEC, 1966a)
Regarding Article 86 of the EEC Treaty, both the Commission and the experts 
consulted agreed that this clause could be applied to certain mergers:
La fusion d’une entreprise en position dominante avec une autre entreprise, qui £limine la 
concurrence qui subsisterait encore dans le march6 en cause en cr6eant une situation de 
monopole, peut prdcisement avoir les memes effets nocifs qu’un comportement vis6 par
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l’article 86. (CEC, 1966a: 26)29
The Commission was aware that Article 86 of the EEC Treaty was not the best 
possible instrument for merger control. In particular, it could be applied only when 
at least one of the undertakings involved in the merger already held a dominant 
position before the event. Moreover, it provided for intervention only after the 
merger had taken place. The Commission, therefore, could neither interfere on the 
grounds that two firms, when merged, would then acquire a dominant position, nor 
prevent an anti-competitive merger from taking place. As underlined in the 
Memorandum, this still left many instances of mergers outside the scope of Article 
86. Nevertheless, the Commission considered that Article 86 did not suffer from the 
strong limitations of Article 85 as merger control instrument:
Contrairement k ce qui se passe pour l’article 85, peu importe, dans le cas de 1’article 86, 
quels sont les moyens utilises pour parvenir k la situation sanctionn£e par 1’ interdiction. Pour 
1’application de l ’article 86, il est done indifferent qu’une concentration k laquelle participe 
une entreprise en position dominante r£sulte d’un accord entre entreprises ou de l’acquisition 
d’une entreprise concurrente par 1’achat d’actions en bourse... Les entires et la technique 
juridique pr£vus k Particle 86 ne feraient pas obstacle k une application aux concentrations: 
il n’y a pas de distinction entre anciennes et nouvelles ententes ni de problfcmes resultant du 
caract£re revocable et temporaire de 1’exemption. (CEC, 1966a: 22)30
By so arguing, the Commission opened in 1966 the door to the use of Article 
86 of the EEC Treaty to control mergers in the Community. Article 86 could be 
applied if an undertaking in a dominant position eliminated competition by taking 
over another economically independent undertaking.31 Indeed, the Commission’s 
First Annual Report on Competition Policy (1972a: 78) noted: ’It has been common
29 The merger of an enterprise holding a dominant position with another enterprise so that a monopoly 
situation is brought about by the removal of any remaining competition on the market in question, may in 
itself constitute an abuse within the meaning of Article 86. (own translation)
30 In contrast to Article 85, the means used to reach the situation sanctioned by the prohibition are 
of no importance under Article 86. Hence, to apply Article 86, it does not matter whether a concentration 
that involves an undertaking in a dominant position is the result of an agreement between enterprises or 
of the acquisition of a competitor through the purchase of shares in the stock market...Article 86’s criteria 
and legal technique would not constitute a barrier to its application to concentrations: there is no distinction 
between old and new agreements nor problems resulting from the temporary and revokable character of 
the exemption, (own translation)
31 Some authors did not share the Commission’s and group of experts’ view that Article 86 could be 
applied to certain mergers. For them, Article 86 does not proscribe a dominant position but rather attacks 
the abuse thereof. (Swann, 1992a; van Bael and Beilis, 1990; Whish, 1989; Swann, 1979)
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knowledge since 1966 that the Commission understands Article 86 to apply to those 
cases of mergers and takeovers which constitute an abuse within the meaning of this 
provision.’
The second half of the 1960s did not bring to an end the increase in the 
degree of concentration observed since 1958 in the different industries of the 
Community. On the contrary, it was confirmed, as seen in chapter two, that Western 
Europe was experiencing its first wave of mergers of this century:
Between 1962 and 1970 the yearly number of concentrations in the Community of the Six - 
defined as financial participations of more than 50% -rose from 173 to 612. In comparison 
with 1962, the yearly number of concentrations had increased three and a half times by 1970. 
In comparison with 1962-66, the rate of increase in 1966-70 had almost doubled. (CEC, 
1973c: 4-5)
Although most of the increase in the number of mergers was due to the creation of 
’national champions’, the overall effect was an increase in the degree of concentration 
in the Community as several studies by the Commission showed (CEC, 1972a; 
1973a; 1974a). Moreover, this concentration process seemed unstoppable: ’If the 
trend continues -and it may not abate until all potential partners are wedded and 
bedded- the European industrial landscape will soon be dominated by a small number 
of very large companies, each with a near monopoly in its national market...’ 
(Siekman 1972: 248).
In this context of rising degrees of concentration, the Commission continued 
looking, though without success, for possible ways to increase its merger armoury. 
For example, the Commission contemplated, at the time when the Treaties we~e 
fused, the possibility of amending the EEC Treaty so as to extend the ECSC merger 
powers to the Common Market as a whole (Allen, 1996; Allen, 1977; Swann and 
McLachlan, 1967). Following Van Graay (1977) and Mestmacker (1973), the 
Commission also considered establishing a system of preliminary control of mergers 
in a sectorial way:
Some sectors were dominated by a small number of large enterprises, and therefore the 
Commission proposed, in 1968, a system of automatic pre-registration for new concentrations 
in the oil, gas and nuclear energy sector. Only a few months later the Commission proposed 
such a system for all branches o f industry characterised by a high degree of concentration. 
(Van Graay, 1977: 468)
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Last but not least, the Commission tried to put into practice its interpretation of 
Article 86 of the EEC Treaty as a merger control instrument! It considered a number 
of merger cases but, after investigation, came to the conclusion that there was no 
need to apply this Article (Cunningham, 1973; CEC, 1969).
Then, in 1969, the Council of Ministers pointed out, in the Second 
Programme for Medium-Term Economic Policy, that structural adaptation to common 
market’s conditions of production and sale would be expressed by an acceleration of 
the process of concentration. The increase in the number of mergers was expected 
to last and even to accelerate. In the face of this, the Council stressed the urgency 
of defining clearly the policy to be followed in the field of mergers 
(Monopolkommission, 1989; van Graay, 1977; CEC, 1973c).
Yet, it was only in June 1971 that the European Parliament, in the shade of 
the integration momentum created by the 1969 Hague Summit and on the basis of its 
1970 Berkhouwer Report on European competition policy, asked for the first time for 
EEC merger control provisions (Dechery, 1990; Monopolkommission, 1989; van 
Graay, 1977; OJ [1974] C 23/19; EP Document 263/73). In its Resolution on the 
rules o f competition and the position o f European firms in the common market and 
in the world economy, passed on 7 June 1971, the European Parliament stated its 
belief that it was necessary to eliminate fiscal and legal barriers to cross-border 
mergers, and, at the same time,
...il s’impose de prgvoir une notificationprdalable pour les concentrations dont la realisation 
permettrait de d£passer un certain taux de participation au marche ou un ordre de grandeur 
donn£; ces concentrations ne devraient £tre consid£r£es conune autorisdes que si la 
Commission ne s’y est pas oppose dans un deiai qui reste k determiner;... (OJ [1971]
C 66/12)32
Also in 1971 but in December, the Commission issued its famous decision on
32 ’...for concentrations which exceed a certain share of the market or a certain size there should be 
prior notification; such concentrations should be regarded as authorized only if the Commission does not 
raise any objection within a time-limit yet to be fixed;...’ (CEC, 1973c)
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the Continental Can case.33 In this decision, five years after its Memorandum on the 
problem of concentration, the Commission formally applied, for the first time, its 
interpretation on the use of Article 86 of the EEC Treaty to merger cases.34 The 
Continental Can Company, an American packaging company, had acquired 
successively two of its main potential competitors, the German Schmalbach-Lubeca- 
Werke AG producer and the Dutch Thomasen & Drijver-Verblifa NV. Company, 
through its Belgian subsidiary, the Europemballage Corporation SA. In the opinion 
of the Commission, the second merger strengthened Continental Can Company’s 
dominant position in such a manner as to practically eliminate any existing 
competition in the market for light metal containers in the north-west region of the 
Common Market. Accordingly, the operation constituted an abuse of a dominant 
position within the meaning of Article 86 (Zachman, 1994; Downes and Ellison, 
1991; Cooke, 1986; Merkin and Williams, 1984; CEC, 1972a; Mestmacker, 1972).
On 9 February 1972, both Eupemballage Corporation SA. and Continental 
Can Co. Inc. appealed against the Commission’s decision to the European Court of 
Justice, leaving the controversial question of the applicability of Article 86 of the 
EEC Treaty to merger control in the hands of the European judges. However, the 
Commission made clear its intention to continue applying Article 86 to mergers 
’entered into by enterprises in a dominant position to the prejudice of consumers’ 
until ’contrary interpretation of the provision by the Court of Justice’ (CEC, 1972a: 
16).
This disputed Commission’s decision was followed by a Communique issued 
by the Heads of State and Government of the Six and of the three States about to join
33 Commission’s decision of 9 December 1971, OJ [1972] L7/25.
34 The Commission’s Continental Can decision was its second decision under Article 86 of the EEC 
Treaty:
After a decade concentrating on the application o f rules concerning agreements (Article 85), in 1971 Community’s 
competition policy entered the phase o f  application o f Article 86 o f the Treaty. The Commission took its first two 
decisions in the Gema [Commission decision o f  2 June 1971, OJ [1971] L 134/15] and Continental Can Co. cases. 
(CEC, 1972a: 74)
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the Community, at their meeting in Paris on the 19 and 20 of October 1972.35 The 
Paris Summit ’introduced an ambitious programme of substantive expansion of 
Community jurisdiction and a revival of the dream of European Union’ (Weiler, 
1991: 2449). In particular, having studied the problem of industrial concentration in 
the Community, the Conference, in its Final Communique (point 7), invited the 
Commission to submit proposals to the Council for controlling excessive 
concentrations making the broadest possible use of Article 235 of the EEC Treaty 
(CEC, 1974a; CEC, 1973a; CEC, 1973b; CEC, 1973c; CEC, 1972b).36 A crucial 
step towards a systematic EEC merger control had been made.
Ten days after this political pronouncement, on 30 October 1972, the 
Commission informed the Council of its intention ’to submit, independently of the 
application of Article 86 to specific cases, proposals designed to introduce a more 
systematic control of mergers of a given scale’ (CEC, 1973a: 11). The Council of 
Ministers took note of the Commission’s intentions in its Resolution of 5 December 
1972 on action to fight inflation (Dechery, 1990; Allen, 1977; CEC, 1973d).37
This movement towards the need to control mergers was also taking place, to 
a certain extent, at the national level. In 1972, the Federal Republic of Germany was 
working on its own merger control law and the only European country which already 
had such law, the United Kingdom, was about to enter into the Community. The 
’pro-merger attitude’ of the 1950s and 1960s seemed to be shifting towards more 
intermediate approaches, towards the need to have merger laws, both at the European 
and national level.38
35 As a result of the negative referendum of 26 September 1972 on its joining the Community, 
Norway did not attend the Summit Conference (CEC, 1972b).
36 Article 235 of the EEC Treaty reads:
If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course o f the operation o f the common market, 
one o f the objectives o f the Community and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, 
acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the Assembly, take the appropiate 
measures.
37 OJ [1972] C 133/14.
38 See Annex E.
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In the late 1960s-early 1970s, evidence was mounting that showed that 
mergers had not often yielded the expected efficiency gains. Moreover, as Swann and 
McLachlan (1967:5) note: ’It [was] recognized that really large enterprises [could] 
bring with them problems as well as opportunities ... the public might have to pay 
dearly for its industrial giants.’ As a result, there was a change in the climate of 
opinion to a more critical analysis of the dangers inherent in an excessive legislative 
and judicial benevolence towards mergers (Bernini, 1991; Woolcock et al., 1991; 
Gardner, 1990; Lever and Lasok, 1986; Scherer, 1974). For example, two early 
1970s reports of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), a research body for the world’s most industrialised countries, concluded 
that a combination of a structural approach and conduct control was needed and 
recommended the establishment of merger control systems (OECD 1970; OECD 
1974). The time seemed ripe to complete EEC competition law.
Indeed, on 21 February 1973, the European Court of Justice’s judgement in 
the Continental Can case confirmed the 1966 Commission’s interpretation on the 
applicability of Article 86 of the EEC Treaty to the control of mergers (Schwartz, 
1993; CEC, 1973a; CEC, 1974a).39 To be more accurate, the Court ruled against 
the Commission decision on Continental Can on grounds of insufficient proof. It 
considered that the Commission had failed to adequately define the market concerned 
(Zachman, 1994; Downes and Ellison, 1991; van Bael and Beilis, 1990; CEC, 
1973a; ECJ, 1973). Yet, at the same time, the European Court upheld the position 
that the Commission could intervene to prohibit mergers which resulted in an abuse 
of a dominant position under Article 86. A company with a dominant position could 
be regarded as abusing its position by acquiring control over a competitor where this 
would substantially obstruct competition (Bulmer, 1994; Brittan, 1991; Korah and 
Rothnie, 1990; Monopolkommission, 1989; Barounos et al., 1975; ECJ, 1973). 
Merger control at European level was assured at least for those combinations effected 
within the Common Market by firms in a dominant position.
It was in this favourable context that the Commission’s Directorate General
39 Eupemballage Corporation and Continental Can Co. Inc. v. Commission (Case 6/72) [1973] ECR 
215; OJ [1973] C 68.
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for Competition (DG IV), at that time in hands of Commissioner Borschette, 
prepared the text of the merger control regulation proposal. Before deciding on its 
proposal to the Council, the Commission consulted member states’ authorities as well 
as several interest groups.40 On 2 July 1973, the Commission convened the 24th 
Conference of Government Experts of member states on Restrictive Agreements and 
Dominant Positions in Brussels, and held a preliminary discussion with the relevant 
national authorities on the draft regulation. The same month, the Commission also 
sought the opinions of industrialists and of trade associations and unions represented 
at European level (Ffrench, 1986; van Graay, 1977; CEC, 1974a; Financial Times, 
21 Jul 1973). After these preliminary consultations, ’the members of Mr. 
Borschette’s competition team [were] under no illusions that their regulation will have 
an easy passage through the Council of Ministers’ (The Economist, 4 Aug 1973). 
Nevertheless, the Commission put its first proposal for a merger control regulation 
before the Council the 20 July 1973,41 initiating the consultation procedure to be 
followed in order to approve the text (CEC, 1974a).
The regulation proposed by the Commission was based on Articles 87 and 235 
of the Treaty of Rome. It made provisions for the control of those concentrations, 
involving at least one undertaking with its seat in the Common Market, which were 
liable to affect trade between member states and which exceeded two quantitative 
thresholds: an aggregate turnover of 200 million units of account (later ECU) and a 
market share, in any one member country, of 25 per cent (Article 1). Furthermore, 
assessment of each merger case was to be based upon a pure competition criteria but 
allowing for exemptions on grounds of the common interest of the Community 
(Article 1). Lastly, it gave the Commission the exclusive competence to deal with 
merger cases within the scope of the regulation, subject to verification by the Court 
of Justice (Article 3). Co-operation between the Commission and the member states 
in the decision-making process was ensured through a simple advisory committee 
procedure.
40 As Cini (1996: 20) points out: ’Under the 1966 Luxembourg Compromise, the Commission has 
an obligation to consult member states as well as other interests before proposals are issued...’
41 OJ [1973] C 92/1.
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At a more technical level, the proposal called for a compulsory regime of 
prior notification for those concentrations whose aggregate turnover was not less than 
1000 million units of account; fixed operational deadlines (i.e. a final decision was 
to be taken at the latest at the end of a period of twelve months); and a procedure 
similar to the one already applied for Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty under 
Council Regulation No 17 (of 1962).
These essential characteristics of the proposed regulation show that the 
Commission desired the absolute control of all merger cases falling within the scope 
of the regulation. Control that would be based on a ’trade-off approach’ to merger 
policy. As noted by the Commission in its explanatory memorandum (CEC, 1973c), 
the draft neither put forward a system, like that of Article 66 of the ECSC, based on 
prior authorisation, nor of general prohibition. Instead it suggested a system where 
incompatibility with the Common Market was to be established case by case after 
assessment by the Commission on whether the power of a concentration hindered 
effective competition in the Common Market (Schwartz, 1993; Swann, 1992b; 
Reynolds, 1990; Holzler, 1990; Monopolkommission, 1989; Swann, 1979; Barounos 
eta l., 1975; The Economist, 4 Aug 1973; The Economist, 14 Jul 1973; CEC, 1973b; 
CEC, 1973c; CEC, 1974a). As Woolcock (1989: 15) stated: ’The Commission [was] 
thus seeking not only exclusivity above a certain threshold, but also the discretion to 
use these powers in a flexible fashion. ’
The first step of the consultation procedure to approve the regulation, was 
completed in February 1974. Having been consulted by the Council,42 both the 
European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee endorsed the 
Commission’s proposal by large majorities on votes taken respectively on 12 
February43 and 28 February 197444. Nevertheless, in the course of the discussions
42 Both Articles 87 and 235 of the EEC Treaty made consultation of the European Parliament 
compulsory and, on 20 September 1973, the Council decided to exercise its option [Article 198 EEC 
Treaty] of consulting the Economic and Social Committee (OJ [1974] C 88/19). From then on, the Council 
consulted the Economic and Social Committee each time the Commission presented a new amended 
proposal on EEC merger regulation, that is, each time the European Parliament was formally consulted.
43 OJ [1974] C 23/19.
44 OJ [1974] C 88/19.
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preceding the two votes, both institutions raised specific amendments to the proposal. 
In its Fourth Report o f Competition Policy (1975) the Commission stated its intention 
to accept three of these amendments:
1. the inclusion of a provision whereby the competent authority would have to take into 
account of competition on the world market when reviewing concentration cases (Article 
1(1));
2. the inclusion under the provisions for compulsory notification of cases of the formation of 
joint subsidiaries by independent undertakings or groups of undertakings which would 
otherwise have fallen within the exemption in Article 4(2);
3. the replacement of 1000 million units by 1250 million as the threshold turnover above 
which mergers of undertakings in the distribution sector were to be subject to compulsory 
notification (Article 5(2)). (CEC, 1975: 19)
In any case, it was a proposal backed as a whole by the ’supranational institutions’, 
that was presented to the Council of Ministers in 1974 for its revision and approval 
by unanimity. (CEC, 1977a; CEC, 1975; CEC, 1974a; CEC, 1973a)
Ensuing a 1973 Council declaration, the Community was to have a merger 
regulation by January 1975. At its meeting of 17 and 18 December 1973, the Council 
of Ministers set a timetable for the first stage of the action programme on industrial 
policy called for by the Paris Conference’s Final Communique. One of the items in 
the timetable read: ’The Council shall by January 1975 act on the proposal for a 
regulation on the control of concentrations’ (CEC, 1974a: 37). In other words, in 
December 1973, the Council intended to speedily decide on the merger proposal.
However, the European context in 1974 was not the same as in 1973. The oil 
shock of 1973 had led to an acute economic crisis in Europe. The unprecedent 
economic growth of the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s was substituted by a recession 
which was to persist throughout the 1970s:
The formation of the OPEC oil cartel and the concomitant quadrupling of the price of oil 
shifted massive economic resources from Europe and the US to the Middle East, jarring 
European economies into a recession that was followed by periods of stagflation that would 
persist for more than a decade. (Gerber, 1994: 114)
As described by the Commission in its Fourth Report on Competition Policy for 1974 
(1975: 9): ’...for some months the Community has been faced with the most serious 
economic and structural problems since its foundation. ’
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The response of the EC member states’ governments towards this crisis was 
purely national, as opposed to concerted, strengthening the interventionist character 
of their policies and erecting non-tariff barriers not only against third-countries but 
also against each other (Armstrong and Bulmer, 1998; Allen, 1996; I 17, 1995; 
Tsoukalis, 1993; Cameron, 1992). Quoting Grahl and Teague (1990: 147):
In the 1970s industrial crises in all member states led to an explosion of interventionism at 
national level: national governments responded to rising unemployment and widespread excess 
capacity with a series o f state-sponsored measures designed to give assistance and protection 
for the afflicted sectors... The political colour o f governments made little difference to the 
patterns of intervention: in Britain, a Conservative government nationalised the Rolls-Royce 
aero-engine company and refinanced British Leyland, while Labour nationalised shipbuilding; 
in Italy, the state-owned industrial holding companies pursued an anarchic expansion through 
the takeover of unprofitable private businesses; Germany reinforced support for its steel and 
shipbuilding companies; similar rescues in France took the form of industrial ’plans’, rapidly 
formulated for the most precarious sectors.
The reinforcement of national interventionism and protectionism was picked 
up by a worried Commission in its annual reports on competition policy throughout 
the 1970s. For example, in its Fifth Report on Competition Policy for 1975 (1976: 
7) the Commission wrote: ’The Commission considers that the proliferation of State 
Aids as a means of mitigating economic difficulties and their social consequences 
carries with it the risk of preserving industrial structures that have failed to adapt to 
the circumstances...’ Another example can be taken from its Sixth Report on 
Competition Policy for 1976 (1977a: 9): ’The illusion that economic and social 
problems can be solved either by Community or national protectionism, jeopardizing 
the unity of the common market, cannot be maintained.’ These were years, however, 
in which the Commission, pressured by governments and industry, adopted a more 
pragmatic interpretation of competition policy -exemplified by the approval or 
tolerance of ’crisis cartels’ and of state aids to industries in trouble (Cini and 
McGowan, 1998; Allen, 1996; Gerber, 1994; Cini, 1993; Wilks, 1992).
Regarding merger policies, throughout the 1970s each national government 
in Europe sought more than ever to build up domestic firms capable of competing 
with the American giants. The state encouraged or engineered mergers and provided 
research and development subsidies. In other words, state procurement heavily 
favoured the domestic firms (Sandholz and Zysman, 1989; Walsh and Paxton, 1975). 
In the words of Hermann at the Financial Times (11 May 1977):
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Competition is fast being replaced by regulation by which the bureaucracies of government, 
big companies and trade unions seek to avoid the consequences of the recession ... These 
demands are reflected in a tolerant attitude towards mergers and a tendency to protect and 
fortify industry against overseas competition by nationalisation or regulation o f some sort 
...The concept of regulation, or dirigisme, with which France entered the Community, seems 
to be getting the upper hand over the essentially American concept of enforced competition 
on which Germany banked when taking part in the European venture.
Nevertheless, the data series showed a relative stability throughout the 1970s of the 
number of large mergers. This stability was the result of divergent trends: the United 
Kingdom and France rate of the hundred largest firms hardly rose, but overall 
concentration in Germany and in the Benelux countries did not come to a standstill 
until the late 1970s (De Jong, 1988; Fishwick, 1982). The continuous process of 
concentration of the 1960s and early 1970s slowed down some time after 1975 (CEC, 
1978) and was marked by stagnation round about 1980 (CEC, 1982a).
It was in these years that two new member states adopted their own merger 
control laws: France in 1977 and Ireland in 1978; and that two other member states 
discussed the possibility of adopting one: the Netherlands and Belgium. Therefore, 
despite the change of context and the re-inforcement of ’national champions’ policies, 
or perhaps because of them, the move previously observed from a ’pro-merger 
approach’ towards a more stringent one continued to take place at national level. As 
the Commission commented in its Sixth Annual Report on Competition Policy for 
1976 (1977: 43):
There are substantial differences in the legal treatment of competition policies resulting from 
differences in legal traditions and degrees o f industrialization and concentration, and from the 
competing priorities of competition, industrial and structural policies. However,..., despite 
differences of degree, there is a general tendency for all member states to strengthen their 
competition policy to safeguard active competition. For instance, the principle o f abuse is 
being dropped in favour of the principle o f prohibition, resale price maintenance is being 
banned and merger control is becoming more stringent...member states are improving their 
own merger control machinery...
It is worth noting, however, that the two new merger laws, similar to the one 
already established in Britain (since 1965), were based on a ’trade-off approach’. In 
other words, public interest was to be taken into account by the competition 
authorities when deciding on a merger case. The other pre-existing merger law, the 
German one (since 1973), was more ’competition oriented’ but also accepted the need
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for public interest considerations in certain cases. Enacted domestic law thus allowed, 
if ’necessary’, for a sympathetic and flexible approach to mergers though public 
interest considerations varied from one country to the other.
On the whole, the result of these interventionist and protectionist national 
measures was a widening of economic divergence among national economies - 
reversing the trend of the 1960s when there had been a progressive narrowing of the 
economic gap- as well as a fragmented and incomplete Common Market and an 
increasing ’Euro-pessimism’ (Tsoukalis, 1993; Cameron, 1992). As the early 1970s 
context had seemed to offer an opportunity to achieve an agreement on merger 
control regulation, the context of the second half of the 1970s challenged such an 
accord.
Notwithstanding the change of context, discussions on the text of the proposal 
among the Nine started as soon as the Council received the Opinions of the European 
Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee (OJ [1975] C 233/12). To be 
more precise, negotiations started with the Council Working Party on Economic 
Questions at its meetings held on 14 June and 25 July 1974 (CEC, 1975). 
Consideration of the proposed regulation continued to take place at this level in 1975: 
meetings on 18 February, 25 June, 23 September and 10 and 11 November. This first 
stage of the work was, as the Commission (1976: 15) indicates, ’devoted to 
discussion of general aspects’ and ’to some extent held back until the outcome of the 
June referendum in the UK was known.’
In July 1975, not satisfied with the progress of the negotiations on the 
proposed merger control regulation, the Commission ’made a formal approach 
requesting the Council to speed up work’ (Reynolds, 1983: 420). It ’criticized some 
governments for dragging out the discussions at the expert level by continually asking 
for supplementary studies and analyses ...[so as] to avoid decision’ (Allen, 1977: 
107). It asked the Council ’to intensify its work’ and ’to give the proposal priority’ 
(CEC, 1976: 9 and 15). Several other Commission’s complaints followed (CEC, 
1978; CEC, 1977a) but, as shown below, without much success.
93
In 1976, the Council Working Party on Economic Questions held only one 
meeting, on 23 March, to consider the merger proposal. After this meeting, it 
submitted an interim report to the Permanent Representatives Committee calling for 
political guidelines on five main problems which it had been incapable of resolving: 
the legal basis of the proposed regulation, the scope or field of application of the 
regulation, the possibility of derogations, the notification of planned mergers and the 
decision-making procedure (Reynolds, 1983; CEC, 1981a; CEC, 1981c; CEC, 1978; 
CEC, 1977a).
The Committee of Permanent Representatives was unable to come to any 
decision on these five questions in 1976. It was not until 1977 that some progress 
was made: ’At meetings held on 17 March, 11 May, 19 October and 25 November 
1977, the Committee noted a growing convergence of views on the power to grant 
derogations and on the question of notification’ (CEC, 1978). However, at the end 
of 1977, all five items were still in the Committee’s agenda. It was at this point in 
the negotiations that the proposal was to all effects shelved in 1978 (Gourvish, 1996; 
Merkin and Williams, 1984; Allen, 1983; The Economist, 12 Dec 1981; CEC, 
1982a; CEC, 1981a; CEC, 1980; CEC, 1979). The first attempt to achieve an 
agreement on European merger regulation had failed.
To summarise this descriptive section, four stages in the 1970s negotiations 
on European merger regulation can be distinguished (see table 4.1). These stages 
followed the consultation procedure needed to approve the Commission proposal, as 
established by Article 235 of the EEC Treaty, but they did not all occur within the 
same political and economic context.
The first three stages took place within a favourable context to enable an 
agreement on European merger regulation. Indeed, the 1960s and early 1970s were 
characterised by an unprecedent economic growth, Euro-optimism, a European wave 
of mergers and a move from ’pro-merger approaches’ towards more stringent ones 
at the European level and, to a certain extent, also at the national level. The first 
stage covered the background of the legislative proposal, i.e. the events which led to 
the proposal. It began as early as 1957, with the absence of a specific merger control
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measure in the EEC Treaty and finished as late as February 1973 with the European 
Court of Justice ruling on Continental Can. The second stage was devoted to the 
preparation of the text of the proposal and coincided with the first semester of 1973. 
The third stage was the consultation period which is the time needed by the European 
Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee to evaluate and vote on the 
proposal.
The fourth and last stage, corresponding to the Council discussions on the text 
of the proposal, happened in a totally different context, i.e. a challenging one. The 
1974-78 context was marked by an economic crisis, Euro-pessimism, protectionist 
national measures and yet there was a reinforcement of the shift from ’pro-merger 
approaches’ towards more intermediate ones at the national level. By 1978 the 
Council discussions arrived at a stalemate.
TABLE 4.1. THE 1970s PERIOD
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CONSULTATION PROCEDURE (ART 235 EEC Treaty)
CONTEXT 1957-73
* Economic boom.
* European merger wave.
* Euro-optimism.
* Move from a ’pro-merger approach’ to a more stringent one at the European level and, to a certain 
extent, also at the national level.
BACKGROUND OF THE LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL
* 1957, No provisions for merger control in the Treaty of Rome (different from the 1951 Treaty of 
Paris, Art. 66)
* 1966, Commission’s Memorandum on the control o f mergers.
* 1969, Council’s statement on the need to define an approach to business concentrations.
* June 1971, European Parliament’s call for systematic European merger control.
* December 1971, Commission’s decision on Continental Can.
* 20 October 1972, Heads o f State and Government’s Communiqu6 calling for an EEC merger 
regulation (EMR).
* 30 October 1972, Commission’s decision to submit proposals for a more systematic control of 
mergers.
* February 1973, European Court of Justice’s ruling on Continental Can.
PREPARATION OF THE TEXT
* July 1973, Commission’s consultations: interest groups and member states’ relevant authorities.
* 20 July 1973, Commission’s first proposal on EMR.
* December 1973, Council’s declaration: intention to have acted on the EMR by January 1975.
OPINIONS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
COMMITTEE
* 12 February 1974, European Parliament’s favourable Opinion.
* 28 February 1974, Economic and Social Committee’s favourable Opinion.
CONTEXT 1974-78
* Economic crisis.
* Reinforcement o f national interventionism and fragmentation of the European market.
* Euro-pessimism.
* Move from ’pro-merger approaches’ to more stringent ones continued at the national level. 
DISCUSSIONS IN THE COUNCIL
* 1974-75, Different meetings o f the Working Party on Economic Questions.
* July 1975, The Commission asked the Council to give priority to the proposal.
* 1976-77, Different meetings of the Committee of Permanent Representatives.
=  >  THE PROPOSAL WAS TO ALL EFFECTS SHELVED IN 1978.
4.2. EARLY 1980s: THE SECOND ATTEMPT
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The beginning of the 1980s found Western Europe in the midst of a deep 
economic malaise. Stagnating output, high inflation, rapidly rising unemployment, 
and declining export shares of world markets formed the main elements of a dismal 
economic picture in the aftermath of the second oil shock. Moreover, these were 
times of the third industrial revolution based on sectors such as electrical and 
electronic equipment, office machinery, and information technology. It represented 
a time of major technological advances and rapid industrial restructuring at the global 
level; and Europeans increasingly felt that they were losing out in the international 
race for the industries of the future. In fact, there was a gradual loss of market shares 
within the Common Market as well as in the world market to the United States and 
Japan in high technology products (Tsoukalis, 1993; Pinder, 1993; Cameron, 1992; 
Holmes, 1992; Sandholtzand Zysman, 1989; Fishwick, 1982; OJ [1981] c 144/19).
Confronted with the fading competitiveness of the EC vis-a-vis the United 
States and Japan, ’market operators pressed for the retention of traditional structures, 
an unrealistic improvement of living standards and reliance on State financial 
intervention and protectionist measures’ (CEC, 1981a: 9). And obtained a response: 
’There [was] a growing tendency in the various member states for the public 
authorities, under considerable pressure, to make use of aid to protect their 
industries’ and even ’to extend public ownership’ (CEC, 1982a: 12 and 13). A clear 
example of this tendency could be found in France. As Grahl and Teague (1990: 151) 
confirm: ’...it was [in France] that industrial strategy had gone furthest in the 
direction of state-led reconstruction on the national basis.’ Indeed, the industrial 
strategy of the left-wing government elected in France in 1981 was a rapid 
implementation of a vast nationalisation programme of French industrial companies. 
But even in Mrs Thatcher’s conservative Britain, the government handed out cash to 
keep tottering firms in business (The Economist, 25 Apr 1981).
In those years when member states often stepped in to support or rescue both 
private and public undertakings, the move previously noted from a ’pro-merger 
approach’ towards a more stringent one did not take place at the national level. Both
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Belgium and the Netherlands dropped their discussions on the possibility of adopting 
merger control laws and Greece, incorporated into the EC in 1981, did not have such 
a law. As a result, in these early years of the decade, only four of the then ten 
member states had their own merger control laws: the United Kingdom, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, France and Ireland.45
Regarding European integration, although the EC had survived its first major 
enlargement in 1973, as well as the dramatic deterioration of the international 
macroeconomic environment, it was considerably weaker. The efforts to extend 
integration to new areas of activity had largely failed and intra-EC trade had 
stagnated as a result of both the non-tariff barriers erected by the member countries 
and the policy of ’national champions’ pursued by most governments. The entrance 
of Greece in 1981 did not change the situation. Quoting Holmes (1992: 65): ’The EC 
had never been less unified than it was in the early 1980s.’ These were years of 
’Euro-pessimism’ and ’Euro-sclerosis’, terms which became popular in the European 
and foreign media (Tsoukalis, 1993).
It is within this challenging context that both the Commission and the 
European Parliament insisted once again on the need to have an EEC merger 
regulation, pressing the Council to resume its work on the proposal. The Commission 
Temain[ed] convinced that it [was] essential to introduce an instrument for a more 
systematic control of large-scale mergers at Community level...’ (CEC, 1981a: 29). 
It continued to control mergers through Article 86 of the EEC Treaty profiting both 
from the extension of the concepts of abuse and dominance brought about by 
European Court of Justice’s rulings throughout the 1970s and from the possibility of 
using interim measures established by the Court in the Camera Care case46 in 1980 
(CEC, 1985; CEC, 1984a; Reynolds, 1983; CEC, 1983a; CEC, 1982a; CEC, 1981a; 
CEC, 1980). As for the European Parliament, it ’deplore[d] the fact that the Council 
ha[d] still not adopted the merger control regulation’ (OJ [1981] C 144/19).
45 See Annex E.
46 Camera Care Ltd v. Commission (Case 792/79 R) [1980] ECR 119.
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Both the Commission and the European Parliament were worried about the 
negative effects high degrees of concentration in the Common Market could have on 
competition (CEC, 1986a; CEC, 1985; CEC, 1982a; OJ [1981] C 144/23). Though 
there were no signs of a new wave of mergers, various Commission’s studies showed 
that oligopolies were increasing their hold on markets. Community industry was 
becoming increasingly concentrated (CEC, 1983a; CEC, 1982a). Quoting the 
Commission’s Eleventh Report on Competition Policy (1982a: 15) there was a 
’combination of persistent crisis and tendency towards oligopolistic structures.’
Then, in 1981, the Commission took again the initiative. The new DG IV 
Commissioner, Mr. Andriessen, pursuant of Article 149 (2) of the EEC Treaty,47 
put before the Council an amended European merger regulation proposal on 16 
December 1981.48 Although aware that political circumstances were not very 
favourable, Andriessen considered ’the Commission [could] not remain inactive with 
regard to the Council’ (CEC, 1981c: 1).
The main purpose of the 1981 amended proposal was twofold. First, it aimed 
to clarify that, as was the intention with the original Commission’s proposal, the 
regulation should be applied first and foremost to mergers of an European scale. The 
scope of the regulation was to be determined by one (i.e. aggregate turnover) instead 
of the two quantitative criteria originally proposed (i.e. aggregate turnover and 
market share). The regulation was not to cover those concentrations which did not 
meet an increased aggregate turnover criterion: 500 million ECU as opposed to 200 
million ECU (Article 1). As to the market share criterion, it was to be used as an 
assessment criterion and no longer as a means of indicating the limits below which 
the regulation would not apply (Article 1). Nevertheless, the widening of the market 
share criterion, from 25 per cent in any one member state to 20 per cent of the total 
Common Market, further indicated the Commission’s intention that there should only 
be Community involvement in the largest and most anti-competitive mergers.
47 Article 149 (2) of the Treaty of Rome read: ’As long as the Council has not acted [on a proposal 
from the Commission], the Commission may alter its original proposal, in particular where the Assembly 
has been consulted on that proposal’. Article 149 was removed by the Treaty on the European Union.
48 OJ [1982] C 36/3.
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Secondly, the new proposal intended to involve member states more closely 
in the decision-making process. Although Article 3, which established the exclusive 
competence of the Commission to deal with merger cases falling within the scope of 
the regulation subject to verification by the Court of Justice, was not changed; Article 
19 introduced the possibility for the Council to have a say in the decision-making 
process. Under the amended proposal, if a majority of the Advisory Committee 
opposed any draft decision on the incompatibility of a merger with the Common 
Market, the Commission could not adopt a final decision until a cooling-off period 
of twenty days had elapsed. Within that period, a member state could raise the matter 
in the Council if it considered that an objective having priority in the common 
interest of the Community justified derogation from the rules concerning 
incompatibility. At the end of the day, nevertheless, the Commission would only be 
obliged to ’take account of the policy guidelines which emerged in the course of the 
Council’s deliberations.’
In short, member states were to be more closely associated in the 
Commission’s decision-making process without, however, casting doubt on the 
Commission’s final power of decision. They would have had more power than under 
a pure advisory committee procedure but less than under a pure management or 
regulatory committee procedure. As Wish (1985: 530) ascerted, under this proposal, 
’national governments [would have retained] some influence over the Commission’s 
merger policy.’
Besides these two main changes in scope and control, the amended proposal 
also introduced, in response to a request made by the European Parliament in 1974, 
a new assessment criterion: the international situation criterion. Using this, the 
Commission, in making its case by case assessment, would have taken into account 
the competitive situation and the development of trade at the international level, that 
is, ’the effects of international competition’ (Article 1).
To sum up, the system of merger control put forward in 1981 was similar to 
that proposed in the 1970s: the Commission would continue to have the last word in 
merger cases within the scope of the regulation and to follow a ’trade-off approach’
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to merger policy. The Commission would first determine whether a merger acquired 
or enhanced the power to hinder effective competition in the Common Market, and 
then decide whether or not the merger should nonetheless be authorised on certain 
common interest grounds (Article 1). Nevertheless, the 1981 amendments increased 
the quantitative threshold which defined mergers with a Community dimension 
reducing the scope of application of the regulation. The modification also attempted 
to involve the member states more closely in the decision-making process and 
introduced the international situation criterion. In short, the Commission was trying 
to offer a solution to two of the previous negotiations’ key political problems and to 
answer some of the 1974 European Parliament’s requests, without drastically 
changing the general lines of its proposal. (Reynolds, 1990; Brussels Law Offices, 
1988; Elland, 1987; Merkin and Williams, 1984; Reynolds, 1983; CEC, 1982a; 
CEC, 1981b; CEC, 1981c)
Following the consultation procedure to approve the regulation, both the 
Economic and Social Committee and the European Parliament were consulted by the 
Council on the new proposal. The Economic and Social Committee endorsed the 
amended proposal in an Opinion adopted at its plenary session of 30 June and 1 July 
1982.49 It welcomed most of the amendments made by the Commission on the 1973 
proposal but stressed that ’the Commission must continue to hold absolute 
responsibility for deciding whether a merger is incompatible or not with the common 
market’ (CEC, 1983a: 34). The European Parliament also supported the 1981 
Commission proposal in its Resolution of 25 October 198350 and suggested some 
amendments. These mainly concerned Article 1 and included both raising the 
aggregate turnover threshold from 500 to 750 million ECU and adding a new 
quantitative threshold whereby any merger which gave the firms concerned, 
irrespective of their turnover in the market as a whole, a market share in a substantial 
part of the Common Market over 50 per cent could be declared incompatible with the 
maintenance of effective competition in the Common Market. Moreover, despite its 
general backing to the proposal, the European Parliament, as the Economic and
49 OJ [1982] C 252.
50 OJ [1983] C 322/26.
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Social Committee had done, rejected the part of the amended proposal dealing with 
co-operation between the Commission and the competent national authorities, i.e. 
Article 19(7) and (8) (CEC, 1984a).
The Commission accepted the majority of the changes suggested by the 
European Parliament yet persisted in its argument for greater co-operation with the 
member states (CEC, 1984a). Indeed, on 7 February 1984, the Commission formally 
introduced the European Parliament’s comments into the text of the proposal but did 
not modify Article 19.51 The reluctance of the Commission to alter Article 19 may 
well have been due to the views expressed in a meeting of the Advisory Committee 
on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions held late in 1983 to discuss the 1981 
amendments (Merkin and Williams, 1984).
In any case, the 1984 amendments only concerned Articles 1, 4 and 6 as well 
as introduced a new Article 22a. They provided for: an increase in the aggregate 
turnover threshold from 500 to 750 million ECU (Article 1); the adding of the market 
share criterion of 50 per cent (Article 1); minor changes in both Articles 4 (prior- 
notification) and 6 (commencement of proceedings); and a new provision (Article 
22a) explicitly stating that the Commission could publish guidelines indicating the 
circumstances in which examination would take place (CEC, 1986a; CEC, 1985; 
CEC, 1984c). The 1981 approach was thus substantially unchanged.
Finally, it was in February 1984 that a revised proposal, backed as a whole 
by the supranational institutions, was submitted to the Council of Ministers for its 
approval. It is important to note that the 1984-86 context, in which the Council 
negotiations were to take place, was unlike that experienced in the 1981-83 period. 
Things had been slowly changing in Western Europe leading to a remarkable 
transformation of the economic and political climate. The first step towards this 
change was the establishment of a link between the loss of competitiveness of 
European firms and the fragmentation of the European market. The second step was 
the perception of the existence of a further link between both and the interventionist
51 OJ [1984] C 51/8.
102
role of the State in Western Europe.
In relation to the first link, Tsoukalis (1993: 49) considers that ’a consensus 
view about its existence gradually developed in the 1980s among key policy-makers 
and industrialists’; and that ’the Commission was highly instrumental in this respect.’ 
The emphasis was on high technology sectors where economies of scale and gains 
associated with learning curves were perceived to be particularly important. 
Accordingly, the priority was on sectors where the advantages from the creation of 
a real Common Market should have been the greatest. As Woolcock et al. (1991: 3) 
described:
The progressive globalization of business [made] it impossible for companies heavily 
dependent on national markets to remain internationally competitive -largely because increased 
technological sophistication mean[t] that the economies of scale needed to fund product 
development [could] no longer be achieved in purely national markets.
Therefore, non-tariff barriers erected by national governments to protect old 
established sectors such as textiles that were hard hit by the stagflation of the 1970s, 
were not only fragmenting the European market but also blocking technological 
progress and thus negatively affecting European firms’ competitiveness. European 
companies could only compete on an increasingly interdependent and global world 
economy if their home market became united rather than fragmented (I 8, 1995; 
Dinan, 1994; Sachwald, 1994; Tsoukalis, 1993; Pinder, 1993; Cameron, 1992; 
Hodges et al., 1992; Keohane and Hoffman, 1994; Grahl and Teague, 1990).
Concerning the second link, as traditional policy instruments produced 
unexpected and often adverse results such as the above mentioned blockage of 
technological progress, and as unemployment increased, the post-war interventionist 
model was being challenged from within. Quoting Holmes (1992: 65):
...by the early 1980s severe disillusionment had set in with the meagre results and even more 
meagre prospects for national champions policies in an increasingly globalised world market 
economy, in which the micro- and macro-roles o f national government spending were less and 
less important.
The failure of interventionist policies to deal with the economic recession and the 
lack of competitiveness of European firms in front of foreign competitors, served to
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focus political attention on the rigidities and barriers created by systems such as state 
management of industry, and their allegedly harmful impact on industrial efficiency 
and technological development (I 17, 1995; Dinan, 1994; Mil ward et al., 1993; 
Cameron, 1992; Grahl and Teague, 1990; Sandholtz and Zysman, 1989). In short, 
attention was focused on the inability of the state in controlling particular policy areas 
and processes. These were no longer ’the high days of optimism about the ability of 
political institutions to guide the "invisible hand"’.
As a consequence of these relationships, it may be said that a new diagnosis 
of the European situation emerged that pointed to the excessive presence of the 
nation-state in every sphere of life as the main cause for both the lack of 
competitiveness of European firms in relation to foreign competitors and the 
European market fragmentation. The change in the economic conditions within which 
Europe was operating in the 1980s required a change in the entire conception of the 
conditions necessary to enable European companies to compete in the international 
arena. This new diagnosis was echoed by developments both at the national and 
European level.
At the national level, a gradual redefinition of the role of the nation-state took 
place. The interventionist state was exposed to a wider-ranging critique pushing in 
favour of supply-side measures. The period’s relatively lower rates of national 
income growth as compared to that in the first three post-war decades seemed to 
justify many of these critiques and paved the way for a gradual coalescence of 
national politics around a neo-conservative call for privatisation, deregulation and a 
reinforcement of competition controls.
However, the final catalyst for the shift from a state-managed to a more 
market-oriented industrial policy was made possible by two key developments internal 
to the nation-state. First, supply-side programmes and economic deregulation mainly 
imported from the United States under President Reagan, were pursued by Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom and later projected towards 
Europe as a means of conquering new markets for British industry and financial 
corporations. Secondly, France’s President Mitterrand’s choice in 1983 to change his
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1981 policy of nationalisation and stimulation of internal demand seemed to mark the 
final abandonment of the belief that the post-war model of the Western European 
state could be made to generate the same results as it had done in previous years (I 
17, 1995; Tsoukalis, 1993; Cameron, 1992; Grahl and Teague, 1990; Sandholtzand 
Zysman, 1989; McLennan, Held and Hall, 1984).
This shift towards supply-side measures, strongly supported by the EC 
Commission in its annual economic reports, was reflected in a general move to the 
political right in terms of economic policies, evident in most countries of Western 
Europe during the first half of the 1980s irrespective of the colour of the political 
parties in power (Tsoukalis, 1993; Cameron, 1992; Sandholtz and Zysman, 1989). 
In the words of Wilks (1992: 9):
Whether one calls it neo-liberalism or Thatcherism the move towards deregulation, 
privatisation and the withdrawal of the state has been of almost revolutionary proportions in 
the UK, it was always congenial to the Germans and has become influential in France and 
many of the smaller European countries.
Thus, it can be said that in the first half of the 1980s there was a shift, although 
taking place at different speeds in the different member states, from a Keynesian 
economic doctrine to a neo-liberal intellectual justification (Cini and McGowan, 
1998; I 19, 1995; I 17, 1995). As Allen (1996: 159) points out: ’The transformation 
came in the 1980s, with the swing away from Keynesian policies towards a new 
enthusiasm for the workings of the market.’ According to Hall (1984: 13), this 
change ’represented a move to restore the ideal of the classical liberal state, but under 
advanced 20th century capitalist conditions: therefore, the Neo-liberal state.’
To recapitulate, in the early mid-1980s the tendency manifested during the 
course of the first thirty years of the post-Second World War, in which the nation­
state accumulated tasks and functions, was reversed. This supposed a gradual 
withdrawal of the nation-state from the governing of economic markets and thereby 
the beginning of a shift of attention from the public sector to the private sector. 
Quoting Sandholtz and Zysman (1989: 110): ’The political basis, in attitude and party 
coalition, for a more-market-oriented approach was being put in place.’
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At the European level, the need of European companies to operate in an 
unhindered fashion throughout the Community rather than in small, national markets 
in order to be competitive, together with the growing popularity of supply-side 
measures and economic deregulation, motivated the programme of ’completing’ the 
Internal Market. The European Court of Justice’s 1970s and 1980s rulings made the 
practical achievement of such a programme more plausible. In particular, its famous 
Cassis-de-Dijon decision (1979) allowed the move from a policy of detailed 
harmonisation of standards to one of minimal harmonisation together with ’mutual 
recognition’, i.e. ’where a product has been lawfully produced and marketed in one 
member state, it must be allowed to be traded freely throughout the Community’ 
(Slynn, 1992: 47). For Keohane and Hoffmann (1994: 253): ’Reliance on "mutual 
recognition" rather than harmonization reflected the decision to focus Community 
attention on removal of barriers rather than on means of economic intervention.’ 
(Allen, 1996; Sachwald, 1994; Tsoukalis, 1993; Cameron, 1992; George, 1991; 
Sandholtz and Zysman, 1989; Woolcock, 1989)
Signed in February 1986, the Single European Act (SEA)52 created a 
timetable for the implementation of the Internal or Single Market by 1992.53 It 
effectively transferred to the European level new policy areas that had for years 
remained under the exclusive control of national governments and authorised a 
revived Commission to assume the responsibility of achieving compliance with the 
Treaty provisions (Cini, 1996; Tsoukalis, 1993; Cameron, 1992; Weiler, 1991; 
Sandholtz and Zysman, 1989; MacLachlan and MacKesy, 1989).
The negotiations and the signing of the SEA (1984-86) coincided with a steady 
improvement of the economic environment. The political readiness to go ahead with 
what was perceived as a supply-side programme contributed to a further improvement 
of it. With the Internal Market, the Community had, as in the 1950s and 1960s, 
found a force motrice for further integration. However, contrary to experiences
52 Single European Act of 7 February 1986, OJ [1987] L 169/7. (effective since 1 July 1987).
53 The Internal Market is defined, in a new Article 8(a) added by the SEA to the Treaty of Rome, 
as ’an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital 
is ensured in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty.’
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during those decades, this time the objective was accompanied by changes in the 
decision-making process which were meant to facilitate the implementation of the 
programme, such as majority voting in the Council of Ministers. On this occasion, 
therefore, an effective link was established between the change in the structure of the 
European market and European political institutions. Moreover, for the first time, a 
programme of full integration of the private market was made possible by the shift 
from state-managed to more market-oriented national industrial policies. (Tsoukalis, 
1993; Cameron, 1992)
The negotiations and signing of the SEA were also concurrent with the 
beginning of a new trend of merger activity in the Community (Woolcock, 1989; 
CEC, 1986a). As the Commission concluded from its annual study on concentration 
for 1986 (CEC, 1987a: 216): ’...there was a sharp rise in the number of acquisition 
of minority holdings. As the acquisition of a minority stake in a company can be a 
prelude to a takeover, this finding could signal a future wave of merger activity.’ 
According to De Jong (1988: 4), the merger movement had started earlier: ’Since 
1983, merger and takeover activity in all European countries is again on the 
increase.’
Thus, it is in a totally different context that the Council negotiations on the 
new merger control regulation proposal started. A transition was taking place from 
a Western Europe based on Keynesian policies in which the nation-state accumulated 
tasks and functions despite being involved in a process of integration, to a Western 
Europe based on neo-liberal policies in which there was a move of activities from the 
nation-state both to the private sector and to the European level as well as a new 
trend of merger activity. In short, as the 1981-83 context challenged an agreement 
on merger control regulation, the 1984-86 period seemed to offer an opportunity to 
achieve such an accord.
Indeed, in this new atmosphere, ’competition policy was seen as an essential 
adjunct to the market’ (Allen, 1996: 159) or even as ’the keystone’ of this new 
market approach (Cini and McGowan, 1998: 31). In the merger area, a new OECD 
report published in 1984 argued once again in favour of prior control of mergers,
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especially of larger ones (Lyons, 1987; OECD, 1984). Yet, neither the Commission’s 
White Paper on the creation of an internal market nor the SEA did include any 
reference to the need of EEC merger control (Cini and McGowan, 1998; Dechery, 
1990). As Rosenthal (1990: 303) put it: ’...merger control was no part of the 1992 
program.’ For some authors, this was a reflection of the difficulties the 1984 
amended proposal was experiencing in the Council (Woolcock, 1989).
The Council’s Working Party on Economic Questions initiated its discussions 
on the Commission’s amended proposal for a merger regulation on 10 July 1984, 
after seven years of interruption (Dechery, 1990). Though the working group’s 
meetings in 1984 and 1985 indicated that a majority of member states agreed with 
the principle of establishing a Community instrument for merger control, 
disagreement persisted both on points of detail and on certain essential issues. Four 
key issues remained unsolved: the scope of application (Article 1(1) and (2)), 
derogations (Article 1(3)), prior notification (Article 4) and the control procedure 
(Article 19) (CEC, 1986a; CEC, 1985). A political decision by the Council to serve 
as guidance for future debates seemed necessary. Yet, ’there was no meeting in the 
Council to discuss these matters’ (CEC, 1987a: 49), ’the Council remain[ed] 
unwilling to enter into a constructive discussion of the Commission’s proposals’ 
(CEC, 1987a: 16). As a result, in the course of 1986, the Council’s Working Party 
and the Committee of Permanent Representatives did not succeed in making any 
progress on these four outstanding issues. Negotiations on the merger regulation 
proposal had reached a new stalemate.
This new impasse arrived despite the efforts and threats of Mr. Peter 
Sutherland, head of DG IV since 1985 and, for some commentators, ’the most 
vigorous and committed Commissioner Europe ha[d] ever had’ (Tempini, 1991: 141). 
Like his predecessor, Sutherland had made merger control one of his priorities (I 8, 
1995; Lever and Lasok, 1986). Shortly after taking office, he threatened to develop 
EC merger policy by other means if the Council did not endorse the merger control 
regulation proposal. First, he indicated that he was prepared to apply not only Article 
86 but also Articles 85 and 90 of the EEC Treaty to mergers (Bernini, 1991; 
Tempini, 1991; Brussels Law Offices, 1988; Elland, 1987; Korah, 1987; Reynolds,
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1987; Lever and Lasok, 1986). For example, in a speech to the Association des
Juristes d’Entreprises Europeens of 18 April 1985, he stated:
As I have already indicated on other occasions if the proposal for merger control which has 
been pending now before the Council for 12 years is not enacted, the Commission will be 
forced to examine the direct applicability of Articles 85, 86 and 90 to mergers. In that event, 
I could propose to the Commission to adopt appropiate guidelines before applying this policy 
in individual cases. (Brussels Law Offices, 1988: 285)M
Then, in November 1985, Sutherland hinted, for the first time, at the 
possibility of extending the Commission’s existing powers under Article 86 of the 
EEC Treaty by exploiting the concept of ’collective dominance’ or ’shared 
monopoly’. Such a development would have placed mergers involving members of 
so-called ’tight’ oligopolies and mergers between one oligopolist and a smaller 
undertaking within the scope of Article 86 (Reynolds, 1987; Lever and Lasok, 1986). 
In a speech delivered at the Eighth Annual Competition Law Conference, organised 
in Brussels by European Study Conferences,
Mr. Sutherland stated that the Commission was going to pay close attention to the type of case 
expressly mentioned in Article 86 namely the abuse of one or more undertakings of a 
dominant position. In other words the Commission would seek to rely on the concept of abuse 
of a collective dominant position where it could not identify one dominant company, for 
example to prevent further concentration in a market that is already oligopolistic...Mr. 
Sutherland stated that a report had been commissioned and that the Commission was 
examining a number of cases. (Brussels Law Offices, 1988: 287)
Sutherland reiterated in other speeches his intention both of using Articles 85 
and 90 of the EEC Treaty as merger instruments and to apply Article 86 to cases 
involving undertakings which were jointly in a dominant position, if there was no 
progress in the Council on the proposed merger regulation. For instance, in his 
September 1986 conference at the International Bar Association meeting in New York 
(Brussels Law Offices, 1988; Elland, 1987; Reynolds, 1987; Lever and Lasok,
54 Article 85 possible application to mergers was discussed by several legal experts in those years as 
this article of the EEC Treaty had been brought in a number of joint venture cases into close contact with 
issues most usually connected with mergers (Brittan, 1992; Lever and Lasok, 1986; Merkin and Williams, 
1984). Sutherland usually mentioned this possibility in a context of a special implementing regulation based 
on Articles 85 and 87 of the EEC Treaty, which would presumably contain thresholds to avoid the flood 
of notifications that would otherwise result as well as introduce strict procedural time-limits (Brussels Law 
Offices, 1988; Reynolds, 1987). Such a regulation would not need unanimity but a qualified majority in 
the Council to be adopted.
Regarding Article 90 of the EEC Treaty, its application to mergers would have been aimed at operations 
involving large public undertakings and would have particularly affected Italian public conglomerates 
(Korah, 1987; Reynolds, 1987).
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1986). Yet, as noted before, Sutherland’s threats were unsuccessful.
Given this situation, in 1986, the European Parliament, in its Resolution on 
the Fifteenth Annual Report on Competition Policy, invited the Commission to 
withdraw the proposal and to start anew:
[The European Parliament] considers that the Commission should end the 13 year-old 
deadlock in Council on its proposal on amalgamation and merger controls by withdrawing [its 
proposals] forthwith, in order that a fresh start can be made on filling this important gap in 
the Community’s competition policy. (CEC, 1987a: 245)
This advice highlighted the fact that the early 1980s attempt to get an EEC merger 
regulation had failed and marked the beginning of a new period of negotiations.
To outline this descriptive section, four stages can again be singled out in the 
early 1980s negotiations of the EEC Merger Regulation (see table 4.2). These four 
stages followed the consultation procedure needed to approve the Commission’s 
proposal. Yet, while a common factor of this period of negotiations was the absence 
of the 1970s move from a ’pro-merger approach’ towards a more stringent one at the 
national level, the four stages did not all occur within the same context.
The first three stages took place within a challenging context characterised by 
a deep economic crisis, ’national champions’ policies and Euro-pessimism. The first 
stage covered the years 1978 to 1980 and accounted for the events which led to the 
1973 proposal’s amendments. The second stage corresponded to 1981, a year 
dedicated to the preparation of the text changes and by the end of which the 
Commission submitted to the Council its revised proposal. In the subsequent third 
stage, both the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee 
approved the 1981 draft though subject to some modifications. In February 1984, 
most of their amendments were formally introduced by the Commission into the 
merger regulation proposal.
The fourth stage, that ran from 1984 to 1986, enjoyed a more favourable 
context. The political and economic climate both at the national and the European 
level was undergoing a transformation. However, at this stage, the Council’s
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Working Party on Economic Questions and the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives discussed the revised text without reaching an agreement. The early 
1980s negotiation period ended with an apparent new deadlock situation and the 
recommendation of the European Parliament to start afresh. The latter closed a period 
of negotiations and announced the start of another.
I l l
TABLE 4.2. THE EARLY 1980s PERIOD
CONSULTATION PROCEDURE (ART 235 EEC Treaty)
CONTEXT 1978-83
* Deep economic malaise.
* Interventionist policies at national level.
* The move from a ’pro-merger approach’ towards a more stringent one at the national level did not 
take place.
* Euro-pessimism.
* Increasing number of oligopolies.
BACKGROUND OF THE LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL AMENDMENT
* 1978, Lack of agreement on the 1973 EEC merger regulation (EMR) proposal.
* 1980, The Commission and the European Parliament pressed the Council to resume its work.
PREPARATION OF THE TEXT
* 16 December 1981, Commission’s amended proposal on EMR.
OPINIONS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
COMMITTEE
* 30 J u n e /1 July 1982, Economic and Social Committee’s favourable Opinion.
* 25 October 1983, European Parliament’s favourable Resolution.
=  >  7 February 1984, Commission’s new amended EMR proposal based on European Parliament’s 
comments.
CONTEXT 1984-86
* Transformation of the economic and political climate both at the national and European 
level towards neo-liberal policies and Euro-optimism.
* Beginning of a new merger wave.
DISCUSSIONS IN THE COUNCIL
* 1984-86, Different meetings of the Working Party on Economic Questions and of the Committee of 
Permanent Representatives.
* 1985-86, Sutherland’s threats.
* 1986, European Parliament’s advice to withdraw the EMR proposal and to start afresh.
=  >  THE AMENDED PROPOSALS DID NOT LEAD TO AN AGREEMENT.
4.3. LATE 1980s: THE THIRD ATTEMPT
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In December 1986, the Commission, under Article 149 of the EEC Treaty, 
modified again its merger control regulation proposal.55 It amended only one article 
but by doing so its early 1980s approach on the control issue was reversed. The 
Commission delated from Article 19 the possibility of a Council involvement in the 
decision-making process going back to its initial proposal of a simple advisory 
committee procedure (CEC, 1986b). As explained in its Sixteenth Report on 
Competition Policy for 1986 (1987a: 49): ’[The Commission] now proposes to 
organize cooperation between the Commission and the member states in the decision­
making process through the establisment of a traditional advisory committee similar 
to that provided for in cartel cases.’ In short, all decision-making power was again 
left in the hands of the Commission.
But the Commission changes to Article 19 did not stop there. By amending 
Article 19(5), the Commission was expressly preventing the Advisory Committee 
from voting on the outcome of its deliberations. Also by amending Article 19(6), the 
Commission obtained the power to set a time limit within which the Committee could 
deliver its opinion upon the draft decision. The Commission’s modifications to 
Article 19, therefore, did not only remove the decision-making influence granted to 
member states’ representatives in the 1981 and 1984 proposals, but also limited the 
advisory power of the Committee (Elland, 1987).
These amendments were made in accordance with the September 1985 
Luxembourg’s Intergovernmental Conference’s call to the Community institutions to 
establish principles and rules for the exercise of executive powers conferred to the 
Commission. Under the strong leadership of Jacques Delors as its president (Cini, 
1996) and of Peter Sutherland as head of DG IV, the Commission took the 
opportunity to reinstate its total jurisdiction over mergers with a Community 
dimension (CEC, 1986b). These changes reflected a more confident Commission. For 
Elland (1987: 165), they even ’tend to indicate that the Commission’s patience with
55 OJ [1986] C 324/5.
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the Council [was] running out. ’ In any case, they were the breaking point between 
the early and late 1980s negotiations.
The late 1980s were years of sustained economic growth, there was ’an 
economic boom’ (I 14, 1995). According to the Commission, this favourable 
economic climate owed much, where the Community was concerned, ’to the 
opportunities for expansion created by the gradual completion of the internal market’ 
(CEC, 1989a: 13).
Certainly, these were years of substantial transformation in the nature of 
Western Europe’s industrial configuration. Business reacted to the Single Market and 
to globalisation, and the return of high growth in the late 1980s went hand in hand 
with a major re-organisation of industry (Gerber, 1994; OECD, 1992; George and 
Jacquemin, 1992; Maclachlan and Mackesy, 1989; House of Lords, 1989; Gray, 
1988; Cooke, 1988). Unlike earlier periods, and as seen in chapter two, this 
restructuring was no longer confined within national boundaries, an increasing 
number of mergers and acquisitions across national frontiers took place in those 
years. With respect to this, the Commission’s Nineteenth Annual Report on 
Competition Policy for 1989 (1990a: 241) reads:
The favourable short-term economic situation has led economic operators to incorporate 
increasingly in their planning the need to adapt to the new market conditions expected for 
1993. The strategic planning implemented by firms leads them to overcome the Community’s 
internal economic barriers by conducting a variety o f transnational operations.
There was a growing ’Europeanness’ or Europanisation of the perceptions and 
strategies adopted by European firms. European companies were changing their 
reference market from national to European (I 13, 1995; Sandholtz and Zysman, 
1989), increasing industrial concentration both in national and European markets 
(Gerber, 1994; Monopolkommission, 1989).
The late 1980s were also years of consolidation, although at different speeds 
in the different member countries, of the shift from interventionist towards neo-liberal 
policies iniciated in the early 1980s. Even in the two new member countries of the 
Community: Spain and Portugal, it was increasingly accepted that subsidised jobs
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were unstable jobs and that successful firms had to find incentives for growth within 
themselves and in the market place (CEC, 1988a). Quoting the Commission 
Seventeenth Annual Report on Competition Policy (1988a: 13):
As the completion of the internal market by 1992 gathers pace, competition policy is coming 
more to the fore. This fact is widely reflected in the economic and industrial policies of the 
member states and in the new emphasis on competition policy even in member states which 
hitherto did not have well developed legislative and policy framework in the field of 
competition.
Just as the 1970s was the decade of industrial policy, the late 1980s represented the 
increasing importance of competition policy. The need of competition and hence of 
competition law became much more acceptable than in the past (I 19, 1995; I 16, 
1995; I 10, 1995; Wilks, 1992; Brittan, 1991; Howe, 1987). As Goyder (1988: 4) 
noted:
Whereas thirty years ago when the Treaty o f Rome was first signed, there was no member 
state which had a competition law of a comprehensive nature and proven effectiveness, today, 
rare is the member state without its own competition law and in many, though not all, cases 
an increasing determination in its enforcement.
Indeed, as regards to merger policy, the two new entrants, Portugal and 
Spain, enacted their own merger laws in 1988 and 1989 respectively; draft laws were 
being considered in three other member states, Italy, Greece and Belgium (they were 
passed in the early 1990s); and France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
United Kingdom were making their merger controls more stringent (CEC, 1990a; 
CEC, 1989a; CEC, 1988a). The gradual move from a ’pro-merger approach’ towards 
a more severe one enunciated in the 1970s, re-started in the late 1980s. By 1989, six 
of the then twelve member states had their own merger control laws, three were 
discussing draft laws, and only three -The Netherlands, Denmark and Luxembourg- 
neither had nor were in the process of enacting such a law. In the late 1980s, 
therefore, although only the United Kingdom, Germany and France had fully 
developed and regularly applied law and policies in the merger field, other member 
states had incipient merger legislations or were in the process of adopting them 
(Brittan, 1991; Woolcock, 1989).56
Within this favourable context, Commissioner Sutherland, with the explicit
56 See Annex E.
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support of the European Parliament, continued to make merger control one of the 
priorities of his DG in 1987. The Commission felt, as well as the European 
Parliament, that although progress had been made in most areas of competition 
policy, there still remained a number of gaps, even in areas that were essential to the 
smooth running of the Community’s economy. They believed that these gaps should 
be filled before 1992 (CEC, 1988a). Prior-control of mergers was among those areas: 
’This matter is crucial to the preservation of competition structures, since it is 
inconceivable, from the standpoint of the completion of the internal market, that 
Community-scale mergers should not be evaluated from a Community standpoint’ 
(CEC, 1988a: 15). Accordingly, throughout 1987 the Commission met with several 
experts, such as the members of the Competition and Intellectual Property Special 
Committee of the Consultative Committee of the Bars and Law Societies in October 
or a delegation from the Conseil National du Patronat Franqais in July, and one of 
the principal topics discussed was merger control (CEC, 1988a).
In July 1987, however, at the Competition Law Inquiry in London and in a 
speech to national Directors-General of competition in Brussels, Sutherland had to 
express again his frustration at the lack of progress in the adoption of the regulation 
(Brussels Law Offices, 1988; Reynolds, 1987). Yet, instead of dropping the issue, 
he decided to force it. The Commission asked the Council ’to adopt a political 
position that would allow work on the Commission’s proposal to be pursued actively 
and constructively’ (CEC, 1988a: 51). To this end aim, in the autumn of 1987, the 
Commission tabled its opinion that the future regulation should be based upon four 
essential points before the Council. These points were the following:
(a) The regime to be set up should be applicable to major mergers which have a truly 
European dimension. The aim should be to prevent both the creation, and the enlargement, 
of dominant market positions.
(b) The regime should, furthermore, provide legal certainty for firms subject to the controls. 
This will require a system of prior notification and the taking of decisions within tight 
deadlines.
(c) The future regulation should also provide for authorization in derogation from the 
prohibition; this provision would be guided by the principles of Article 85(3) o f the EEC 
Treaty, ...
(d) Lastly, the regulation should ensure adequate participation of the member states in the 
decision-making process, and close cooperation within the Advisory Committee. (CEC, 
1988a: 51-52)
If a political commitment on the principle of Community-wide merger control
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was not achieved, the Commission intended to control large-scale mergers without 
the EEC regulation by making full use of its powers under Articles 85 and 86 of the 
EEC Treaty (van Empel, 1990; House of Lords, 1989; Europolitique, 5 Mar 1988; 
Financial Times, 3 Jul 1987). In July 1987, presenting the Commission’s Sixteenth 
Annual Report on Competition Policy, Sutherland told member states that if they 
could not agree by the end of the year, at least in principle, to the necessity for an 
EEC merger control regulation, he would use the full force of Articles 85 and 86 to 
try to fill the gap (Owen and Dynes, 1989). In October 1987, he declared to the 
European Parliament that:
If our efforts in the Council do not achieve the desired results, I intend to propose my 
colleagues in accordance with the suggestion contained in the Parliament’s Resolution on the 
Fifteenth Competition Report that the Commission withdraw the proposal and in that event 
we will have to apply ourselves to the innovative task o f applying Articles 85 and 86 directly 
to mergers. (Venit, 1990: 13)
At the beginning of November, following the Commission’s opinion and 
threats and before the Council meeting scheduled to discuss the matter, the Union of 
Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe (UNICE) emitted a declaration 
in favour of the adoption of a Council regulation. UNICE’s members wanted 
’Community-level control over European-scale company mergers, including joint 
ventures of a concentrative character. ’ Their declaration asked for a merger control 
’exercised on the basis of pre-defmed, objective and transparent, economic and legal 
criteria’, which should be such as to ’favour cross-border mergers within the 
framework of the EEC Treaty’ and ’to enable industry to strengthen its competitive 
position on European and world markets.’ It also suggested that companies should 
be able to choose between prior and subsequent control and that short decisional 
deadlines were necessary. (CEC, 1988a; UNICE, 10 Nov 1987)
Also before the Council could give its opinion on the Commission’s approach, 
the European Court of Justice, in its ruling on the BAT-Reynolds case57 (also known
57 British American Tobacco Company Ltd. and Reynolds Industries Inc v. Commission of the 
European Communities (Joined Cases 142 and 156/84) [1987] ECR 4487.
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as Philip Morris case)58 of 17 November 1987, widened Community’s armoury to 
control mergers. The Court ruled, for the first time, that Article 85 of the EEC 
Treaty could, in certain circumstances, be applied to acquisitions of financial holdings 
between two competing firms. Though the judgement was ambiguous on the crucial 
question of whether Article 85 only applied to the acquisition of a minority 
shareholding in a competitor or also to acquisitions of majority or total shareholdings, 
the Commission considered that ’the line taken by the Court suggested] that the 
prohibition on cartels contained in Article 85 could possibly be applied to certain 
mergers, both by the Commission and by a national court’ (CEC, 1988a: 17). 
Indeed, on 29 November 1987, the Commission derived support from the Court’s 
ruling to threaten again with developing EEC merger control on the basis of Articles 
85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty (Dechery, 1990; House of Lords, 1989). Also, during 
the two years of negotiations that followed, it did not hesitate to put its interpretation 
of the judgement into effect. It not only applied with greater vigour Article 86 of the 
EEC Treaty to mergers but also started to use Article 85 to this endeavour, building 
up a dual track negotiating stance with the Council (Venit, 1990).
It was after these events that, on 30 November 1987, the Council met to 
discuss the Commission’s opinion. Although an agreement on the need for an EEC 
merger regulation could not be reached due to refusal of the British and French 
delegations to take a position at that stage, the Council ’adopted a generally positive 
attitude on the main lines of the Commission’s approach’ (CEC, 1988a: 52; CEC, 
1987c: 31). In fact, the Germans declared their intention to give priority to this 
question in their then forthcoming Presidency (CEC, 1988a) and the Council opened 
the door for the Commission to present a new proposal: ’Should the Commission be
58 British American Tobacco Company Ltd and R.J. Reynolds Industries Inc. had brought actions 
before the European Court of Justice in 1984 for the annulment of a Commission decision of the same year 
declaring that certain agreements concluded between Philip Morris Incorporated and Rembrandt Group 
Limited did not infringe Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty. In April 1981, the Rembrandt Group, a 
South African based company, had sold to Philip Morris, the largest American exporter of cigarettes, 50 
per cent of the equity in Rothmans Tobacco Holdings (RTH). Because RTH had a controlling interest in 
Rothmans International (RI), the Rembrandt Group and Philip Morris had agreed that the activities of RI 
should be managed on a joint basis. After the objection of the Commission to this agreement, the parties 
decided that Philip Morris would abandon its 50 per cent interest in RTH in exchange for a direct 
shareholding in RI. Philip Morris would have a 30.8 per cent stake in RI but would hold only 24.9 per cent 
of the votes. The Commission found no objection to the new share deal. (Downes and Ellison, 1991; Le 
Bolzer, 1990; Brussels Law Offices, 1988; ECR, 1987; Fine, 1987; Lever and Lasok, 1986)
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required to amend its proposal, it will once again formally consult the European 
Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee’ (CEC, 1988a: 52). At the end 
of 1987, therefore, the Council had agreed, at the Commission’s request, to 
recommence work on a revised draft regulation (CEC, 1989a; Carr, 1988). This 
favourable disposal led the Commission to express its optimism: ’It should be 
possible for the Council to adopt the Regulation before the end of 1988’ (CEC, 
1988a: 52).
The European Commission’s expectations seemed to be well founded. In the 
first half of 1988, the German Presidency placed, as promised, the work of 
establishing Community merger control high on its list of priorities (Dechery, 1990; 
CEC, 1988c; Carr, 1988; The Times, 7 Jun 1988). It was the first Presidency to do 
so and the ensuing ones followed its example (Zachman, 1994; Dechery, 1990). In 
any case, the Germans wanted to get the Council to adopt a merger control regulation 
during 1988 (CEC, 1988c). The merger issue had been included in the Council’s 
agenda.
On 25 April 1988, the Commission adopted an amended proposal for EEC 
merger regulation containing the main points it had earlier submitted to the 
Council.59 To mark that it was to signify a new start, the proposal included a new 
preamble and fully stated all the articles. It provided for changes in three areas: 
thresholds, the authorisation criteria and procedural rules. As to thresholds, the scope 
of the regulation (Article 1) was to be determined by three quantitative thresholds 
based on two criteria, a turnover criterion and a new geographical criterion. Namely, 
the regulation was not to be applied to those concentrations: which had an aggregate 
worldwide turnover of less than 1000 million ECU; or where the aggregate 
worldwide turnover of the undertaking to be acquired was less than 50 million ECU; 
or where all the undertakings effecting the concentration achieved more than three- 
quarters of their aggregate Community-wide turnover within one and the same 
member state. The idea was again that European merger control should apply only 
to large-scale mergers of Community-wide importance, with the national authorities
59 OJ [1988] C 130/4.
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continuing to exercise control in cases having essentially a national impact.
Concerning the authorisation criteria, Article 2 of the new proposal was based 
on principles analogous to those contained in Article 85(3) of the EEC Treaty, 
limiting the possibility of exemptions. It still contained important industrial caveats 
but these would be considered only insofar as the merger did not block competition. 
Specifically, Article 2(4) stated:
The Commission shall authorize concentrations as compatible with the common market where 
they contribute to the attainment o f the basic objectives of the Treaty, in particular to 
improving production and distribution, to promoting technical or economic progress or to 
improving the competitive structure within the common market, taking due account of the 
competitiveness of the undertakings concerned with regard to international competition and 
of the interests of consumers, provided that they do not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the 
achievement o f the concentration;
(b) do not afford the undertaking concerned the possibility of eliminating competition in 
respect of a substantial part of the goods or services concerned.
Lastly, regarding the procedural rules, the main changes proposed made time­
limits for Commission decisions on merger cases tougher and widened the prior- 
notification regime. In relation to the latter, the proposal called for a regime of prior- 
notification of all mergers within the scope of the regulation, and not only of those 
whose aggregate turnover was not less than 1000 million units of account (Article 4). 
As Korah and Lasok (1988: 361) stated: ’The definitions of mergers that [were] 
subject to control and those which [were] required to be notified to the Commission 
[were made] identical.’ Respecting procedural time-limits, Article 6(3) established 
that only two months, instead of three, could elapse from notification to the 
commencement of proceedings. Once the procedure had been initiated, new Article 
19(1) stated that a decision should be taken within four months instead of nine, unless 
the parties concerned agreed on an extension. In other words, a final decision should 
be taken, at the latest, at the end of a period of six months instead of twelve. The 
operational deadlines had been halved.
To sum up, in April 1988 the Commission was still seeking exclusive control 
of all merger cases above certain thresholds and to follow a ’trade-off approach’ to 
merger policy. Any merger that created or reinforced a dominant position would be 
banned except when subject to exemption. However, this proposal, by limiting the
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possibility of exemptions, implied a tendency towards a more ’competitive-structure 
approach’ (i.e. competition as the only criteria to judge a merger case), and, by 
introducing new turnover and geographical criteria, offered a new definition of the 
scope of the regulation, reducing it. (Monopolkommission, 1989; Woolcock, 1989; 
Schwartz, 1993; Reynolds, 1990; CEC, 1989a; CEC, 1988c)
The Council immediately commenced deliberating on the proposal at working 
party level. The German Presidency intended ’to report to the Council on 22 June 
1988 of the results of the discussions to be held in its relevant working party on the 
[...] amended proposal for a regulation’ (CEC, 1988c: 8).
Meanwhile, both the European Parliament and the Economic and Social 
Committee were formally consulted on the new proposal. On the 2 June 1988, the 
Economic and Social Committee endorsed the proposal stressing the need for 
concentrations with a Community dimension to be appraised solely by the Community 
authority, for the whole of the Common Market, thus ruling out the applicability of 
national legislation in such cases. The Opinion also pointed out that it was essential 
that undertakings were not controlled at both the Community and national level, and 
that the administrative procedures should be as short as possible. Lastly, the 
Committee asked that account be taken of the need to inform and consult the workers 
affected by a concentration (CEC, 1989a).60
The Economic and Social Committee’s Opinion was followed the 22 of June 
by a favourable assessment of the Council of Ministers on the proposal: ’...the 
Council noted that considerable progress had been made in drafting the Regulation’ 
(CEC, 1989a: 51). At that meeting, the Council also reached general agreement on 
the need of ensuring a one-stop-shop system, prior-notification and the assessment 
of mergers on the basis of effective competition. Namely, it agreed on the following 
points:
(i) decisions taken by the Community authorities should as far as possible prevail over national
decisions;
(ii) concentrations with a Community dimension should be notified prior to implementation;
60 OJ [1988] C 208/11.
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(iii) the decisive criterion for prohibiting a concentration should be the creation o f a position
impeding effective competition in the com m on market. (CEC, 1989a: 51)
Last but not least, that Council meeting was important in that the French 
representatives accepted in principle that mergers with a Community dimension 
should generally be subject to EEC control, leaving the British alone in maintaining 
a general reserve upon the regulation. (Tempini, 1991; Dechery, 1990; 
Monopolkommission, 1989; Owen and Dynes, 1989; The Times, 19 Dec 1988; 
Europolitique, 10 Sep 1988; The Times, 23 Jun 1988)
On 26 October 1988, the European Parliament also welcomed the 
Commission’s proposal in its Resolution, emphasising that the Community should 
have exclusive competence for concentrations covered by the regulation. National 
competition law should not apply to such concentrations. Besides some technical 
amendments, the Parliament requested that the Commission make provision for, on 
the one hand, the immediate publication of notifications’ main points in order to 
inform all the economic and social actors concerned and, on the other hand, the right 
of the undertakings supervisory bodies and of the legitimate representatives of their 
employees to be heard by the Commission (CEC, 1989a).61
The Commission approved on the spot most of the European Parliament’s 
amendments to the draft regulation. Yet, before it could take any formal action, the 
Council, at its meeting of 18 November 1988 and on the basis of its group of experts 
work, further discussed two of the three problems which had emerged during the 
preparatory work: the question of exclusive competence and the question of the 
assessment criteria. On the former, in accordance with the general agreement reached 
in June, the ministers decided that in principle ’the appraisal of concentrations with 
a Community dimension should be carried out by a single authority on the basis of 
the Regulation and that national legislation should not in principle be applicable’ 
(CEC, 1989a: 53). On the latter, ’the Council agreed to continue its work on the 
basis of the principle of neutrality...the general approach to concentrations should be 
open and free from the outset of any bias’ (CEC, 1988a: 53). The Commission
61 OJ [1988] C 309/49.
122
should not presume the compatibility or incompatibility of a merger with the 
Common Market before investigation (Dechery, 1990).
On 30 November 1988, the Commission modified its proposal of 25 April 
1988 taking into consideration most of the amendments adopted by the European 
Parliament and including some innovations. The latter were mostly based on a 
Commission’s internal working paper completed in July 1988 and set out to take into 
account the ideas formulated by the Council. The proposal was published in the 
Official Journal on 28 January 1989.62 The most important changes and innovations 
concerned the scope of the regulation and the relationship between Community law 
and national laws.
On the latter, the amended proposal envisaged two situations in which national 
laws could be applied to mergers within the scope of the regulation. Article 8(2) 
established that, in cases where a concentration is compatible with the Common 
Market, each member state directly concerned by the concentration would be 
empowered to apply its national legislation on competition, in order to ensure 
conditions of effective competition in local markets. Moreover, Article 20(3) allowed 
member states to ’take appropiate measures where necessary to protect legitimate 
interests other than those pursued by the Regulation, provided that the interests are 
sufficiently defined and protected in domestic law and that the measures are 
compatible with other provisions of Community law.’ In other words, although the 
Commission should still have sole competence for concentrations with a Community 
dimension and the decision-making would remain under the simple advisory 
committee procedure (Art. 20(1)), the field of national laws and interests was to be 
extended by other means. These articles granted member states broad powers to block 
or permit a merger at national level, regardless of what the Commission decided.
As to the changes on the scope of the regulation (Art.l), one of the 
quantitative thresholds was substantially increased diminishing the number of mergers 
considered to have a Community dimension: ’...the  requirement that the firm being
62 OJ [1989] C 22/14.
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acquired should have a minimum worldwide turnover of ECU 50 million was 
replaced by a turnover threshold of ECU 100 million, to be achieved in the 
Community by at least two of the firms involved in the operation’ (CEC, 1988a: 52).
Besides these two main amendments, it should be noted that the procedural 
time-limits were again reduced. Though the Commission continued to have four 
months for the full investigation, the preliminary inquiry period was reduced. The 
Commission would just have one month, instead of two, to decide whether to start 
proceedings against a merger (Art. 6(3)). Under these new arrangements, therefore, 
where the Commission judged a merger deserved full investigation, the whole inquiry 
would have had to be completed and a ruling given within five months instead of the 
previous six. The time-limits could, however, still be extended by agreement or for 
other reasons, including the provision of incomplete information by the parties.
With these modifications, on the whole, the 1988 proposals had redefined 
some of the most controversial issues of the regulation. They had certainly limited 
the scope of the regulation and, although confirmed the sole competence of the 
Commission to take the decisions, provided for some sharing of control with the 
member states. Moreover, procedural rules had been clarified and tougher time-limits 
for decision established. However, whilst the 1988 amendments had advanced 
towards a competition based authorisation criteria, by and large, the approach to 
merger policy was still the same as in the 1970s, a ’trade-off approach’. A merger 
authorisation could still be granted if the contribution of the merger towards 
improving the competitive structure within the Common Market outweighted the 
damage to competition. (Woolcock, 1989; Monopolkommission, 1989; House of 
Lords, 1989; CEC, 1988a; The Guardian, 10 Nov 1988; The Economist, 5 Nov 
1988)
It is worth adding to this picture of the 1988’s events, that throughout the year 
the Commission maintained several contacts with interested parties. As the 
Commission stated in its Eighteenth Report on Competition Policy for 1988 (1989a: 
27): ’The Commission also received a wide range of observations from interested 
parties in the course of its work on the proposal for a Council regulation on the
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control of concentrations.’ Among those interested parties, the Commission was 
particularly in touch with UNICE:
The Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe continued closely to follow 
developments in connection with the Commission’s proposals for a regulation on the control 
of concentrations. Commission officials attended two meetings with Unice in which this matter 
was discussed in depth. Unice also submitted a number of written observations during the 
year, both on the modified concentration control proposals and on the two proposals for block 
exemption regulations... (CEC, 1989a: 26)
Thus, the preparation of the 1988 proposals was a joint job between all Community’s 
institutions and interested parties.
When an agreement on the Commission’s final proposal on European merger 
regulation was not reached by the Council at the end of 1988, this communication 
with interested groups, and especially with UNICE, was not lost. In 1989, while the 
Council discussions continued, ’a meeting was held with representatives of businesses 
at the European level (UNICE) to discuss merger control, and there were a number 
of bilateral exchanges with national employers* organizations’ (CEC, 1990a: 24).
At the critical Council of Ministers meeting of 21 December 1988, an 
agreement could still not be reached despite a last concession made by Sutherland to 
raise the combined worldwide turnover threshold from 1 to 2 billion ECU (Elland, 
1991; Financial Times, 9 Feb 1989; The Times, 6 Jan 1989). It was on the grounds 
of this last offer that Leon Brittan, in charge of DG IV since January 1989, and who 
had also made merger control a priority, continued the negotiations for an EEC 
merger regulation endlessly proposing further amendments (Jacobs and Stewart-Clark, 
1990; Brittan, 1989; The Economist, 7 Oct 1989; The Times, 31 Jan 1989; The 
Times, 28 Jan 1989; Financial Times, 28 Jan 1989). Most of these revisions were the 
result of an increased number of bilateral and multilateral contacts between the 
Commission and the member states’ delegations, as well as between the member 
states’ delegations themselves, held in parallel to the official negotiations (1 14,1995; 
Dechery, 1990; van Empel, 1990; Financial Times, 19 Sep 1989). As van Empel 
(1990: 12) described: ’...the drafts followed each other in quick succession, so that 
even those closely involved had some difficulty in keeping track.’
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To give an example, in March 1989, with hindsight of the 13 April Council 
meeting, the Commission proposed further upward revisions of the quantitative 
jurisdictional thresholds. Brittan announced that the Commission would be prepared 
to consider a global turnover figure of 5 instead of 2 billion ECU, but only until the 
end of 1992. The threshold would fall to 2 billion ECU the first of January 1993. 
Moreover, merger entities that would generate at least two-thirds of their EC-wide 
revenue in a single state would be exempt, a reduction from prior drafts’ three- 
quarters hurdle. The Commission estimated that the new proposals, if adopted, would 
limit its competence to 30 or 40 transactions per year in the first few years and to 
around 80 once the threshold drop to its permanent level, as opposed to the estimated 
150 transactions under previous versions. (Schwartz, 1993; Dechery, 1990; Fine, 
1989; Whish, 1989; Woolcock, 1989; Lee and Robin, 1989; Europolitique, 15 Apr 
1989; Financial Times, 1 Apr 1989; The Times, 1 Apr 1989)
Lastly, it was on 21 December 1989, under the French Presidency, that the 
Council arrived at an agreement on EEC merger regulation after two years of very 
complex and hard negotiations (I 12, 1995; I 6, 1995; Brittan, 1992; van Empel, 
1990; Reynolds, 1990; Dechery, 1990).63 As in the Commission’s proposals, the 
Regulation established a distinction between mergers having a Community dimension, 
for which the Commission would be responsible, and those whose main impact was 
at national level, which would be accountable to the national authorities. Three 
increased cumulative quantitative thresholds were agreed upon to achieve this aim. 
A merger had a Community dimension when the combined aggregate worldwide 
turnover of all the undertakings concerned was more than 5 billion ECU; the 
aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings 
concerned was more than 250 million ECU; and each of the undertakings concerned 
did not achieve more than two-thirds of its aggregate Community-wide turnover 
within one and the same member state (Article 1). Concentrations with a Community 
dimension had to be notified to the Commission and certain waiting periods observed 
before they could be put into effect.
63 Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 (OJ [1989] L 395/1; corrigendum 
in OJ[1990] L 257).
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Nevertheless and in line with the Commission’s 1988 proposals, the 
Regulation also provided for two derogations to the principle of exclusive Community 
responsibility for mergers which fell under its scope. Article 9, the so-called ’German 
clause’, enabled national authorities, subject to the Commission’s permission, to 
intervene where a problem involving a dominant position arose in a ’distinct local 
market’. Also, Article 21, the so-called ’British clause’, gave member states the right 
to ensure the protection of ’legitimate interests’ other than those protected by the 
Regulation such as public security, plurality of media and prudential rules. In both 
cases, member states could only be more severe than the Commission in judging the 
merger.
In addition, and as a counterweight, the Regulation introduced exceptions to 
the principle of national responsibility for mergers below the thresholds. The most 
obvious was the one granted by Article 22(3), the so-called ’Dutch clause’, that gave 
the Commission the power to intervene at the request of one of the member states 
concerned. But the Regulation also allowed for a limited use of Articles 85 and 86 
of the EEC Treaty in those merger cases. Indeed, though expressly excluding the 
application of these two articles of the Rome Treaty to mergers with a Community 
dimension (Article 22), the Regulation was silent on their application to mergers 
below the thresholds. These mergers could, therefore, be subject to the use of Article 
86 by the national courts at the request of third parties, and, should the Commission 
seek to act on its own initiative or in response to a request from a third party, to the 
application of both Articles 85 and 86 pursuant to Article 89 of the EEC Treaty. The 
Commission in fact indicated that it intended to reserve the right to apply those 
articles of the EEC Treaty to mergers below the Regulation’s thresholds where the 
aggregate worldwide turnover of the parties was 2 or more billion ECU and the 
Community-wide turnover of each of at least two of the parties was 100 or more 
million ECU, on grounds that above such levels a merger could significantly affect 
trade between member states.64
These derogations were seen by some commentators as undermining the
64 Accompanying statements by the Council and the Commission on the EEC Merger Regulation 
([1990] 4 CMLR 314).
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principle of ’one-stop shop’ that the Regulation was supposed to establish (Bernini, 
1991; Woolcock et al. , 1991; Korah, 1990; Venit, 1990; Financial Times, 21 Sep 
1990b). Yet, for others, these exceptions were necessary when two levels of authority 
and jurisdiction coexist and, anyhow, were too narrowly circumscribed to endanger 
the ’one-stop shop’ goal. The largest transactions, with significant cross-border 
effects, were to be principally the concern of the European Commission while smaller 
transactions, with mainly national impact, were to be primarily the concern of 
national authorities (I 12, 1995; 111, 1995; Dechery, 1990; Brittan, 1990). Despite 
its possible imperfections, this delineation of responsibility between the Commission 
and national authorities was seen by some authors, including the Commission, as the 
first formal manifestation of the principle of subsidiarity in Community competition 
law (CEC, 1995; 111, 1995; Bright, 1991). Quoting the Commission (1996a: 10):
The allocation of cases between the Community and the Member States in the area o f merger 
control was...inspired by the same principles that underpin the notion o f  subsidiarity. 
According to this notion, action should be taken at the most appropiate level o f  jurisdiction, 
in view of the objectives to be attained and the means available to the Community and the 
Member States.
Regarding the approach to merger control, the Regulation, in contrast with 
previous drafts and proposals, did not contain an exemption provision allowing the 
Commission to authorise or exempt a merger on the ground that the benefits of the 
concentration outweigh the adverse effect on competition in the Community (Article 
2). Thus, it could be considered to follow a pure competition approach. However, 
the reference to economic and social cohesion in Recital 13 and the criteria of the 
’structure of all markets concerned’ and ’technical and economic progress’ found in 
Article 2(1), indicated a tendency towards inclusion of non-competition-oriented 
factors in the evaluating process. For some legal experts, these factors were included 
only in a subservient fashion. Mergers resulting in the establishment or strengthening 
of a dominant position which significantly impeded effective competition, in the 
Common Market or in a substantial part of it, would not be allowed (I 22, 1995; I 
19, 1995; I 12, 1995; I 7, 1995; Bulmer, 1994; Bos et al., 1992; Brittan, 1991; 
Cook and Kerse, 1991; Woolcock et al., 1991; Brittan, 1990; van Empel, 1990; 
Jacquemin, 1990). Still, for others, they left a door open to the Commission to follow 
a ’trade-off approach’ (I 9, 1995; Sachwald, 1994; Whish, 1993; Schwartz, 1993; 
Swann, 1992b; Martin, 1992; Keppenne, 1991; Holzler, 1990; Financial Times, 18
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Oct 1990; Financial Times, 21 Sep 1990a; The Economist, 22 Sep 1990; Financial 
Times, 26 Mar 1990; The Independent, 12 Jan 1990). In any case, the Commission 
had a time limit of five months to make the final decision.
As may be inferred from what precedes, the 1989 Regulation followed the 
’competitive-structure approach’ to merger control but included references to non­
competition-related criteria. It established a ’one-stop shop’ system of merger control 
in the Community but included derogations and high thresholds which limited the 
Commission’s jurisdiction. Thus, the Regulation was ambiguous and a watered-down 
version of the Commission’s original proposals. Yet, it was not a closed text. The 
Regulation provided for the revision to take place before 1994, on the basis either of 
unanimity or of a qualified majority, of its provisions on scope and control.
To recapitulate, the events described in this section may be clustered into four 
stages (see table 4.3). These stages, as in the 1970s and the early 1980s periods of 
negotiation, coincided with the consultation procedure needed to approve the 
Commission’s proposal. They all took place in a favourable context characterised by 
sustained economic growth, increased ’Europeanness’ of firms’ strategies and 
perceptions, and by the consolidation of the move towards neo-liberal policies started 
in the early 1980s and reflected, in particular, in the development of national merger 
laws.
The first stage of the late 1980s negotiations started with a new change in the 
merger regulation proposal made by a more confident Commission in December 
1986. The events included in that stage allowed a fresh opening of negotiations in 
1988. The second stage was then dedicated to the delineation of a new proposal 
which was issued by the Commission on 25 April 1988. In the third stage, the April 
draft was analysed by all Community institutions as well as by interested parties. The 
result was a new amended proposal submitted by the Commission to the Council on 
30 November 1988. Lastly, and for one year, different modifications to the 
November design were discussed within the Council. This fourth stage culminated 
with an agreement on 21 December 1989.
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The Regulation entered into force nine months later, on 21 September 1990, 
to allow firms to familiarise themselves with it and to allow the Commission to draw 
up its implementing rules.65 The third attempt to derive an accord on EEC merger 
regulation had proven successful.
65 The Commission adopted an Implementing Regulation (OJ [1990] L 219/5) as well as published 
two Notices containing guidelines on certain technical and legal aspects of the EEC Merger Regulation (OJ 
[1990] C 203/5; OJ [1990] C 203/10).
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TABLE 4.3. THE LATE 1980s PERIOD
CONSULTATION PROCEDURE (ART 235 EEC Treaty)
CONTEXT
* Sustained economic growth.
* Transformation of Europe’s industrial structure (wave of mergers).
* Consolidation of the trend towards neo-liberal policies both at the national and European level.
* Move from a ’pro-merger approach’ towards a more severe one re-started at the national level.
BACKGROUND OF THE LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL AMENDMENT
* 1986, Lack of agreement on the 1984 proposal.
* 2 December 1986, Commission’s new confidence ->  amendment of Article 19 o f the EEC merger
regulation (EMR) draft.
* 1987, SEA entry into force.
* 1987, Merger control continued to be a priority o f DG IV; contacts with experts.
* Autumn 1987, The Commission asked and obtained permission from the Council for a new EMR 
proposal as well as political support.
* November 1987, UNICE’s declaration in favour o f a Council merger regulation.
* 17 November 1987, Ruling of the European Court o f Justice on BAT-Reynolds v. the 
Commission.
PREPARATION OF THE TEXT
* 1988, Consultation of different interest groups such as UNICE.
* 1988, The Federal Republic of Germany made EMR a priority of its Presidency.
The ensuing Presidencies followed its example.
* 25 April 1988, The Commission issued a new EMR proposal.
OPINIONS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
COMMITTEE
* May 1988, Deliberations on the proposal in the Council started at working party level.
* 2 June 1988, Economic and Social Committee’s favourable Opinion.
* 22 June 1988, Ministerial agreement on some general points of the proposal.
* 26 October 1988, European Parliament’s favourable Resolution.
* 18 November 1988, The Council discussed two problems.
=  >  30 November 1988, Commission’s new amended proposal based on European Parliament’s and 
Council’s comments.
DISCUSSIONS IN THE COUNCIL
* 21 December 1988, Council meeting but final agreement not possible.
* 1989, Council discussions, several Commission’s informal amendments to the draft proposal, 
contacts with interest groups continued.
=  >  THE LATE 1980s PROPOSALS LEAD TO AN AGREEMENT IN DECEMBER 1989.
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CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has exposed, from a descriptive perspective, the events related 
to merger policy which took place in the 1970s, early 1980s and late 1980s. It has 
shown that each period of negotiations can be divided into four stages corresponding 
to the consultation procedure necessary to approve the merger regulation under 
Article 235 of the EEC Treaty. It has also highlighted that these stages befell in 
different contexts, some more challenging than others, for passing such regulation.
Chapter five will analyse these events so as to establish whether the factors 
and hence conditions which compound this research’s hypothesis were present in any 
of the three periods.
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CHAPTER 5. ANALYSIS
The purpose of this chapter is to give an analytical perspective of the events 
exposed in chapter four. It aims to ascertain whether the factors which determine the 
two conditions of this research’s hypothesis took place in any of the three periods 
under analysis. Again, the chapter has been divided into three parts, each one 
corresponding to one of the periods. Each of the three sections will answer the 
following analytical question: ’what is the evidence on the presence or absence of the 
neo-functionalist and realist factors?’. This will be done, as explained in chapter 
three, by analysing the contents of the data collected in a restrospective and deductive 
way.
5.1. 1970s: THE FIRST ATTEMPT
This section intends to certify whether the factors which shape the neo­
functionalist condition and the realist condition occurred in the 1970s.
A. The neo-functionalist condition
The neo-functionalist condition for integration is defined by three factors: the 
position and role of the EC supranational institutions, whether there was political 
spillover and the existence of functional spillover.
Concerning the first factor, the question to be asked is: did EC 
supranational institutions press for an EEC merger regulation in the 1970s? The 
answer is yes, all three of them did.
The European Commission did press for an EEC merger regulation in the
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1970s. Its 1966 Memorandum on the use of Article 86 of the EEC Treaty to control 
mergers, its late 1960s search for pre-notification procedures, its 1971 Continental 
Can decision, its quick response to the 1972 Paris Conference in delivering a merger 
control regulation proposal in 1973 or its different complaints to the Council on the 
slow progress of the discussions on the proposal, all denote that the Commission, 
throughout the 1960s and 1970s, both vindicated the need for the EEC to have 
merger control measures and tried to find a legal basis for such provisions. Yet, on 
top of that, one can find not so obvious evidence of the Commission’s involvement.
With its 1966 Memorandum, the Commission had been able to open the door 
to much more than the possible use of Article 86 as a source of control over those 
mergers which created a monopoly. By overcoming the fact that the Treaty of Rome 
did not contain merger provisions and instead emphasising the Treaty’s objective of 
ensuring competition in the Common Market (Art. 3(f)), it had opened the door for 
a gradual expansion of EEC merger control. Indeed, as Schwartz (1993: 616) argues, 
with its Memorandum, the Commission ’shifted discussion of the jurisdiction 
accorded to the Community by the Treaty of Rome from the realm of historic 
evidence regarding the intent of the signatories’ so as to ’dissipate strict limits on 
Treaty interpretation.’ By doing so,
The memo helped convert the Treaty from a text that granted limited authority based on literal 
readings and original intent, into one that, through expansive reading, could be interpreted 
as granting broad-based, discretionary authority to govern, to make decisions, and to interpret 
the Treaty o f Rome for the good of the EC as a whole. (Schwartz, 1993: 616)
In short, the Commission had interpreted teleologically the Treaty of Rome so as to 
give EEC merger control a legal basis. This line of interpretation of the EEC Treaty 
did not convince all legal commentators (Monopolkommission, 1989; Goyder, 1988; 
Mestmacker, 1973) but, seven years later, the European Court of Justice adopted it.
This teleological interpretation of the Treaty was made at the time of the 1966 
Luxembourg Accords which closed the 1965 ’empty chair’ crisis brought about by 
France. Clearly this was not the best moment for the Commission to discover new 
powers for itself in the Treaty of Rome. This indicates that the Commission wanted 
EEC merger control powers badly enough to propose the use of at least Article 86
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of the Treaty to this task at a time that was politically challenging.
The Commission considered that mergers, and in particular cross-border ones, 
helped the formation of the Common Market by creating firms large enough to profit 
from economies of scale. In this sense, the Commission wanted to eliminate fiscal 
and legal barriers to cross-border mergers - ’les obstacles artificiels aux 
concentrations europeennes d’entreprises’ (Cini and McGowan, 1998; Ortega, 1997; 
McGowan, 1994; The Economist, 31 Aug 1974; Alexander, 1973; Mestmacker, 
1972; CEC, 1966a; CEC, 1966b). It tried, for example, to introduce a European 
company statute for companies operating in several member countries.65 Yet, the 
Commission also believed mergers had to be controlled so as to prevent the costs of 
excessive concentration. In its 1966 Memorandum the Commission summarised its 
position as follows:
Le march£ commun exige des entreprises de taille europ6enne, afin que les avantages de la 
production en masse et de la recherche scientifique et techniques profitent, sans restrictions, 
k 180 millions de consommateurs .. .une attitude positive vis-&-vis des concentrations s’impose 
[done] dans la p6riode actuelle d’integration europ£enne.. .d’autre part, des fusions 
d’entreprises peuvent empecher la concurrence de fonctionner ou limiter outre mesure la 
liberte de choix et d’activit£ des consommateurs, des foumisseurs et des acheteurs. Enfin, la 
concentration des entreprises affecte les conditions d’existence de nombreuses petites et 
moyennes entreprises. (CEC, 1966a: 5-8)67
As a result of this apparent conflict between the desire to develop large 
enterprises and the desire to maintain undistorted competition in the Common 
Market, the Commission’s 1973 proposal was for a ’trade-off approach’ on EEC 
merger control. ’Mergers which might benefit other EEC policies, such as regional 
development, preserving employment in particular sectors of industry, guaranteeing 
energy supplies or boosting vulnerable or advanced EEC industries on the world 
market, are given a global let-out clause in the draft regulation’ {The Economist, 4
66 Proposal for a regulation on the Statute of the European Company, OJ [1970] C 124/1.
67 The common market requires undertakings with a European dimension in order to pass on the 
benefits of mass production and of scientific and technical research without limitation to 180 million 
consumers...a positive attitude must thus be taken regarding concentrations at the present period of 
European integration...on the other hand, however, mergers between undertakings may prohibit 
competition or restrict, outside any proportion, the freedom of choice and action of consumers, suppliers 
and purchasers. Lastly, concentration of undertakings influence the very existence of many small and 
medium size undertakings, (own translation)
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Aug 1973).
Moreover, for some authors such as Bernini (1991) and Le Bos et al. (1992), 
the Commission’s dismissal of Article 85 of the EEC Treaty as a merger control 
instrument in 1966 was also a reflection of this apparent conflict of interests. 
According to these authors, the Commission’s rejection was made on grounds of legal 
technicalities instead of convincing legal evidence. The reason behind this was 
political. The Commission did not want to subject mergers to automatic prohibition 
but rather to advantageous treatment to allow for the development of more efficient 
industrial structures and to foster the achievement of European integration. Article 
86 of the Rome Treaty offered the Commission the opportunity to prohibit dangerous 
concentrations while otherwise subjecting mergers to a more favourable legal 
evaluation than would have been possible on the basis of the automatic cartel 
prohibition. In other words, the Commission did not want to take an ’anti-merger 
approach* but rather a ’trade-off approach’ and only Article 86 permitted such an 
approximation.68
In any case, the Commission believed systematic merger control was 
necessary to achieve an effective Community competition policy and to ensure the 
objectives of the Treaty, particularly the one established by Article 3(f), within a 
context of increasing degrees of concentration in the Community. For the 
Commission, ’the growth in the number of concentrations and the acceleration in the 
rhythm of their development’ made ’necessary to put into operation more precise and 
modern legislation on this subject’ (CEC, 1973e: 15); indeed ’the trend towards 
mergers would, if it were to continue unchecked, constitute a threat to the 
maintenance of undistorted competition within the common market’ (CEC, 1973b: 
153). This opinion was clearly stated in the Preamble of the Commission’s proposal:
Whereas, for the achievement o f the objectives of the Treaty establishing the European
Economic Community, Article 3 (f) requires the Community to institute ’a system ensuring
that competition in the common market is not distorted';
Whereas analysis of market structures in the Community shows that the concentration process
68 Other authors see the Commission’s decision to reject Article 85 of the EEC Treaty as merger 
control instrument as pragmatic: ’Article 86 was the provision most amenable to an interpretation which 
would enable the Commission to exert merger control’ (Downes and Ellison, 1991: 3).
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is becoming faster and that the degree of concentration is growing in such manner that the 
preservation of effective competition in the common market and the objective set out in 
Article 3(f) could be jeopardized;
Whereas concentration must therefore be made subject to a systematic control arrangement;... 
(OJ [1973] C 92/1)
To ensure this necessary systematic control of mergers, the Commission 
considered Article 86 of the EEC Treaty was unsatisfactory (Cini and McGowan, 
1998; I 20, 1995; Cini, 1993; Brittan, 1991; Korah and Rothnie, 1990; Owen and 
Dynes, 1989; van Empel, 1990; Whish, 1985; Merkin and Williams, 1984; Allen, 
1977; van Graay, 1977; The Economist, 18 May 1974; The Economist, 14 Jul 1973; 
CEC, 1973e). The Commission was ’conscious of the limitations of concentration 
control on the basis of Article 86’ (Bos et al., 1992: 113). For the Commission 
(1976: 14): ’An effective Community competition policy aiming to prevent harmful 
structural changes is out of the question unless systematic merger control is 
introduced along the lines proposed by the Commission to the Council, making it 
possible to prohibit the creation of a dominant position [rather than its abuse].’
In fact, one of the reasons given by the Commission for its merger regulation 
proposal was the inadequacy of Article 86 in dealing with the entire concentration 
phenomenon at Community level. Quoting the Recitals of its 1973 proposal:
Whereas Article 86 applies to concentrations affected by undertakings holding a dominant 
position in the common market or in a substantial part of it which strengthen such position 
to such extend that the resulting degree of dominance would substantially restrict competition; 
Whereas the power of action aforesaid extends only to such concentrations, as would result 
in only undertakings remaining in the market whose conduct depended on the undertakings 
which had effected the concentration; whereas it does not extend to the prevention of such 
concentration;
Whereas additional powers of action must be provided for to make it possible to act against 
other concentrations which may distort competition in the common market and to establish 
arrangements for controlling them before they are effected;... (OJ [1973] C 92/1)
This belief was further manifested by the insistence of the Commission to base 
its proposal not only on Article 87 of the EEC Treaty but also on Article 235. Article 
87 implied that the merger regulation was ’to give effect to the principles set out in 
Articles 85 and 86.’ Therefore, the sole use of this Article as legal basis for the 
merger regulation would have meant that either Article 85 or Article 86 were good 
instruments of merger control. The inclusion of Article 235 indicated that the 
Commission wanted to go further than Article 86 or 85 permitted in merger control
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(Bulmer, 1993; Bernini, 1991; van Empel, 1990; Hornsby, 1988; Barounos et al. 
1975; Comite de Redaction, 1973; Mestmacker, 1973). Certainly, it was the first 
time the Commission utilised Article 235 as legal basis for a proposal (The 
Economist, 19 Jan 1974) and this article signified that additional powers of action 
were necessary to achieve a specific Community objective within the sphere of the 
Common Market. In the words of Bos et al. (1992: 22): ’Since the implications of 
the regulation on competition policy were more far reaching than allowed by Articles 
85 and 86, the Commission was not able to rely on Article 87 alone, but was forced 
to rely on Article 235 as well.’
Yet, despite being aware of its limitations, the Commission, supported by the 
European Court of Justice’s ruling in the Continental Can case, continued to use 
Article 86 to control mergers after issuing its proposal in July 1973. From 1973 to 
1979, the Commission assessed ten merger cases pursuant to Article 86 of the EEC 
Treaty (van Bael and Beilis, 1990; Monopolkommission, 1989; CEC, 1980; CEC, 
1978; CEC, 1977a; CEC, 1976; CEC, 1975; CEC, 1974a). As the Commission 
declared in its Third Annual Report on Competition Policy (1974a: 9): ’The 
Commission will remain as active as ever in applying Article 86 to mergers which 
constitute abuses of dominant positions.’ Indeed its Sixth Annual Report on 
Competition Policy for 1976 (1977a: 103) reads:
In the absence of more suitable merger control arrangements for EEC industries, the 
Commission continues to exercise Community surveillance of mergers after they have taken 
place to ensure that they are not contrary to the prohibition on abuse of dominant positions 
in Article 86 of the EEC Treaty.
To put it simply, by making teleological interpretations of the EEC Treaty and 
by applying Article 86 of the EEC Treaty to mergers, notwithstanding its flaws as 
merger control instrument, the Commission was sending a double message to the 
member states’ governments. Message one: systematic merger control was really 
necessary. Message two: if an EEC merger control regulation was not agreed upon, 
the Commission would nevertheless be prepared to develop a less appropiate merger 
control measure through Article 86. It was a subtler form of pressure...
The European Parliament also pressed for an EEC merger regulation in this
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first period. It was the first institution to present to the Commission specific 
considerations on EEC merger control measures in 1971. Just like the Commission, 
the European Parliament wanted both the elimination of legal and fiscal barriers to 
cross-border mergers and the control at European level of large mergers. After its 
1971 Resolution, it ’repeatedly asked for the introduction of prior control of 
concentrations’ (EP Document 362/73: 11).
The Parliament’s suggestions, to a certain extent, influenced the Commission’s 
decision to issue a merger regulation proposal in 1973 (Allen, 1977). The 
Commission’s Second Annual Report on Competition Policy (1973a: 28) noted that: 
’The Treaty could well be used as the basis for proposals based on the same 
considerations as those incorporated by the European Parliament in its Resolution on 
the rules of competition of 7 June 1971.’ The 1974 Bulletin o f the European 
Communities added that:
The Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee [of the European Parliament] had for a 
considerable time been discussing with the Commission the whole of the competition policy 
and the allied need for the control of concentrations. This represented an example of how 
Parliament and the Commission could work together on technical matters and influence the 
formulation o f proposals to the Council. (CEC, 1974b: 71) (see also van Graay, 1977)
Moreover, the European Parliament made clear its support for such a 
regulation in 1974, when it approved the Commission’s proposal by a large majority 
(Holzler, 1990; Allen, 1977). The few amendments it presented requested technical 
rather than fundamental changes. Even the Conservative group in the Parliament, the 
most critical during the debate, ’accepted the philosophy behind the proposals of the 
Commission’ (The Economist, 19 Jan 1974; see also CEC 1974b; CEC, 1974c; EP 
Document 362/73; EP Document 263/73). As Reynolds (1983: 420) stated: ’In 
February 1974 the Commission secured the support of the European Parliament.’
The European Parliament, therefore, believed EEC merger regulation was 
necessary and was actively involved in the preparation and promotion of the 1973 
proposal. In fact, it continued to press for an EEC merger regulation after its 
Resolution on the Commission’s proposal. For example, in 1977 the Socialist group 
urged for prompt approval of the regulation warning that any further delay would 
increase the possibility of oligopolies or monopolies dominating the market (CEC,
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1977b; see also OJ [1979] C 282/5).
Lastly, as with the other two EC supranational institutions, the European 
Court o f Justice embraced the EEC merger regulation cause in the 1970s. In its 
Continental Can case ruling, the Court accepted the Commission’s decision, referring 
to the applicability of Article 86 of the EEC Treaty to the control of concentrations, 
through a teleological interpretation of the Treaty (Allen, 1996; Schwartz, 1993; Bos 
et al., 1992; Merkin and Williams, 1984; van Graay, 1977; Allen, 1977; Barounos 
et al., 1975; The Economist, 28 Apr 1973). According to Gerber (1994: 116), with 
this ruling the Court ’sanctioned the apotheosis of the teleological method.’
The Court could have carried out a strict reading of the text of the EEC 
Treaty and rejected the suitability of using Article 86 to control mergers. Indeed, 
Advocate General Roemer and several legal commentators argued against the 
Commission authority to police mergers on the basis that the Treaty of Rome did not 
explicitly place merger control under Community purview (Gerber, 1994; Schwartz, 
1993; Dechery, 1990; Goyder, 1988; Swann, 1983; Mazzolini, 1973; ECJ, 1973). 
However, the Court disregarded this method of analysis in favour of the teleological 
mode.
The teleological grounds of the European Court interpretation are clearly 
stated in points 7 to 13 of its judgement (ECJ, 1973). In particular, point 10 reads: 
’The spirit, general scheme and wording of Article 86 as well as the system and 
objectives of the Treaty must all be taken into account. Problems of this kind cannot 
be solved by comparing this Article with certain provisions of the European Coal and 
Steel Treaty.’ The Commission’s Third Report on Competition Policy (1974: 15) 
further confirms the teleological nature of the Court’s interpretation:
Apart from the effect of the ruling in relation to mergers, its importance lies in the 
demonstration by the Court of its practice of interpreting the Treaty. The Court declined to 
.confine its construction to a narrow reading of the text of one Article in isolation from other 
Treaty provisions, since this could have negated the clearly expressed aims o f the Treaty as 
a whole.
The European Court considered that to achieve the objectives of the Treaty 
some kind of merger control was necessary. For the Court, the rules on competition
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of the EEC Treaty aimed at the same goal of maintaining effective competition in the 
Common Market. The pursuance of this aim, closely defined in Article 3 (f), was, 
as the Court of Justice also stressed, ’indispensable for the achievement of the 
Community’s tasks.’ Any differing legal treatment of cartels and mergers would 
therefore have ’[made] a breach in Community legislation on competition which 
could [have] jeopardized] the orderly functioning of the Common Market’ (ECJ, 
1973: 216-217).
In other words, for the European Court of Justice, Article 86 should be seen 
as applicable to mergers because merger control was essential to ensure other 
common goals: Article 3 (f) of the EEC Treaty and the functioning of the Common 
Market. With this ’maverick’ judgement on Continental Can (Financial Times, 7 Dec
1987), the European Court of Justice upheld, seven years later, the teleological line 
of interpretation used by the Commission in its 1966 Memorandum (Swann, 1992a; 
Comanor et al., 1990; van Empel, 1990).69 Quoting Allen (1977: 104): ’The 
Court’s judgment on Continental Can supported the Commission’s view that effective 
competition within the framework of the Treaties required the control of 
concentration and hence mergers.’
In addition to this teleological ruling, the Court of Justice helped to expand 
the use of Article 86 of the EEC Treaty to control concentrations in subsequent 
judgements throughout the 1970s, on cases that did not involve mergers but anti­
competitive behaviour (Gerber, 1994; Schwartz, 1993; Bishop, 1993; Brittan, 1991; 
Winckler and Gerondeau, 1990; Korah, 1987; Lever and Lasok, 1986).70 As 
Reynolds (1983: 407) notes: ’...the European Court of Justice increased the ability
69 For some authors, such as Gerber (1994), the European Court of Justice’s 1973 ruling was just one 
example of a broader judicial policy in favour of a European competition law doctrine which increased the 
powers of the Commission. The Commission was often the source of new ideas and these were given 
authoritative force by the Court through inclusion in its judgements. The justification behind it was that 
competition law was an important vehicle for integration.
70 Cases such as: Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA and Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Commission 
(Cases 6 and 72/73) [1974] ECR 223; Suiker Unie and others v. Commission (Sugar Cartel Case) (Cases 
40-48, 50, 54-56, 111, 113 and 114/73) [1975] ECR 1663; BRT v. SABAM (Case 127/73) [1974] ECR 
313; Sacchi (Case 155/73) [1974] ECR 409; United Brands Co. and United Brands Continental B.V. v. 
Commission (Case 27/76) [1978] ECR 207; Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission (Case 85/76) [1979] ECR 
462; Hugin v. Commission (Case 22/78) [1979] ECR 1869.
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of the Commission to control mergers under Art 86 by lowering the threshold of 
dominance and extending the concept of abuse through its rulings in a number of 
subsequent cases.’ Indeed, in its Eight Report on Competition Policy (1979: 12), the 
Commission recognised that ’recent judgements of the Court of Justice ha[d] given 
it valuable support in this area.’71
Therefore, like the other two supranational institutions, the European Court 
of Justice can be said to have pressed for an EEC merger regulation in the 1970s by 
using all its weapons. The first neo-functionalist factor was present in this first period 
of negotiations.
Regarding the second neo-functionalist factor, whether there was political 
spillover, the answer is no. Most European industrialists were not in favour of an 
EEC merger regulation. Although some managers favoured the transfer of merger 
control powers to the European Commission,72 European industrialists’ position 
towards the proposed EEC merger regulation was, in general, one of opposition or 
indifference (Jacobs and Stewart-Clark, 1990; Woolcock, 1989; Martin and Rider, 
1988; Financial Times, 11 Dec 1981; Allen, 1977; Financial Times, 17 Jul 1973). 
As The Economist (14 Jul 1973) described: ’Although [the Commission proposal] is 
assured of support from the European Parliament as well as from the European trade 
unions, it draws the instinctive hostility of European big business.’
Different national confederations of industry or employers’ expressed their 
opposition, the French being the most negative {The Economist, 31 Aug 1974; The 
Economist, 4 Aug 1973; Financial Times, 17 Jul 1973). This rejection was voiced 
at the European level by UNICE (I 21, 1995), an encompassing organisation
71 According to Schwartz (1993), other European Court of Justice’s rulings -establishing the 
supremacy of EC competition law over domestic competition law and giving EC law ’direct effect’- also 
helped both to clarify the Commission’s authority over competition and to enhance the Commission’s 
potential power to police mergers through Article 86.
72 Mazzolini (1973), on the bases of a series of interviews of the top managers of 154 major European 
companies, reported that some German and British managers favoured the delegation of all merger control 
power to the EEC Commission. For those managers a total transfer of powers was necessary to avoid 
multiple control, to provide a viable alter ego to the United States’ Antitrust Authorities and to ensure a 
control based on European competition objectives instead of short-sighted domestic competition terms.
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representing much of the constituency of business interests described by some as ’the 
peak association of business’ (Greenwood, 1997: 103). They all argued that such a 
regulation would be an unnecessary encumbrance to the rationalisation and 
restructuration of European industry at a time the Common Market was still a 
relatively long-term objective, cross-border mergers were the exception and only 
Germany and the United Kingdom had merger control laws of their own (121, 1995).
Most European industrialists, therefore, preferred an EEC merger control 
based on Article 86 of the EEC Treaty to specific merger control measures. In truth, 
although the possible application of Article 86 created some uncertainty due to its 
weaknesses as a merger control instrument, businessmen were not really concerned 
about it in the 1970s. Various attitudes were adopted with some believing that the 
Commission was going to apply Article 86 to operations involving large foreign 
undertakings and others that Article 86 was very difficult to implement to mergers 
(I 14, 1995; Mazzolini, 1973).
So, albeit with some exceptions, the European business community did not 
want an EEC merger regulation. Industrialist pressure was, in general, against the 
approval of the Commission’s 1973 merger control regulation proposal. The second 
neo-functionalist factor was not present in the 1970s.
With respect to the third and last neo-functionalist factor referring to 
whether an European merger regulation was considered essential to ensure any 
other specific goal, the answer is mixed. The merger regulation was only considered 
essential by some of the actors involved. The Commission, the European Court of 
Justice, the European Parliament and, at least in 1972, the Heads of State or of 
Government of the enlarged Community believed such a regulation was indispensable 
to guarantee that competition in the Common Market was not twisted by the 
increasing number of mergers taking place in the Community and the lack of an 
appropriate instrument to control them. For these actors, the lack of a systematic 
merger regulation at European level could jeopardise the goal set out in Article 3(f) 
of the EEC Treaty, that requires the Community to institute ’a system ensuring that 
competition in the common market is not distorted’, and thus imperil the Common
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Market. Yet, for most European industrialists and member states’ governments, an 
EEC merger regulation was not necessary.
To sum up, only one of the three neo-functionalist’s factors -the pressure of 
supranational institutions- was fully present in the 1970s. European industrialists were 
against the merger regulation and only some of the actors involved considered the 
regulation to be necessary to ensure another specific common goal. The neo­
functionalist condition for integration was not fulfilled in this first period of 
negotiations.
B. The realist condition
The realist condition for integration is determined by one factor: the three 
most powerful member states’ position on the issue in the EC intergovernmental 
institutions. Were at least two of the three most important member states in 
favour of an European merger regulation? The answer is no. Although all member 
states’ governments seemed to accept the need for EEC merger control in 1972, 
negotiations in the Council at both working group and Committee of Permanent 
Representatives level evidenced that, at least since 1974, two of the three biggest 
member states were not in favour of such a regulation.73
In 1969, the Council urged that a clear policy should be followed in the field 
of mergers. Then, the Paris Summit Conference of 19 to 21 October 1972 raised the 
problem of business concentration and, in its Final Declaration, called both for ’the 
elimination, especially in the field of taxation and law, of obstacles hindering 
alignment and concentration among undertakings’ and ’the preparation of provisions 
to guarantee that concentrations, affecting undertakings established in the 
Community, are compatible with the Community’s socio-economic goals and fair 
competition under the Treaty provisions both within the Common Market and on the
73 One of my interviewees (I 19, 1995) talked about the possibility that the Heads of State or 
Government of the Nine had not really agreed to the need of EEC merger control in 1972. For the 
interviewee, member states’ governments were not worried about the control of mergers at that time. It 
is possible that their declaration of principle on the need of such a control ’se soit gliss&e’. According to 
him, this has happened in other cases.
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outside markets’ (CEC, 1972b: 19). The Heads of State or of Government further 
believed that, in order to accomplish these tasks, it was desirable to make the widest 
possible use of all the dispositions of the Treaties, including Art 235 of the EEC 
Treaty (CEC, 1972b).
In other words, the Heads of State or Government of the enlarged Community 
clearly backed, in October 1972, the Commission’s approach to mergers. While 
demanding the elimination of barriers to cross-border mergers, they agreed on the 
necessity of specific EEC merger control rules to ensure the rules and aims laid down 
by the Rome Treaty. Moreover, through Article 235, the Heads of State or 
Government gave the Commission the legal basis to make a proposal (Weiler, 1991; 
Jenny, 1990; Comanor et al. , 1990; Fine, 1989; Monopolkommission, 1989; Merkin 
and Williams, 1984; Reynolds, 1983; Barounos e ta l., 1975). By doing so, they were 
encouraging the Commission to take action (Dechery, 1990; Allen, 1977; CEC, 
1973d). As Reynolds (1990: 33) observed: ’...it was the member states themselves 
who in 1972 invited the Commission to draw up a proposal to regulate mergers at the 
European level.’
The initial unanimity of member governments as expressed in the Declaration 
seemed to continue in 1973. Indeed, as mentioned in chapter four, the Council 
declared in December 1973 its intention to act on the merger proposal by 1 January 
1975. This led some commentators to conclude that the regulation was going to be 
adopted ’in the reasonably near future’ (Barounos et al. , 1975 : 200). However, the 
Council’s Working Party on Economic Questions was unable to reach an agreement 
on several key issues in neither 1974 nor 1975. Neither was the Committee of 
Permanent Representatives, when presented with the problem in 1976, capable of 
reaching any decision on these issues. Negotiations reached a deadlock in 1978 
despite the complaints of the Commission, the European Parliament and the 
Economic and Social Committee, and the Commission’s proposal was, to all effects, 
shelved.
This lack of progress in the negotiations reflects that member states’ 
delegations were not really interested in reaching an agreement. The atmosphere was
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’not so much of hostility on the part of governments as of relative indifference’ and 
no member state took an ’enthusiastic sponsorship’ role in this realm (Allen, 1977: 
101). According to most commentators, there were no real negotiations in the 1970s, 
’aucun debat de fond’ (1 18, 1995; I 16, 1995; I 12, 1995; 111, 1995; I 8, 1995; van 
Empel, 1990). ’At that time, the Council did not give serious consideration to the 
draft regulation’ (CEC, 1990a: 33). As Bulmer (1994: 429) stated: ’...the Council 
of Ministers showed little real interest in developing EEC powers in this area; the 
member states simply did not see the need for supranational regulation.’ Most 
member states’ governments wanted to retain absolute control over merger policy in 
order to further their own national industrial policy objectives (Cini and McGowan, 
1998; Gourvish, 1996; I 18, 1995; I 12, 1995; Kovar, 1991; van Empel, 1990; 
Holzler, 1990; Woolcock, 1989; Reynolds, 1983).
The French, British and Italian delegations were the most hostile to the idea 
of the regulation. In the words of Woolcock (1989: 3): ’The initial proposals of the 
European Commission in 1973 failed to gain the support of Italy, Britain and 
France...’ Other authors highlight that the 1981 Commission amendments ’were 
designed to dilute opposition from member states’ governments, in particular the UK, 
France and Italy’ (Brussels Law Offices, 1988: 282; Reynolds, 1983: 419). Indeed, 
Italy and France objected strenously to the idea of EEC merger control (1 18, 1995; 
Dechery, 1990; Woolcock, 1989; Allen, 1977; The Economist, 18 May 1974; 
Financial Times, 21 Jul 1973). The British opposition, however, was not so clear cut. 
For Allen (1977: 107): ’The evidence of the British position suggested] that the UK 
delegation ha[d] not finalized their position. ’
The British delegation entered general reservations against the proposal as a 
whole in 1973 but relaxed, in principle, its opposition in 1975, after the June 
referendum on its membership in the Community. On November 1975, the British 
government announced that it was prepared to withdraw its general reservation and 
to accept the principle of Community control over mergers within limits and 
conditions to be defined (Reynolds, 1983; van Graay, 1977). Nevertheless, the 
British position was still one of hostility (I 18, 1995). The Economist of 31 August 
1975 reports that ’Britain was cool under the Heath government, cooler still under
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Labour.’ According to this well-known journal, Britain was just using a different 
strategy: ’Britain has not mounted a frontal assault but has engaged in spoiling 
tactics...’ For example, The Economist accused Britain of having exaggerated, 
together with France and Italy, ’the Commission’s potential for mischief in an effort 
to preserve national sovereignty over corporations.’
Of the three largest member states, therefore, the only that did not oppose the 
regulation was the Federal Republic of Germany (McGowan, 1993; Allen, 1977; The 
Economist, 31 Aug 1974). The German delegation made clear that they would 
endorse an EEC merger regulation if it was based on pure competition criteria 
(Woolcock et al., 1991). Yet, the German delegation did not ’sponsor’ the regulation. 
The Germans were not ready to fight for the regulation. For some interviewees, the 
Germans did not really want an EEC merger regulation in the 1970s because they had 
just introduced their own national merger control (I 18, 1995; I 12, 1995).
Thus, it can be concluded that the governments of two of the three biggest 
member countries, that is of France and of the United Kingdom, were not interested 
in reaching an agreement during the 1974-77 negotiations. One may even question 
the support the third most powerful member state, Germany, was prepared to give 
to the regulation. In any case, the realist factor was not present in the 1970s. The 
realist condition for integration was not completed in this period.
C. Conclusion
As evidenced from what precedes and summarised in table 5.1, none of the 
two conditions which conform this research’s hypothesis were complied with in this 
first period of negotiations on EEC merger regulation. As shown in table 5.2, only 
some of the factors which determine the neo-functionalist and realist conditions for 
integration did occur in the 1970s.
Table 5.1. FIRST PERIOD FINDINGS
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CONDITIONS FOR INTEGRATION PRESENT
NEO-FUNCTIONALIST NO
REALIST NO
TABLE 5.2. FACTORS OCCURRING IN THE 1970s
CONDITIONS’ FACTORS PRESENT EVIDENCE
NEO-FUNCTIONALIST
* Pressure supranational 
institutions:
- Commission YES 1966 Memorandum (teleological interpretation), 
arguments for an EEC merger regulation (EMR), 
late 1960s proposals, 1971 Continental Can 
decision, 1973 EMR proposal, 1974-78 
complaints, use Article 86 EEC Treaty.
- European Parliament YES 1971 Resolution, 1974 support, 1974-79 
complaints.
- European Court of Justice YES Teleological approach, help to expand use Art. 86 
EEC Treaty to control mergers.
* European Industrialists in 
favour?
NO EMR was cumbersome and unnecessary.
* Functional spillover YES/NO To ensure Art. 3(F) EEC Treaty and Common 
Market (Commission, ECJ, EP and, in 1972, 
Heads of State or Government)
REALIST
* At least two of the three 
largest member states in 
favour?:
NO France and United Kingdom against. Germany 
did not oppose it. Lack o f real negotiations.
5.2. EARLY 1980s: THE SECOND ATTEMPT
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This part aims to verify whether the factors which compound the neo­
functionalist condition and the realist condition took place in the early 1980s.
A. The neo-functionalist condition
The three factors that shape the neo-functionalist condition for integration are: 
the position and role of the EC supranational institutions, whether there was political 
spillover and the existence of functional spillover.
With respect to the first factor, the three EC supranational institutions 
pressed for an EEC merger regulation in the early 1980s.
The European Commission, despite the lack of success of its first proposal, 
persevered in its attempts to achieve an agreement on EEC merger regulation in the 
early 1980s. The most obvious evidence of this is its proposal of an amended merger 
regulation in 1981 and the 1984 revision. Despite the challenging context of those 
first years of the decade, the dynamic new DG IV Commissioner, Mr. Andriessen, 
’attempted to breathe new life into the Commission’s controversial merger control 
proposal...’ (Reynolds, 1983: 419; I 8, 1995; I 17, 1995) and gave ’high priority’ 
to this project (van Bael and Maier-Reimer, 1983: 29). Furthermore, his successor 
in 1985, Peter Sutherland, made clear that he was prepared to resort to all the 
Commission’s available powers under the Treaty to establish a comprehensive EEC 
merger control.
Just as in the 1970s, the Commission considered cross-border mergers as 
desirable and tried to encourage them (Sachwald, 1994; Tsoukalis, 1993; van Bael 
and Maier-Reimer, 1983). Certainly, as Martin and Rider (1988: 20) observed, Lord 
Cockfield’s 1985 White Paper argued that:
Community action must go further and create an environment or conditions likely to favour 
the development o f co-operation between undertakings. Such co-operation will strengthen the 
industrial and commercial fabric of the internal market (paragraph 133)...In spite of the 
progress made in creating such an environment, co-operation between undertakings of
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different member states is still hampered by excessive legal, fiscal and administrative 
problems...
Nevertheless, the Commission also continued to think that an EEC merger 
control regulation was necessary to preserve competitive structures within the 
Common Market (CEC, 1986a; CEC, 1981c; CEC, 1980).74 Convinced of the 
unsuitability of Article 86 of the EEC Treaty to control mergers in an efficient 
manner, the Commission held that only with a more systematic control of large-scale 
mergers at the Community level, would it be able to ensure ’that those industries 
which [were] already highly oligopolistic [did] not veer towards anti-competitive 
structures’ (CEC, 1982a: 14). For the Commission: ’...the increasingly oligopolistic 
structure of many sectors of industry [made] merger control more necessary ... than 
ever’ (CEC, 1985: 46). In fact, the Commission believed that, by preserving 
competition in the Common Market, an EEC merger regulation could be regarded 
as important to ensure the triumph over the early 1980s economic crisis. As it stated 
in the Preamble of its 1981 revised proposal: ’A policy designed to strengthen 
effective competition plays a significant role in achieving more flexible structural 
adjustment and maintaining the competitiveness of our industries and, in so doing, 
also contributes to overcoming the current crisis.’
With the 1981 and 1984 amendments, the Commission intended to allow the 
Council to resume the work suspended since 1978: ’The modifications introduced by 
the Commission on the proposed merger regulation [1981 and 1984 proposals] were 
aimed at eliminating the main stumbling blocks at the Council level’ (CEC, 1985: 24; 
see also CEC, 1982a). And to do so speedily:
...following the Parliament’s adoption in October 1983 of a Resolution broadly endorsing the 
Commission’s amended proposal, as the Economic and Social Committee had done the year 
before, the way is now clear for the Commission to submit a suitably revised text to the 
Council which it will commend to the Council’s urgent consideration...[the Commission] will 
take the opportunity of urging the Council to resume its consideration of the merger control 
proposals without delay. (CEC, 1984a: 15 and 49)
The Commission was being flexible in wanting to alter the text proposed in 1973,
74 The result of this apparent conflict between the desire to develop large European enterprises and 
the desire to maintain undistorted competition was the maintenance in both the 1981 and the 1984 amended 
proposals of the previous 1973 ’trade-off approach’ on EEC merger control.
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showing its will to facilitate an agreement (see Nugent, 1994). A clear example of 
this flexibility was the Commission’s changes in Article 19 of the 1973 proposal 
enabling member states’ representatives to have more influence in the decisions. As 
Bulmer (1993: 9) noted, such involvement of the Council in EEC merger control 
’would have been outside the approach used in competition policy more generally.’
The Commission disposition to provide all the necessary steps to obtain the 
regulation was further evidenced at the end of this period of negotiations. By 1986 
it was becoming clear that despite all the efforts made by the Commission and the 
change of context which was taking place in Europe, the Council was reluctant to 
enter into a constructive discussion of the Commission’s proposals (CEC, 1987a; 
CEC, 1986a; CEC, 1985). Despite the Council’s attitude, the Commission did not 
wish to forgo the issue but was willing to consider alternatives: to follow the 
European Parliament’s advice to withdraw its proposal and start afresh, or to further 
develop its powers of ex-post vetting of certain types of mergers (CEC, 1987a). In 
any case, the Commission would continue to persist in its demands for an European 
merger regulation.
Indeed, a further and subtler evidence of the Commission’s pressure to the 
Council on this issue, was the persisting use of Article 86 of the EEC Treaty against 
mergers during the early 1980s. Although Continental Can remained the 
Commission’s only formal merger decision under Article 86, most commentators 
agree that this was not due to voluntary restraint or inaction from the part of the 
Commission. On the contrary, the lack of formal decisions is usually explained by 
the limitations of Article 86 as a merger control instrument and by the fact that 
’where the Commission ha[d] investigated mergers and found evidence of dominance 
or abuse, the parties ha[d] withdrawn voluntarily or adjusted the proposal’ (Gourvish, 
1996: 16). (McGowan, 1994; Bulmer, 1994; Bishop, 1993; Swann, 1992a; Le 
Bolzer, 1990; Korah and Rothnie, 1990; Comanor et al., 1990; van Bael and Beilis, 
1990; Korah, 1990; Holzler, 1989; Brussels Law Offices, 1988; Reynolds, 1987; 
Fine, 1987; Elland, 1987; Merkin and Williams, 1984; Raybould, 1984). Quoting 
Downes and Ellison (1991: 12):
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The true extent of the Commission’s merger control activity under Article 86 is revealed by 
examination of its informal practice.. .the Commission considered numerous proposed mergers 
in the light of the Article 86 criteria established in [Continental Can]; at times causing a 
change of conduct by the firms concerned; at other times seeing fit to take no action.
As the Commission stated in its Tenth Annual Report on Competition Policy (1981a: 
104):
Experience in recent cases has confirmed that, even if Article 86 is difficult to apply on 
account o f the conditions of its application, it still enables the Commission to monitor to a 
certain extent large-scale mergers and, if necessary, to prevent them being carried through 
or to have changes made which are desirable from the point of view of competition.
The Commission used the threat of an Article 86 action to win changes to 
mergers in at least ten cases from 1980 to 1986 (Bos et aL, 1992; Venit, 1990; 
Monopolkommission, 1989; CEC, 1985; CEC, 1984a; CEC, 1983a; CEC, 1982a; 
CEC, 1981a). The exact number of cases is difficult to estimate. After 1984 there are 
few references to the Commission’s informal settlement practice in relation to 
mergers in the Annual Reports on Competition Policy. However, press reports 
evidence that such actions continued (van Bael and Beilis, 1990; 
Monopolkommission, 1989). Moreover, as Whish (1989: 738) argued: ’What one 
cannot know is how many mergers [were] not contemplated at all because of the 
possibility that they might [have] infringe[d] Article 86.’
Anyhow, there is evidence that the Commission informally intervened in a 
number of merger cases in the early 1980s. The unsuitability of Article 86 of the 
EEC Treaty to control mergers had thus not prevented the Commission, on its own 
initiative or at the request of the parties contemplating a merger or of complainants, 
to use its only weapon against anti-competitive mergers until a better armoury was 
given to it.
In fact, the Commission had been prepared to profit from European Court of 
Justice’s judgements on Article 86 cases not involving mergers, that had expanded 
the concepts of both dominance and abuse, so as to control other merger cases (Bos 
et al., 1992; Elland, 1991; Cook and Kerse, 1991; Downes and Ellison, 1991; 
Comanor et al., 1990; Brussels Law Offices, 1988; CEC, 1985; CEC, 1984a; 
Merkin and Williams, 1984; Reynolds, 1983; CEC, 1983a; CEC, 1982a; CEC,
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1981a; CEC, 1980). Quoting the Commission Tenth Report on Competition Policy 
for 1980 (1981a: 30 and 103):
Developments in the Commission decision-making and in the case-law o f the Court with 
regard to the abusive conduct of dominant undertakings provide an indication of the scope for 
merger control afforded by the Continental Can doctrine, when re-examined in the light of 
more recent judgements {Sugar, United Brands, Hugin/Liptons and Hoffinann-La Roche)... In 
assessing conditions for applying Article 86 to mergers, particularly as regards the concepts 
of dominant position and abuse, the Commission also based its action on the line taken in later 
judgements in the United Brands and Hoffinan-La Roche cases.
Also, regarding procedure, the Commission had been prepared to use its power to 
order interim measures in competition cases, as established by the Court ruling in the 
Camera Care case in 1980,75 so as to enable intervention before mergers were 
completed (Comanor eta l., 1990; Brussels Law Offices, 1988; Reynolds, 1987; van 
Bael and Maier-Reimer, 1983; CEC, 1982a). Although it never actually took interim 
measures against any merger, the Commission menaced some mergers with them. In 
Amicon/Fortia (CEC, 1982a), the threat brought merger talks to an immediate end; 
in Pilkington/BSN (CEC, 1981a), the Commission obtained major modifications to 
the merger proposal.
So, in this period of negotiations, the Commission combined flexibility in the 
contents of the merger regulation proposal with action, indicating that it intended to 
develop European merger policy with or without the regulation. This threat was 
actually made explicit several times in 1985 and 1986 by Commissioner Peter 
Sutherland. He pointed out that if the regulation was not enacted by the Council, 
merger control would be developed at an European level not only by extending the 
Commission’s powers under Article 86 of the EEC Treaty but also by applying 
Article 85 and 90 of the EEC Treaty to mergers.
The European Parliament also pressed for an EEC merger regulation in this 
second period. As with the Commission, it considered that ’the constant evolution of 
the market towards a generalized oligopolistic structure ... [could] seriously threaten
75 Camera Care Ltd v. Commission (Case 792/79 R) [1980] ECR 119. Interim measures are to be 
used in case of urgency and are designed to avoid irreparable damage being caused to a complainant or 
to the public interest when preliminary investigations are being undertaken (Comanor et al, 1990; Downes 
and Ellison, 1991).
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competition’ and therefore that the Commission had to ’reshape its competition policy 
with a view to preventing any irreversible evolution of the market by controlling 
concentrations...’ (OJ [1981] C 144/23; see also CEC, 1986a). Accordingly, it 
repeatedly deplored the fact that the Council had still not adopted the merger control 
regulation and expressed its support for the creation of effective means of controlling 
trans-frontier mergers (I 8, 1995; Brussels Law Offices, 1988; CEC, 1984a; CEC, 
1982a; OJ [1981] C 144/19; CEC, 1980). As a matter of fact, the European 
Parliament, though suggesting some amendments, broadly backed the 1981 EEC 
merger regulation proposal in October 1983 and, in 1986, advanced a breakthrough 
of the 13 year-old deadlock situation on EEC merger control: by withdrawing the 
proposal and making a new start in filling this lacuna in the Commission’s 
competition policy.
As to the third supranational institution, the European Court o f Justice’s 
position in that period is more difficult to ascert. In the early 1980s there was no case 
like the Continental Can. In principle, the Court could thus not express whether it 
supported the Commission’s efforts to establish EEC merger control. Nevertheless, 
the Commission intended to use several 1970s Court’s rulings on Article 86 cases 
which were not concerned with acquisitive behaviour, but which lowered the 
thresholds for proving dominance and abuse, to broaden the scope of that Article of 
the EEC Treaty in the merger area. As Reynolds (1983: 409) comments: ’It is now 
apparent that although [those judgements] did not involve mergers but anti­
competitive behaviour, the Commission’s policy is to apply the concepts of both 
dominance and abuse as developed in these cases also to mergers.’ According to 
some legal experts, it is by no means clear that the Court’s rulings were intended for 
this aim. For them, this interpretation of the judgements was just another attempt by 
the Commission to expand its merger powers (Elland, 1991; Brussels Law Offices, 
1988; Merkinand Williams, 1984). Regarding this, Cook and Kerse (1991: 2) wrote: 
’...although no subsequent judgments of the Court have applied Article 86 to 
takeovers or acquisitions the Commission itself has, since 1973, sought to broaden 
the scope of application of that Article in this area by reference to later Article 86 
cases not concerning acquisitive behaviour’ (my emphasis).
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However, by establishing the Continental Can doctrine that Article 86 of the 
EEC Treaty could be applied to mergers, any subsequent ruling concerning this 
article was liable to have an impact on the Commission’s powers to control mergers. 
Was this not to have been the case, the European Court should have specifically said 
so in the ruling. This was not the case. Therefore, it can be interpreted, as most 
commentators do, that, through these rulings, the European Court Justice had 
continued to press for EEC merger control (Gerber, 1994; Bishop, 1993; Brittan, 
1991; Winckler and Gerondeau, 1990; Korah, 1987; Lever and Lasok, 1986; 
Reynolds, 1983). As Schwartz (1993: 619-620) stated:
On merger control in particular, Continental Can was one of a number of decisions that, taken 
cumulatively, created the potential for increased Commission authority. ... Some experts on 
EC jurisprudence believe that Hoffman-La Roche continued a trend whereby the Court slowly 
lowered the Continental Can hurdle, which had required a "substantial" effect on competition 
for Article 86 to apply.
The European Court of Justice had used its common tactic to gradually 
introduce a new doctrine. In the first case which came before it, the Court established 
the doctrine as a general principle but suggested that it was subject to various 
qualifications or just covered some extreme cases. Certainly, the test for intervention 
on merger cases under Article 86 of the EEC Treaty, enacted by the Continental Can 
ruling, was stringent. A corporate acquisition had to be carried out by a dominant 
undertaking and was only unlawful under Article 86 if it had ’substantial fettering’ 
effects on competition. The principle, however, had been established. Not receiving 
too many protests, it was re-affirmed in later cases indirectly related with the new 
doctrine. Qualifications were then taken away -by lowering the thresholds of what 
can be understood by dominance and abuse- and the full extent of the doctrine 
revealed (Lasok and Bridge, 1991; Mancini, 1991; Colchester and Buchan, 1990; 
Dehousse and Weiler, 1990; Hartley, 1981). This tactic was a subtle way of pressing 
for the introduction of a new doctrine: in this case for the expansion of Community 
control over mergers through Article 86 of the EEC Treaty.
By the early 1980s, therefore, the European Court of Justice had given the 
Commission the possibility to use Article 86 of the EEC Treaty in more merger 
cases. Although there was no other cases like that of Continental Can, it was in this 
period of negotiations that the full extent of the doctrine, established in that case and
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further expanded in subsequent judgements throughout the 1970s, was revealed. As 
in the 1970s, the three supranational institutions pressed for an EEC merger 
regulation in the early 1980s. The first neo-functionalist factor was present in this 
second period of negotiations.
Regarding the second neo-functionalist factor: were European industrialists 
in favour of an European merger regulation? European industrialists’ position 
towards the proposed regulation continued to be, in general, one of opposition or 
indifference (I 21, 1995; Woolcock, 1989).76 The business community considered 
that the 1981 and 1984 amendments had not modified the 1973 approach to merger 
control. The changes were merely ’cosmetic’. Moreover, for them, the early 1980s, 
with the rampant economic crisis, was not a suitable time to add such an instrument 
(I 21, 1995). In this sense, the Financial Times' issue of 2 February 1981 recorded 
that the Confederation of British Industry, in a report on the impact of EEC 
legislation on British business, had made ’a sharp attack on the European Community 
for trying to impose too many unnecessary laws and regulations on companies... ’ The 
report specifically stated that there was ’little appetite for new initiatives except in 
the Commission.’ According to the Financial Times' article, the Confederation of 
British Industry’s ideas ’gained support from other employer groups in the EEC, 
particularly the French, Italians and West Germans.’ Although some companies were 
dissatisfied with the pervasive uncertainty of how the Commission would treat any 
proposed merger under Article 86 of the EEC Treaty (Bishop, 1993; van Empel, 
1990; Brussels Law Offices, 1988), European businessmen generally did not believe 
that an EEC merger regulation was mandatory. Just as in the 1970s, there was no 
political spillover witnessed in the early 1980s.
Lastly, with respect to the third neo-functionalist factor: was an EEC 
merger regulation considered essential to ensure any other specific goal? Just as 
in the 1970s, the answer remains mixed. The Commission and the European 
Parliament considered such a regulation as indispensable to preserve competitive
76 Most interviewees and secondary information consulted, do not distinguish between a 1970s and 
early 1980s business community position on EEC merger regulation. According to them, businessmen only 
changed their position from one of opposition or indifference to one of support in the late 1980s.
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structures within the Common Market, that is, the goal established in Article 3(f) of 
the EEC Treaty. Indeed, for them, the limitations of Article 86 of the EEC Treaty 
as a merger control instrument and the increasingly oligopolistic structure found in 
many sectors of industry, made an EEC merger regulation much more necessary than 
ever. Moreover, the Commission believed such a regulation, to ensuring competition 
in the Common Market, would help to overcome the early 1980s economic crisis. An 
European merger regulation was, thus, deemed essential to ensure an specific 
Community goal - the preservation of competition in the Common Market- and was 
expected to help contribute to the defeat of the economic crisis.
But the regulation was regarded as vital only by the Commission and by the 
European Parliament, the business community and member states’ governments did 
not seem to share this belief. As for the European Court of Justice, it did not have 
the opportunity in that period to clearly express its opinion. Its reasoning in 
Continental Can and its gradual extension, through other rulings, of the legal doctrine 
established in that case, indicate, nevertheless, that it probably agreed with the other 
supranational institutions. In any case, an EEC merger regulation was not held to be 
essential to ensure another specific goal by all the actors involved.
To recapitulate, as in the 1970s, only one of the three neo-functionalist’s 
factors -the pressure of supranational institutions- was fully present in the early 
1980s. Most European industrialists opposed the regulation and, like the member 
states’ governments, did not believe there was functional spillover. The neo­
functionalist condition for integration was not fulfilled in this second period of 
negotiations.
B. The realist condition
The factor that defines the realist condition for integration is the position of 
the three most powerful member states on the issue in the EC intergovernmental 
institutions. Were at least two of the three most important member states in 
favour of an European merger regulation? Just as in the 1970s, the answer remains 
no.
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The representatives of member states’ governments in the Council of 
Ministers did not show any willingness to enter into constructive discussion of the 
Commission’s proposal (I 18, 1995; I 12, 1995; Bulmer, 1993; CEC, 1985; CEC, 
1987a). Quoting the Commission’s Sixteenth Report on Competition Policy for 1986 
(1987a: 16): ’...the Council has still not made a serious attempt to discuss and adopt 
the Commission’s proposals.’ Despite the need for political decision to pursue the 
debates at both the Working Party and Committee of Permanent Representatives 
level, no meetings were held at the ministerial level to discuss these matters.
The lack of real negotiations in the Council reflected the fact that, although 
by 1984 a majority of member states agreed with the principle of giving the 
Commission pre-merger control powers (CEC, 1986a; CEC, 1985), at least two of 
the three largest member states opposed it.
Regarding France, at the end of 1983, just before assuming the Presidency of 
the Council, the French government issued a memorandum which seemed to indicate 
that it was going to support an EEC merger regulation. The memorandum read: ’La 
legislation de chaque Etat membre devrait reconnaitre explicitement que le risque de 
concentration excessive doit etre apprecie au regard de l’espace economique que 
constitue la Communaute et non dans le cadre de chaque Etat’ (Dechery, 1990: 
309).77 This statement was interpreted by the Commission as encouraging. 
However, the French delegation’s next move was to propose two alternatives to an 
EEC merger control regulation. Namely, the harmonisation of national merger laws 
and to concede the Commission the right to express its opinion on merger cases 
examined by national authorities (Dechery, 1990). The French opposition to the 
regulation was further revealed in subsequent meetings (I 8, 1995; Bos et al., 1992; 
Dechery, 1990). As in the 1970s, the French delegation maintained a formal 
reservation during that period of negotiations (I 18, 1995; Woolcock et al., 1991; 
Woolcock, 1989).
77 Each member state legislation should explicitly recognise that the risk of excessive concentration 
must be appraised taking into account the economic area the Community constitutes rather than just the 
domestic market, (own translation)
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As to the other two largest member states, the British delegation continued to 
oppose the regulation (I 18, 1995; I 8, 1995; Dechery, 1990; Brussels Law Offices,
1988) and the German delegation to support EEC merger control only if based on 
pure competition criteria (Woolcock, 1989). However, the Germans were still not 
enthusiastic about the regulation (Tsoukalis, 1993; Dechery, 1990). According to 
some interviewees, the Germans did not really want an EEC merger regulation in the 
early 1980s because they considered their Federal Cartel Office, the 
Bundeskartellamt, to be better in controlling mergers than the Commission could ever 
be (I 18, 1995; I 8, 1995).
In short, as in the 1970s, the governments of France and Great Britain 
opposed the idea of EEC merger control and the support of the German government 
to the regulation was, at best, conditional. Hence, the realist factor was not present 
in the early 1980s. The realist condition for integration was not completed in this 
period.
C. Conclusion
As displayed in table 5.3, none of the two conditions that conform with this 
research’s hypothesis were found within this second period of negotiations of the 
European Merger Regulation. Indeed, as table 5.4 outlines, only some of the factors 
which determine the neo-functionalist and realist conditions for integration occurred 
in the early 1980s.
Table 5.3. SECOND PERIOD FINDINGS
CONDITIONS FOR INTEGRATION PRESENT
NEO-FUNCTIONALIST NO
REALIST NO
TABLE 5.4. FACTORS OCCURRING IN THE EARLY 1980s.
159
CONDITIONS’ FACTORS PRESENT EVIDENCE
NEO-FUNCTIONALIST
* Pressure supranational 
institutions:
- Commission YES Arguments for an EEC merger regulation, 1981 
and 1984 amendments and 1986 options, use 
Article 86 EEC Treaty, use ECJ nilings, 
Sutherland's threats.
- European Parliament YES Complaints, 1983 Resolution, 1986 suggestion.
- European Court of Justice YES Full extent of doctrine revealed.
* EuroDean Industrialists in 
favour?
NO Cumbersome and unnecessary.
* Functional spillover YES/NO To ensure Art.3(F) EEC Treaty and Common 
Market and hence help to overcome the economic 
crisis (Commission and EP; possibly the ECJ)
REALIST
* At least two of the three 
largest member states in 
favour?:
NO France and United Kingdom against. Germany 
did not oppose it. Lack o f real negotiations.
5.3. LATE 1980s: THE THIRD ATTEMPT
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This part proposes to ascertain whether the factors which determine the neo­
functionalist condition and the realist condition were present in the late 1980s.
A. The neo-functionalist condition
The three neo-functionalist factors are: the position and role of the EC 
supranational institutions, whether there was political spillover and the existence of 
functional spillover.
Concerning the first factor: did EC supranational institutions press for an 
European merger regulation in the early 1980s? In this period, it can be seen that 
such pressure was provided by all three of the supranational institutions.
The European Commission did press for an European merger regulation in the 
late 1980s. A more confident Commission, under the strong leadership of President 
Delors and DG IV Commissioner Sutherland (and later on of DG IV Commissioner 
Brittan), reinstated its sole competence in merger cases decisions by amending Article 
19 of the draft regulation in 1986 and made again merger control one of its priorities.
The increased confidence of the Commission, in general, and of DG IV, in 
particular, during this period of negotiations, derived both from the personality of the 
Commissioners in charge and from the importance competition policy acquired. 
Regarding leadership, as Rosenthal (1990: 299) argued: ’DG-4 can be constrained by 
a passive commissioner for competition... ,but, conversely, strong leadership in those 
positions strengthens its hands.’ Most commentators agree that both Sutherland and 
Brittan were forceful competition Commissioners. For Wilks (1992: 10): ’...the 
significance of leadership from the Commissioner was established by Peter Sutherland 
whose success was built upon by Leon Brittan.’ Both were relatively young, tough 
and ambitious and proved to be sophisticated and able operators on the Brussels scene 
(Cini and McGowan, 1998; I 22, 1995; I 17, 1995; I 7, 1995; 12, 1994; Cini, 1993; 
Wilks, 1992; Rosenthal, 1990; Winckler and Gerondeau, 1990; Owen and Dynes,
1989; Financial Times, 5 Sep 1988; Carr, 1988).
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As to the importance of competition policy, the revival of EC dynamism in 
the form of the single-market programme led to a renewed enthusiasm for all aspects 
of competition policy and hence enhanced the DG IV’s status by giving it legitimacy 
(Cini and McGowan, 1998; Allen, 1996). As Wilks (1992: 9) stated:
To a large degree market integration has always been the prime objective o f DG IV. To have 
it elevated to the main Commission objective is good for morale, raises the salience of 
competition issues and means that DG IV is taken more seriously by other Commission 
agencies...
This self-assured Commission continued to hold mergers, and especially cross- 
border mergers, as necessary for building a real European market. For the 
Commission, cross-border mergers were ’a means of realizing the objective of the 
Single European market and improving international competitiveness* (Tsoukalis, 
1993: 112; see also Rosenthal, 1990; CEC, 1988c and the Preambles of the 1988 
proposals). The potential gains from completing the Internal Market, identified by the 
1987 Cecchini Report on the cost of non-Europe, relied, in part, on the reallocation 
of resources between enterprises and activities which would be achieved through such 
mergers (Jacquemin and Wright, 1993). Accordingly, the Commission tried to 
encourage cross-border mergers and alliances through its various projects in the high 
technology field, its internal market programme and its persistent attempts to 
harmonise company legislation and to offer European companies a common 
framework for conducting their operations (Tsoukalis, 1993; MacLachlan and 
MacKesy, 1989; Ownes and Dynes, 1989; Brittan, 1989; The Economist, 7 Oct 1989; 
Financial Times, 18 Jul 1989).
At the same time, however, the Commission persisted in its demands for an 
EEC merger regulation. The potential gains of the completion of the Internal Market 
were also expected to depend upon reduction in monopoly power. In this sense, the 
Commission believed systematic merger control was not only necessary but 
indispensable and urgent.78 The unsuitability of EEC existing competition powers
78 The result of this apparent conflict between the desire to develop large European enterprises and 
the desire to maintain undistorted competition was the maintenance in the 1986 and 1988 amended 
proposals of a ’trade-off approach’ on EEC merger control.
162
to deal efficiently with mergers, the wave of mergers which was taking place in the 
Community, the disparity and limited scope of national merger control laws, and the 
need to ensure the objectives of the Treaty and the completion of the Internal Market 
were all arguments asserted by the Commission in this respect. This was reflected, 
for instance, in its different Annual Competition Reports and in the Recitals to its 
draft proposals.
To be more specific, according to the Commission, an EEC merger regulation 
was crucial to achieve the aims of the Treaty of Rome as established in Article 3(f) - 
to institute ’a system ensuring that competition in the common market is not 
distorted’- and, by doing so, to ensure that the full benefits of the Internal Market 
could be realised. By maintaining a competitive structure for European industry, and 
thus the unity of the Internal Market, systematic EEC merger control would lead to 
an optimal allocation of resources and create the best possible climate for fostering 
innovation and technical progress (Sachwald, 1993; CEC, 1991c; CEC, 1990a; CEC, 
1989b; CEC, 1988f; CEC, 1988a).
Such a merger control was all the more imperative when the single market 
project had given rise to a process of restructuring of European industry and hence 
to a wave of mergers (CEC, 1987a; CEC, 1989a). Wave of mergers characterised 
not only by an increasing number of large domestic mergers but also, for the first 
time, by an increasing number of cross-border mergers. For the Commission (1990a: 
33): ’Although many such mergers [had] not posed any problems from the 
competition point of view, it [had to] be ensured that they [did] not in the long run 
jeopardize the competition process which lies at the heart of the common market.’ 
In the words of Dinan (1994: 375): ’The number, size, and speed of 1992-induced 
mergers gave Competition Commissioner Peter Sutherland a legitimate pretext upon 
which to press national governments to cede more regulatory authority to Brussels.’ 
Indeed, as the Financial Times of 3 June 1988 reported, Sutherland ’appealed for 
progress towards a Community-wide merger regime’ on the basis that ’new 
Commission figures showed that Europe [had] seen a steep rise in large mergers.’ 
Without an EEC merger control regulation, there was an implicit danger that merger 
activity would restrict market competition by creating dominant positions for the
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combined firms.
Article 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty did not provide the Commission the tools 
’to cover all operations which [could] prove to be incompatible with the system of 
undistorted competition envisaged in the Treaty’ (Preambles 1988 proposals; see also 
Martin, 1992). As Kovar (1991:72) noted, the need to continue basing the EEC 
regulation upon Article 235 of the EEC Treaty ’[arose] out of the need to remedy the 
deficiencies of Articles 85 and 86 which [did] not guarantee effective intervention in 
all cases of concentration.’ Both articles offered limited scope of application and 
neither of them provided for prior notification of a proposed merger, or for formal 
grant of approval (Tempini, 1991; Elland, 1990; Sutherland, 1989; 
Monopolkommission, 1989; Brussels Law Offices, 1988). In the words of Brittan 
(1991: 31): ’Articles 85 and 86 do some of the job, but they are very limited and 
technically inadequate (for example, if there is no agreement or no pre-existing 
dominant position, they may no apply).’ Accordingly, and as John Temple Lang, 
then head of DG IV, told the International Bar Association conference in Strasbourg 
in October 1989: ’...the Commission wished to see the merger regulation adopted 
because of several aspects of the law contained in Articles 85 and 86 which were 
unclear or otherwise unsatisfactory’ {Financial Times, 6 Oct 1989).
Moreover, the Commission considered that national laws could not guarantee 
an efficient control of large mergers. National rules were restricted to the respective 
territories of the member states concerned, and therefore, could not deal adequately 
with large-scale mergers where the reference market was the Community as a whole 
or a large part of it (CEC, 1990a; CEC, 1990b; CEC, 1988c). Furthermore, national 
authorities could favour certain mergers for nationalistic reasons. In the Explanatory 
Memorandum attached to the April 1988 draft proposal, the Commission stated that 
national instruments of merger control could ’be a damaging risk to the internal 
market if they were used to favour "national champions" rather than the interests of 
the Community as a whole’ (CEC, 1988c: 4). Nevertheless, the reason the 
Commission most emphasised to establish the unsuitability of domestic control over 
large mergers was the possibility of ’multiple jeopardy’ in cross-border cases.
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Major mergers extending beyond national frontiers in a single market 
’[needed] to be appraised on the basis of uniform and non-discriminatory rules’ 
(CEC, 1989a: 50). In such a market, therefore, major mergers ’[could not] be 
adequately assessed under such national laws as [existed], which [were] in any case 
not homogeneous’ (CEC, 1988a: 51). The lack of Community control was ’damaging 
to the interest of firms that [were] seeking to develop their presence in the integrated 
Community market’ (CEC, 1987a: 16). Cross-border mergers were at the mercy of 
differing national rules on merger control authorisation and could be faced with 
higher legal risks and transaction costs due to the possibility of parallel procedures 
from different national authorities. At a conference in Paris in March 1988 
Sutherland asked:
Is it really acceptable that the same mergers between different companies in different member 
states should be subject to differing national laws, with the distinct possibility that conflicting 
decisions will be reached resulting from the fact that member states could apply different 
criteria? (Owen and Dynes, 1989: 129)
The very creation of a Community-wide merger control could be seen as the 
elimination of a technical barrier to integration (CEC, 1994c).
In short, for the Commission, the existing Treaty provisions and domestic 
laws could not provide an efficient system of control for all mergers. In a context of 
industrial restructuring and increasing number of large mergers, an EEC merger 
regulation was indispensable to ensure competition in the Single Market and hence 
its completion. For Sutherland: ’...a Community-wide merger regulation [was] a vital 
instrument in achieving the single integrated market by 1992’ (Brussels Law Offices, 
1988: 289). Leon Brittan hailed the 1989 Agreement on EEC merger regulation as 
a ’historic breakthrough in the creation of a single European market’ {Financial 
Times, 22 Dec 1989).
But the Commission not only pressed the Council with ’common sense’ 
arguments. It also threatened once again to develop merger control at the European 
level with or without an agreement on EEC merger regulation, despite the 
unsatisfactory system provided by the EEC Treaty (1 15, 1995; I 12, 1995; 12, 1994; 
Jacobs and Stewart-Clark, 1990; van Empel, 1990; Le Bolzer, 1990; Fine, 1989;
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MacLachlan and MacKesy, 1989; Financial Times, 24 Nov 1987). As the 
Commission (1988c: 4) stated: ’...it is possible to envisage an approach whereby the 
Community’s existing competition rules might be applied systematically to certain 
mergers that significantly affect competitive structures within the common market... ’ 
Undeterred by the alleged defects of Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty as merger 
control instruments, the Commission was prepared to turn to case-law to develop 
EEC merger policy if the Council did not adopt a regulation (Schwartz, 1993). In the 
words of Sutherland: ’The issue [was] not whether Europe ha[d] a merger policy but 
what type it ha[d]’ {The Economist, 5 Nov 1988).
The Commission in fact proceeded to carry out its threats after the BAT- 
Reynolds ruling of the European Court of Justice in November 1987. In 1988, 
besides continously applying Article 86 of the EEC Treaty to mergers, the 
Commission started to utilise Article 85 of the EEC Treaty to this endeavour (CEC, 
1990a; CEC, 1989a). The Commission considered the European Court of Justice’s 
controversial decision in BAT-Reynolds established this possibility, substantially 
increasing the number of mergers it could control (Zachman, 1994; CEC, 1988a; 
Korah, 1987). For some commentators, this interpretation of the Court ruling was 
’undoubtedly inspired by the political goal of seeing the Council adopt a 
concentration control regulation’ (Bos et al., 1992: 90; see also Cook and Kerse, 
1991; van Empel, 1990; Financial Times, 24 Nov 1987). According to others, the 
Commission’s interpretation was accurate.
In any case, the Commission applied both articles in several share acquisitions 
of competitors, mergers and hostile takeovers (Allen, 1996; Bulmer, 1994; Bellamy 
and Child, 1991; Venit, 1990; CEC, 1990a; CEC, 1989a; Owens and Dynes, 1989; 
Fine, 1989; Whish, 1989; Forrester, 1989; CEC, 1988a). Two cases in particular 
’made the Commission’s name’ (The Economist, 5 Nov 1988). In March 1988, it 
used Article 86 to force British Airways to accept abandoning some of its routes to 
its competitors after it had taken over British Caledonian (CEC, 1989a), and, in July 
1988, it used Article 85 to block the GC and C Brands proposed takeover of Irish 
Distillers (CEC, 1989a). Most commentators agree that, though few cases were 
mentioned in the Annual Reports, the Commission was fairly active in monitoring
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mergers under those articles of the EEC Treaty subsequent to BAT-Reynolds (Van 
Bael and Beilis, 1990; Whish, 1989). The Economist (7 Oct 1989) reported that, by 
1989, the Commission was examining about fifty deals a year.
These interventions did not usually result in formal decisions but made the 
Commission’s determination to keep on developing its merger control armoury more 
credible than ever (Carr, 1988; Gray, 1988; Reynolds, 1987). Sutherland had ’proved 
that Brussels could interfere under the Treaty of Rome with or without an agreed 
prior-vetting policy’ (The Times, 2 Feb 1989). As the European Communities sub­
committee of the British House of Lords concluded (1989: 5): ’Such interventions 
[draw] attention to the powers relied on by the Commission to control mergers under 
the EEC Treaty and to its efforts to secure more comprehensive powers by means of 
the proposed Regulation.’ Quoting the Financial Times of 9 February 1989: ’The 
genie [was] out of the bottle; and there [was] no way to put it back...’ The 
Commission was pressing for an EEC merger regulation not only with words but also 
with actions. And these actions had high associated costs for companies wanting to 
merge.
In increasing the use of Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty to attempt to 
control mergers without clear and predictable technical and assessing rules, the 
Commission was provoking a lot of second-guessing and legal uncertainty (Davison 
and Fitzpatrick, 1995; Institute of Directors, 1989; Blumberg and Schodermeier, 
1988; Financial Times, 24 Nov 1987). Many mergers, such as the 1989 Metal 
Box/Carnaud (CEC, 1990a), were voluntarily brought to the attention of the 
Commission on the grounds that ’it [was] preferable to have a green light from the 
Commission in advance than to discover that it intend[ed] to open proceedings in 
respect of a completed merger, with the possibility that it might order divestiture’ 
(Whish, 1989: 751). These were major mergers ’which previously would not have 
dreamed of calling upon Brussels’ to seek the Commission’s prior opinion (Swann, 
1992b: 71).
Moreover, the development by the Commission of EEC merger policy on a 
case by case bases implied the creation of a twofold system of merger control in the
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Community. A system based, on the one hand, on Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC 
Treaty, which could be applied directly by the national authorities, and, on the other 
hand, on national merger laws. This resulted in many mergers being investigated both 
by domestic competition authorities and by the Commission. For example, the British 
Airways takeover of British Caledonian was investigated in the United Kingdom and 
by the Commission. The joint bid by GEC and Siemens for Plessey had to be notified 
to the Commission and to the British, French, Italian and German national 
competition authorities (not to mention further notifications in other non-EC 
countries, mainly because of defence interests). And Ashland Oil/Cabot was 
monitored at both EEC level and by the French Commission de la Concurrence. 
(Woolcock etal. , 1991; CEC, 1990a; CEC, 1989a; Whish, 1989; Owen and Dynes, 
1989; Woolcock, 1989)
This multiple control system was very costly to European firms (Zachman, 
1994; Woolcock et al., 1991; Brittan, 1990; Whish, 1989; Financial Times, 9 Feb 
1989). It meant that the already confused legal environment surrounding large 
mergers was becoming even more complicated in a moment of active industrial 
restructuring. The Commission was not only aggravating the problem of parallel 
control from different national authorities on cross-border mergers but also extending 
it to large national mergers. As a result, companies faced considerable uncertainty 
about whether a potential large merger would be investigated by national or European 
merger regulators or both. Furthermore, the Commission and member states’ 
competition authorities could reach conflicting positions on the desirability of 
proposed mergers. For example, in the British Airways/British Caledonian case, the 
conditions demanded by the Commission for approval were more stringent than those 
asked for by the British Monopolies and Mergers Commission.
With relation to this problem of corporate uncertainty, the Commission argued 
again that only a ’one-stop shop’ system, a single Community control for large-scale 
mergers, could avoid the risk of differences of assessment and establish clear legal 
jurisdictions and procedures (CEC, 1990a; Pathak, 1990; Financial Times, 18 Oct 
1990; The Times, 28 Jan 1989; The Times, 23 Jun 1988). The only way to eliminate 
this uncertainty was with the approval of a comprehensive approach to merger
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control. As Sutherland argued: ’...it [was] better to have a clear procedure than the 
risk of the retrospective application of Articles 85 and 86’ (Carr, 1988: 7).
The Commission was, thus, offering EEC merger regulation as the alternative 
to a situation of legal uncertainty that it had greatly help to create. An EEC merger 
regulation was required not only to control anti-competitive mergers which could 
jeopardise the Single Market but also to help competitive mergers to take place by 
clarifying the rules. It ’[could] be seen as a means of facilitating European mergers, 
by reducing as much as possible the area in which national and Community 
competences overlapped’ (Tsoukalis, 1993: 112). Sutherland claimed that an EEC 
merger regulation was ’not designed as an impediment’ but as ’a reorganisation that 
[would] remove one layer and replace it with one decision-making body’ (Carr, 1988: 
7). In an interview for The Independent (31 Jul 1989), Sir Leon Brittan affirmed that 
’one-stop control [was to] be to the benefit of industry.’ The need to establish a ’one- 
stop shop’ system became a ’cornerstone’ of the Commission’s arguments for an EEC 
merger regulation (I 15, 1995; Brittan, 1989; Sutherland, 1989; The Times, 28 Jan
1989).
As may be deduced from what precedes, the Commission increasing use of 
Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty can be seen ’as a political move by Brussels 
to strengthen its hand in winning member states agreement to a EC-wide merger 
control regulation’ (Financial Times, 5 Sep 1988), that is, as a means of persuasion. 
As Forrester (1989:98) described, the Commission’s ’unusually frequent involvement 
in merger cases over the past months has been part of its campaign to be granted 
clear power to review major mergers.’ The Commission was hoping member states 
would view a merger control regulation with less alarm than the prospect of an 
increasing use of these articles of the EEC Treaty to attack mergers (Financial Times, 
24 Nov 1987). Indeed, in 1988 and 1989, the Commission insisted on the risks the 
use of Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty as merger control instruments implied 
yet, at the same time, threatened member states not only to persist in their application 
until adoption by the Council of an EEC merger regulation, but to do it to a greater 
extent (Monopolkommission, 1989; Woolcock, 1989; Forrester, 1989; Financial 
Times, 6 Oct 1989; CEC, 1988f). According to The Economist (5 Nov 1988) the
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right word to describe the Commission’s intentions was ’blackmail’.
Last but not least, the Commission resolve to get a specific merger control 
instrument especially adopted to deal with Community-scale mergers, was displayed 
by three further facts. First, by its willingness to work with interested groups, the 
European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Council in the 
preparation of its merger regulation proposals (I 18, 1995; Dechery, 1990; CEC, 
1990a; CEC, 1989a; CEC, 1988a; CEC, 1987a). Secondly, by its flexibility in 
amending its proposal twice in 1988 and several times in 1989 as the final text of the 
regulation showed (CEC, 1989a). As one interviewee involved in the late 1980s 
negotiations stated, the Commission was ’practical and sensible’ (I 14, 1995). And 
thirdly, by the fact that the Commission’s delegation to the negotiations, the so-called 
’merger team’, was headed, and this is exceptional, sometimes by the director 
general of DG IV, sometimes by the deputy director general, or sometimes by a 
member of the Commissioner’s cabinet (I 18, 1995; I 12, 1995).
Briefly, in the late 1980s a more assured Commission fought with all its 
weapons for an agreement on European merger regulation. It offered ’common sense’ 
arguments for an EEC merger regulation, increasingly applied Articles 85 and 86 of 
the EEC Treaty to mergers, despite (or because of) their limitations and thus 
associated costs, and was prepared to be flexible on the contents of the regulation. 
The energy shown by the Commission in attempting to get Council agreement on the 
subject of EEC merger control was indeed highlighted and welcomed by the 
European Parliament in several occasions. For instance, in its voluntary Resolution 
on mergers of October 1987,79 in its Resolution on the Seventeenth Report on 
Competition Policy (CEC, 1989a) and in its Resolution on the Eighteenth Report on 
Competition Policy (CEC, 1990a).
The European Parliament also pressed for an EEC merger regulation in this 
third period. Just as with the Commission, it considered such a regulation more 
necessary than ever due to the unsuitability of EEC existing competition powers to
79 OJ [1987] C 318/120.
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deal efficiently with mergers, the wave of mergers which was taking place in the 
Community, the 1992 target of a true internal market and the need to avoid multiple 
control on mergers (CEC, 1992a; CEC, 1991c; CEC, 1990a; CEC, 1989a; CEC, 
1988a).
For this reason, besides voting in favour of the Commission’s 1988 April 
amended proposal and greeting the Commission’s efforts to get an agreement, the 
European Parliament directly appealed to the Council for the regulation. It ’urged the 
Council to implement [the regulation] as soon as possible’ (CEC, 1989a: 259). As 
expressed in its voluntary Resolution on mergers of October 1987, the Parliament 
’deplor[ed] the many years of deadlock on the Council’s Economic Questions 
Working Party and the Committee of Permament Representatives on the proposal’ 
and ’call[ed] upon the Council to recognize that, by its failure to act so far, it [was] 
both seriously jeopardizing competition in the Community and denying companies the 
certainty and assurance to which they [were] entitled’ (OJ [1987] C 318/120).
However, the European Parliament’s main line of action was to exhort the 
Commission to take all the necessary steps to get a Council agreement on this issue. 
On the one hand, in its Resolution on the Sixteenth Report on Competition Policy 
(CEC, 1988a), it stated its belief ’that a firm decision [had to] be taken by the 
Commission as to how it [intended] to proceed with regard to its proposals on merger 
controls, which [were] still deadlocked in the Council.’ On the other hand, it 
encouraged the Commission to use Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty as 
instruments of merger control if the Council did not reach an agreement:
[the European Parliament] Notes that the European Court of Justice in the Philip Morris case 
suggested that the prohibition on cartels contained in Article 85 could possibly be applied to 
certain mergers as well; considers, therefore, that the Commission should fully use its powers 
under both Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty if the proposal for a regulation on merger control 
is not accepted by the Council. (CEC, 1989a: 259)
Indeed, Brittan (1991: 31-32) commented that during the negotiations, the Parliament 
’did not miss an opportunity to urge [the Commission] to withdraw the regulation 
proposal from the Council table and instead get on applying the Treaty rules 
audaciously.*
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Moreover, the European Parliament actively participated in the late 1980s 
discussions on European merger regulation. As the Commission noted in its 
Nineteenth Report on Competition Policy (1990a: 22): ’The Parliament played a 
constructive role in the process leading to the adoption of the text. Its opinions and 
criticisms were taken into account by the Commission.’
Hence, when in December 1989 an agreement was eventually reached on the 
regulation, the European Parliament was the first to applaud the success in its 
Resolution on the Nineteenth Report on Competition Policy: ’[The European 
Parliament] Welcom[ed] the fact that the Council [had] finally [taken] the decision 
to adopt a Regulation on merger control in December 1989 after so many years of 
stalemate’ (CEC, 1991c: 252).
Lastly, just like the Commission and the European Parliament, the European 
Court o f Justice pressed for an European merger regulation in the late 1980s. In 
November 1987, it issued a disputed ruling in the BAT-Reynolds case. In this ruling, 
the Court rejected BAT and Reynolds specific complaint but held that, in principle, 
the acquisition of a minority shareholding can amount to a restrictive agreement 
under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty irrespective of whether those transactions 
constitute an abuse of dominance under Article 86 of the EEC Treaty (George and 
Jacquemin, 1990; Holzler, 1990). The Court argued that:
It should be recalled that the agreements prohibited by Article 85 are those which have as 
their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion o f competition within the 
common market.
Although the acquisition by one company of an equity interest in a competitor does not itself 
constitute conduct restricting competition, such an acquisition may nevertheless serve as an 
instrument for influencing the commercial conduct of the companies in question so as to 
restrict or distort competition on the market on which they carry on business. (ECR, 1987: 
4576-4577, parag 36 and 37)
Commentators agreed the Court unequivocally ruled that Article 85 of the EEC 
Treaty could be applied to the acquisition of a minority shareholding in a competitor. 
Notwithstanding, they had different opinions on the crucial question of whether the 
judgement had established that Article 85 could also apply to acquisitions of majority 
or total shareholdings.
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According to the Commission, the European Parliament and some legal 
experts, the Court had significantly widened EC merger powers of intervention. For 
them, the Court’s judgement ’radically revised the application of Article 85 to 
mergers’ undermining the restraint imposed by the 1966 Memorandum (Schwartz, 
1993: 642). It implied that Article 85 of the EEC Treaty could be applied in instances 
of majority share acquisitions and even to full mergers if they lead to control of the 
commercial conduct of the acquired company (I 12, 1995; Bishop, 1993; Bos et al. , 
1992; Hodges et al., 1992; Kovar, 1991; Woolcock et al., 1991; Downes and 
Ellison, 1991; Le Bolzer, 1990; George and Jacquemin, 1990; Whish, 1989; 
Financial Times, 9 Feb 1989; Forrester, 1989; CEC, 1989a; Blumberg and 
Schodermeier, 1988; Brussels Law Offices, 1988; CEC, 1988a; CEC, 1988c; CEC, 
1987c; Fine, 1987; Reynolds 1987).
These commentators based their assessment on the fact that the Court included 
amongst agreements ’prohibited by Article 85’ instances ’where, by the acquisition 
of a shareholding or through subsidiarity clauses in the agreement, the investing 
company obtains legal or de facto control of the commercial conduct of other 
company...’ (ECR, 1987: 4576-4577, parag 36-38) and any agreement that ’gives the 
investing company the possibility of reinforcing its position at a later stage and taking 
effective control of the other company...’ (ECR, 1987: 4577, parag 39). They argued 
that the Court was not required to include such broad statements of principle in the 
assessment of this case. It could have as well avoided the question of the applicability 
of Article 85 to mergers as the Commission had done in 1984.
For other legal specialists, nevertheless, the Court’s ruling had not broken 
new ground. It was ’far less revolutionary than some may pretend’ (Van Bael and 
Beilis, 1990: 303). The judgement related only to minority share acquisitions and 
thus had just confirmed that Article 85 of the EEC Treaty could be applied, not only 
to specific restrictive clauses in agreements on the formation of joint ventures, but 
to the formation of a joint venture itself where it provides a framework for co­
operation between the parents that is likely to restrict competition, backing the 
Commission policy in this area (Bos et al., 1992; Kovar, 1991; Bellamy and Child, 
1991; van Bael and Beilis, 1990; van Empel, 1990; Forrester, 1989;
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Monopolkommission, 1989; Whish, 1989; Financial Times, 24 Nov 1987).
These legal experts pointed out many uncertainties and practical objections 
militating against a broad interpretation of Article 85 as well as paragraphs 30 and 
31 of the European Court’s ruling. In these paragraphs, the Court characterised the 
issue before it as
...whether and in what circumstances the acquisition of a minority shareholding in a 
competing company may constitute an infringement of Articles 85 and 86 o f the Treaty. Since 
the acquisition of shares in Rothmans International was the subject-matter of agreements 
entered into by companies which have remained independent after the entry into force of the 
agreements, the issue must be examined first of all from the point of view of Article 85. 
(ECR, 1987: 4575)
This passage suggests that Article 85 of the EEC Treaty is applicable only where an 
undertaking acquires a minority shareholding in a competitor and the agreement is 
entered into by companies which have remained independent. If one of the parties to 
the agreement were to lose its independence -in other words, if a true merger or 
acquisition were to occur -Article 85 might not apply. Finally, the mention of 
’competing companies’ suggests that even if horizontal mergers could be brought 
under Article 85, the holding might not reach vertical and conglomerate mergers. 
According to these legal experts, if the Court had wanted to allow for expansive 
reading of Article 85, it ’could have categorized the transaction as one that gave one 
company control of another, thus clearly enabling it to extend its analysis to 
concentrations’ (Schwartz, 1993: 641).
The European Court of Justice ruling was thus unclear (I 2, 1994; Whish, 
1989; Korah, 1987). It ’was written ambiguously enough to support either a 
restrictive or an expansive reading of Article 85 of the EEC Treaty’ (Schwartz, 1993: 
641). On the one hand, the Court made the application of Article 85 of the EEC 
Treaty contingent upon the fact that the undertakings concerned also remained 
independent following the conclusion of an agreement, but, on the other hand, 
deemed Article 85 to be applicable if the acquisitor obtained the legal or factual 
control of the business activities of the other undertakings (Brittan, 1991; 
Monopolkommission, 1989; Lever and Lasok, 1988). The judgement had left 
unexplained the scope of application of Article 85 of the EEC Treaty to mergers and
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thus, as Swann (1992b: 71) argued, had ’threw up a host of unresolved procedural 
issues’ (Bernini, 1991; Venit, 1990; Holzler, 1990; Whish, 1989). In the words of 
Montagnon (1990: 103), this decision ’raise[d] more questions than [it] answerfed].’
In any case, however, ’the judgement [had] raised some possible doubts 
whether, after all, Article 85(1) might be made applicable to merger’ (Forrester, 
1989: 98). Despite the lack of clarity concerning the powers of the Commission vis- 
a-vis undertakings, the ruling had actually opened up the possibility to broaden the 
use of Article 85 of the EEC Treaty to merger cases. As a result, it helped to 
increase the credibility of the Commission’s threats to develop European merger 
control with or without an specific merger regulation (I 7, 1995; Owen and Dynes, 
1989; CEC, 1988c). Quoting Korah and Rothnie (1990: 212): ’...the judgement in 
BAT and Reynolds was widely interpreted as an indication to the Council of 
Ministers that it should adopt the regulation or suffer the consequences of a wide 
interpretation of the precedent.’
Certainly, by giving the Commission the chance to have considerable 
discretionary power to control acquisitions, the ambiguous ruling provided for the 
creation of a twofold system which would be very costly to European firms (I 7, 
1995). In the words of Hodges et al. (1992: 31): ’This decision opened up the real 
prospect that European industry would be subject to double-jeopardy on mergers - 
with both Commission and national governments ruling according to different 
criteria-...’ In fact, as Downes and Ellison (1991: 25) noted, the Court’s decision ’led 
immediately to a number of informal investigations which were settled after 
negotiation with the Commission.’ An ambiguous judgement was all that was needed 
to encourage the Commission to claim the power to investigate mergers on the basis 
of Article 85 and to confer new impetus to its efforts to introduce a Council 
regulation on mergers (Swann, 1992b; Cook and Kerse, 1991; Brittan, 1991; Bellamy 
and Child, 1991; Whish, 1991; Downes and Ellison, 1991; van Bael and Beilis, 
1990; Holzler, 1990; Brussels Law Offices, 1988).
Therefore, despite or because of its ambiguity, the European Court of 
Justice’s ruling in the BAT-Reynolds case gave the Commission a useful new weapon
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with which to control mergers and to urge the Council for an EEC merger regulation. 
With its decision, the Court assisted the Commission in its efforts to get an EEC 
merger regulation and, by doing so, pressed, at least indirectly, for it. For some 
authors, the judgement was indeed an important catalyst in the evolution of 
Community merger control; it helped create a new momentum (Allen, 1996; Bulmer, 
1994; Swann, 1992b; Hodges et al., 1992; Woolcock et al., 1991; Downes and 
Ellison, 1991). According to Lord Slynn (1992), former judge of the European 
Court, the Court laid the foundations of the EEC Merger Regulation.
Yet, whereas the effects of the ruling are straightforward, what is not so clear 
is whether they were intentional. At first sight, the Court of Justice was not seeking 
to help the Commission. Unlike in the Continental Can case in the early 1970s, the 
Commission’s decision on the Philip Morris case in 1984 did not try to establish the 
principle that Article 85 could be applied to mergers (Schwartz, 1993). Contrary to 
the Continental Can case, therefore, the Court could not be presumed to have 
followed the Commission’s interpretation in this case. Perhaps, the judgement’s 
ambiguity was just the result of the Court’s internal proceedings. As Nugent (1994: 
231-232) notes:
...the use of majority voting, coupled with the lack of opportunity for dissenting opinions, has 
encouraged a tendency, which perhaps is inevitable given the different legal backgrounds of 
the judges, for judgements sometimes to be less than concise; occasionally even to be fudged.
On the other hand, however, Sutherland had threatened the Council with using 
this article of the EEC Treaty to control mergers since 1985 and especially before the 
crucial Council meeting of 30 November 1987. The Court issued the controversial 
ruling some days before that meeting. Perfect timing or coincidence? As Downes and 
Ellison (1991:20) stated: ’The Court of Justice was clearly sensitive to the fact that 
these proceedings were regarded by many interested observers as a test case of the 
Court’s attitude to the application of Article 85 to agreements which had an element 
of concentration or merger in them.’ Despite this, the Court issued an ambiguous 
ruling. Perhaps, as some authors have argued:
.. .the Court’s vagueness suggests uncertainty as to how institutional and political actors would 
receive the Court’s interpretation. Thus the Court included clauses in the opinion to ’allow 
future limitation’ in case expansive reading of the decision proved ’unworkable’. (Schwartz, 
1993: 641)
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It is difficult to believe that the Court did not have in mind the political 
implications of its decision (I 2, 1994). It is said that a member of Sutherland’s 
cabinet ’was frequently on the telephone to the Court’ (I 2, 1994). The likelihood of 
some political influence cannot be excluded. Blumberg and Schodermeier (1988: 35) 
noted that ’in combining the antitrust investigation with the transfer of control, the 
Court [had] come very close to the Commission’s view expressed in Article 2 of the 
Draft Merger Regulation.’
The possibility that in the BAT-Reynolds ruling the Court had tried, just as 
with the Continental Can decision, to interpret the Treaty in a light most favourable 
to the expansion of the Commission’s powers over mergers cannot be dismissed. 
Whether or not the Court intended the scope of its judgement to extend so far, the 
fact is that it gave the Commission an opportunity to reinforce its position. Like in 
the previous two periods of negotiations, the first neo-functionalist factor was present 
in the late 1980s.
Regarding the second neo-functionalist factor: were European industrialists 
in favour of an European merger regulation? Yes, the European business 
community was, in general, in favour of an EEC merger regulation in the late 1980s 
(Armstrong and Bulmer, 1998; I 19, 1995; I 18, 1995; I 17, 1995; I 7, 1995; 
Bulmer, 1994; Brittan, 1991; Holzler, 1990; Korah, 1990; van Empel, 1990; Brittan, 
1989; Woolcock, 1989; Sutherland, 1989; The Times, 28 Jan 1989; The Guardian, 
10 Nov 1988; The Economist, 5 Nov 1988; Financial Times 5 Sep 1988). At the 
beginning of November 1987, European industrial and employers’ confederations 
issued a declaration, through UNICE, making plain their support for EEC merger 
control (I 21, 1995; CEC, 1988a; UNICE, 10 Nov 1987)80 and, in 1988, major 
European industrial leaders in the Round Table organisation gave the regulation 
general backing (The Guardian, 21 Jun 1988).
Industrialists argued that the logic of the Single Market necessitated a single
80 In a footnote to the official UNICE opinion, the Federation of Danish Industries clearly stated that, 
contrary to the rest of national industrial or employers’ organisations, it did not see the need for the 
regulation. However, in UNICE’s official opinion of 4 November 1988, this footnote had disappeared.
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EC merger policy. As UNICE, the European grouping of national industry 
confederations, pointed out in its declaration of 10 November 1987, ’the completion 
of the internal market by 1992 and the exigencies of international competition’ were 
surmised to ’give rise to a major restructuring in the EC.’ Competition was expected 
to take place more and more on the European level. Accordingly, the application of 
national policies to large mergers was not only inappropiate but could also jeopardise 
the completion of the Single Market: ’National controls on company restructuring, 
being based on different national criteria, are incompatible with the existence of a 
really integrated market and the increasing geographical extension of a large number 
of markets’ (UNICE, 10 Nov 1987). As the EEC Treaty did not contain ’any suitable 
provisions concerning the control of company mergers from the competition policy 
point of view’, an EEC merger regulation was, therefore, required to reflect the 
nature of competition in the European market and also avoid multiple national control 
and unequal treatment (UNICE, 10 Nov 1987). (I 21, 1995; I 17, 1995; I 13, 1995; 
Woolcock, 1989)
After the November 1987 European Court of Justice’s BAT-Reynolds ruling 
and the Commission’s informal involvement in several cases, industry requests for 
clarification of the Commission’s and member states’ jurisdictions and the substantive 
standards each would apply to future merger control were fuelled (I 21, 1995; 
Bulmer, 1994; Hodges et al., 1992; Bernini, 1991; Schwartz, 1993; Holzler, 1990; 
UNICE, 14 Dec 1989; The Independent, 31 Jul 1989a; Financial Times, 5 Sep 1988; 
UNICE, 17 Nov 1989; UNICE, 4 Nov 1988). After these events, large European 
companies were faced with the possible consolidation of a multiple merger control 
system in the Community based not only on different national merger laws but also 
on Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty. Such a system meant more delay, expense, 
uncertainty and the increasing possibility of divergent decisions at precisely the time 
when more companies were considering mergers (121, 1995; I 19, 1995; Zachman, 
1994; Bulmer, 1994; Woolcock et al., 1991; Brittan, 1991; Dechery, 1990; van 
Empel, 1990; Korah, 1990; Holzler, 1990; Fine, 1989; Woolcock, 1989; House of 
Lords, 1989; Sutherland, 1989; The Times, 28 Jan 1989; The Economist, 5 Nov 
1988). When, in December 1989, UNICE welcomed the Agreement on EEC merger 
regulation, it was ’for ending the haphazard system under which the Commission
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[had] power to overrule the decisions of national authorities, but only when the 
merger [had] taken place’ (Financial Times, 22 Dec 1989).
Most European industrialists, therefore, regarded an EEC merger regulation 
as mandatory to avoid the costs of multiple control and hence to allow European 
industry to restructure and the completion of the Internal Market. Accordingly, the 
associations representing ’big business* formed a coalition with the Commission in 
favour of replacing the possibility of multiple control by one single ’one-stop’ 
exercise in Brussels and pressed both at the European and national level for an EEC 
merger regulation (I 21, 1995; Bulmer, 1994; van Empel, 1990; Woolcock, 1989).
At the European level, UNICE tried, through its usual means, to influence the 
Council’s discussions. It submitted a number of formal position papers and had 
several informal contacts with Commission officials and government representatives 
(CEC, 1990a; CEC, 1989a; UNICE, 14 Dec 1989; UNICE, 17 Nov 1989; UNICE, 
14 Dec 1988; UNICE, 4 Nov 1988; UNICE, 4 May 1988; UNICE, 10 Nov 1987). 
By doing so, some commentators argue, ’UNICE helped to get the regulation through 
the Council’ (Collie, 1993: 218; I 21, 1995). An interviewee added that the help was 
provided not only by UNICE but also by other professional and industrial 
organisations (I 18, 1995).
At the national level, employers’ and industry confederations undertook 
lobbying campaigns directed at their governments (I 21, 1995). In the United 
Kingdom, the most reluctant member state to an EEC merger regulation, the 
campaign was particularly tough. To give an example, in July 1988, John Banham, 
then Director General of the Confederation of British Industry, asked narrow, 
nationalistic competition policies to be set aside in favour of the European 
Commission becoming the key arbiter for international company mergers. His 
defending arguments were similar to those used by UNICE at the European level: an 
EEC merger regulation was needed to ensure fair play in a free market and to allow 
British industries to link up sufficiently in preparation for 1992. This statement was 
in direct conflict with the British government policy at the time (Owen and Dynes, 
1989; Financial Times, 14 Jul 1988b; Financial Times, 8 Jul 1988; The Times, 8 Jul
1988; see also House of Lords, 1989).
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To sum up, in contrast to earlier periods, in the late 1980s the European 
business community held the view that an EEC merger control regulation was 
necessary and was prepared to fight for it, lobbying the Council both directly and 
indirectly. Political spillover was finally present in that period of negotiations.
The same can be said of the third and last neo-functionalist factor. An 
European merger regulation was also considered for the first time essential to 
ensure another specific goal by all the actors involved. Contrary to the 1970s and 
early 1980s, in the late 1980s, the need for merger control at the European level was 
accepted not only by the three supranational institutions but also by member states’ 
governments and the business community. An EEC merger regulation was thought 
indispensable to achieve the aims of the Treaty (Article 3(f)) and to complete the 
Internal Market because of the unsuitability of EEC existing competition policy to 
deal efficiently with mergers, the wave of mergers which was taking place in the 
Community and the disparity of national merger control laws.
To summarise, the three neo-functionalist’s factors were present in the late 
1980s. This time, European industrialists, and not only the supranational institutions, 
pressed for the regulation and all actors involved believed the regulation was required 
to achieve the Single Market. The neo-functionalist condition for integration was 
fulfilled in this third period of negotiations.
B. The realist condition
The position held by the three most powerful member states on the issue in 
the EC intergovernmental institutions determines the realist condition. Were at least 
two of the three most important member states in favour of an European merger 
regulation? Contrary to earlier periods of negotiation, the answer is yes.
The representatives of all member states’ governments in the Council of
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Ministers showed willingness to enter into constructive discussion of the 
Commission’s proposals in the late 1980s. As the Economic and Social Committee 
stated: ’On 30 November 1987 the Council of Ministers responsible for the internal 
market finally gave up its obstructive attitude’ (OJ [1988] C 208/11). The Council 
did not wait for the European Parliament or the Economic and Social Committee 
before proceeding with the Commission’s April 1988 proposal. Informal discussions 
and deliberations did even take place within the Council prior to the formal referral 
of the proposal from the Commission. Moreover, deliberations not only occurred at 
the Working Party or Committee of Permanent Representatives’ level, but ministers 
were, for the first time, involved in the debate from the outset. Last but not least, the 
Council’s change of attitude on EEC merger regulation negotiations was further 
reflected by the fact that the four countries holding the Presidency from 1988 to 1989 
-the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Spain and France- made the work of 
establishing Community-level merger control one of their priorities.
As a result, and contrary to the 1970s and early 1980s, in the late 1980s real 
negotiations on EEC merger regulation took place. In the words of van Empel (1990: 
5): ’It could be said that negotiations only began in earnest from the moment when 
the then-responsible Commissioner, Mr. Peter Sutherland wrested a "political 
commitment" to the concept of a Community-wide merger control from the Council 
in November 1987.’ ’The proposals were given serious consideration by the Council’ 
(Bellamy and Child, 1993: 306) and, as the Commission itself recognised, this 
intergovernmental institution ’pressed ahead vigorously with its work on approving 
new legislation on merger control’ (CEC, 1989a: 16). Complex and hard formal and 
informal bargaining, between the Commission and the member states’ representatives 
and between the member states’ representatives amongst themselves, took place 
during the two years it took the Council to agree on the final text of the Regulation; 
particularly on the provisions relating to scope, control and criteria (I 17, 1995; 
Bulmer, 1994; Tsoukalis, 1993; Hodges etal., 1991;Kovar, 1991; van Empel, 1990; 
Holzler, 1990; House of Lords, 1989).
Member states’ governments seemed to accept the functional spillover 
arguments for an EEC merger control regulation held by the EC supranational
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institutions and by European industrialists. Indeed, Recitals one to six of the final 
Regulation read:
.. .Whereas, for the achievement of the aims of the Treaty establishing the European Economic 
Community, Art 3(f) gives the Community the objective of instituting ’a system ensuring that 
competition in the common market is not distorted";
Whereas this system is essencial for the achievement of the internal market by 1992 and its 
further development;
Whereas the dismantling o f internal frontiers is resulting and will continue to result in major 
corporate re-organizations in the Community, particularly in the form of concentrations; 
Whereas such a development must be welcomed as being in line with the requirements of 
dynamic competition and capable o f increasing the competitiveness of European industry, 
improving the conditions of growth and raising the standard of living in the Community; 
Whereas, however, it must be ensured that the process of re-organization does not result in 
lasting damage to competition; whereas Community law must therefore include provisions 
governing those concentrations which may significantly impede effective competition in the 
common market or in a substantial part of it;
Whereas Articles 85 and 86, while applicable, according to the case-law o f the Court of 
Justice, to certain concentrations, are not, however, sufficient to cover all operations which 
may prove to be incompatible with the system of undistorted competition envisaged in the 
Treaty;
Whereas a new legal instrument should therefore be created in the form of a Regulation to 
permit effective monitoring of all concentrations from the point of view of their effect on the 
structure o f competition in the Community and to be the only instrument applicable to such 
concentrations;... (OJ [1989] L 395/1)
By endorsing those Recitals, the Council of Ministers indicated that it was 
adopting the EEC Merger Regulation to answer the needs created by the single 
market project. Effective competition was considered essential to the completion of 
the Internal Market and, in a context of industrial restructuring, the available 
Community merger control instruments were not sufficient to ensure competition was 
not distorted in the European market. The Regulation should establish an effective 
system of control for Community-wide mergers (111, 1995; I 7, 1995; Zachman, 
1994; Swann, 1992a; The Times, 27 Nov 1989). Indeed, it had to be effective enough 
to ensure competition and, at the same time, to eliminate the possibility of double and 
multiple control so as to help the process of corporate re-organisation that the Single 
Market implied. As Recital seven stated, the new Merger Control Regulation should 
be ’the only instrument applicable to such concentrations’ (my emphasis). In the 
words of Brittan (1991: 51): ’The member states, all of them, were fully committed 
to the one-stop shop idea.’
Not all member states’ governments, however, were in favour of an EEC 
merger regulation in 1987. Only ten of the twelve member states* ministers accepted
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in principle the need for such a regulation at the November Council meeting. The 
French and British governments did not want to grant their approval in principle on 
the introduction of such a regulation at that meeting. Both had political and technical 
reservations about the transfer of sovereignty such a Community control represented. 
Both countries’ governments also coincided in their worry about the political 
consequences of giving new powers to the Commission in an area greatly related with 
national and industrial interests. Yet, neither of them explicitly opposed EEC merger 
control. They just reserved their positions in principle. (Zachman, 1994; Schwartz, 
1993; Tempini, 1991; Dechery, 1990; van Empel, 1990; Owen and Dynes, 1989; 
Financial Times, 3 Jun 1988; Europolitique, 5 Mar 1988; Korah, 1987)
Of the three largest member states, therefore, only Germany was in favour 
of having an EEC merger control regulation from the outset of the late 1980s 
negotiations. The West German government was the first to put the establishment of 
such a regulation high on its list of priorities during its Presidency of the Council in 
the first half of 1988. Though, as in the 1970s and early 1980s, the Germans were 
only prepared to accept an EEC merger control regulation if based on pure 
competition criteria alone, this time they were ready to ’sponsor’ the regulation. 
Indeed, as the Guardian (3 June 1988) reported, Chancellor Kohl made specific 
appeals to the United Kingdom to agree to the principles of the proposed EEC 
merger control regulation during his chairmanship of the European Council. For 
example, he wrote to Mrs. Thatcher in advance of the June 1988 Hannover European 
summit, suggesting that merger control was a ’vital element’ in the approach to 1992. 
(Zachman, 1994; Woolcock et al., 1991; Dechery, 1990; Woolcock, 1989; Financial 
Times, 9 Oct 1989; The Guardian, 21 Jun 1988)
After the Council’s meeting of June 1988, nevertheless, Germany was no 
longer the only large member state in favour of an EEC merger regulation. At that 
meeting, the French delegation formally endorsed, in principle, the need for such a 
regulation. As written in The Times (23 Jun 1988): ’The meeting ended with Britain 
isolated over its refusal to accept "in principle "...that an EEC merger control 
regulation was "indispensable" for the completion of the European internal market 
by 1992.’ Thereafter, France played an important part in the adoption of the
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Regulation, particularly during the second half of 1989, when this country’s 
government took the Presidency of the Council and made agreement on EEC merger 
control regulation one of its main goals (I 22, 1995; I 18, 1995; I 15, 1995; I 7, 
1995; Schwartz, 1993; The Independent, 21 Dec 1989).
As soon as it took the Presidency in July, the French government, under the 
leadership of its forceful minister of European Affairs Edith Cresson, set a target date 
of the end of 1989 for the adoption of the draft regulation and established a special 
committee of national officials to work on resolving the problems still impeding the 
unanimous agreement needed (Reynolds, 1990; Financial Times, 18 Jul 1989). For 
Brittan, the French led negotiations in a ’businesslike* fashion (The Independent, 21 
Jul 1989). Reynolds (1990: 34) comments that under the direction of the French 
government, ’both the Commission and the Council expressed new enthusiasm to 
adopt the Merger Regulation before the end of the year.’ Lastly, it was on the basis 
of a proposal that the French Presidency submitted to the Council in September 1989 
that the last horse-tradings between member states were organized (Dechery, 1990; 
Zachman, 1994).
As to the United Kingdom, it proved to be the most reluctant member state 
to the idea of an EEC merger regulation. In the words of Schwartz (1993: 626): 
’Great Britain became the last member to lift its basic reservations to the idea of 
merger control.’ Despite pressures from the Commission, the Confederation of 
British Industry and the different countries holding the Presidency in 1988 and 1989, 
the British government refused to express formal support, even in principle, for such 
a regulation until the last moment (Winckler and Gerondeau, 1990; Woolcock, 1989; 
The Independent, 4 May 1989). Though Lord Young, the then British Secretary of 
State for Trade and Industry, unofficially accepted the need for such a regulation in 
January 1989, it was just an informal endorsement CEuropolitique, 8 Feb 1989; The 
Independent, 31 Jan 1989; The Times, 31 Jan 1989). The British government’s 
position remained formally unchanged until the last Council meeting on the issue, the 
21 December 1989 (The Times, 22 Dec 1989b).
In January 1989, after talks in Brussels with key members of the new
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Commission, including Sir Leon Brittan, Lord Young said that ’while Britain retained 
reservations about the proposed merger control regulation, it accepted the necessity 
of avoiding the problem of "double jeopardy”, where mergers had to be approved by 
both national and Community authorities’ (Owen and Dynes, 1989: 139). In other 
words, he seemed to indicate that the British government considered such a regulation 
desirable. But, at the same time, Lord Young said that the British position was 
formally unchanged. If there were any doubts, Lord Young further stated in February 
that ’it was not a question of whether there should or should not be Community 
controls but a matter of deciding the basis on which these should operate.* Until all 
key questions were answered, Britain would not decide whether it was for or against 
an EC-wide merger regulation (Financial Times, 17 Feb 1989).
Nevertheless, despite this reluctance to accept the need for an EEC merger 
regulation, Britain never opposed or blocked the negotiations (Dechery, 1990). On 
the contrary, it fully and actively participated in them to the point of putting forward 
proposals designed to bridge gaps between member states (I 7, 1995; Jacobs and 
Stewart-Clark, 1990; House of Lords, 1989; Financial Times, 11 Oct 1989; 
Europolitique, 10 Sep 1988). Quoting Woolcock et al. (1991: 17): ’Although the 
British government took no formal position until well into 1989, it was actively 
involved in negotiations with the Germans and the French on the shape of the 
proposal.’ Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, the then British Prime Minister, wrote in a letter 
to Chancellor Helmut Kohl in 1988 that: ’...while Britain "will contribute 
constructively to the detailed negotiations," it will only take a formal position in the 
light of those talks’ {Financial Times, 3 June 1988; The Guardian, 3 Jun 1988). 
Sutherland recognised in June 1988 that British officials had taken full part in 
working groups examining the proposal {The Guardian, 3 Jun 1988).
Therefore, and in line with its approach to many other European issues, the 
British government followed a ’wait and see’ strategy (1 12, 1995; Woolcock, 1989; 
House of Lords, 1989). The British position was clearly stated by the then British 
Junior Trade Minister, Francis Maude, when he said: ’We are not prepared to say 
yes to the principle before we know the final form of the proposal’ {The Times, 19 
Dec 1988; The Times, 23 June 1988). As written in The Independent (31 Jan 1989),
185
in the late 1980s, the British government maintained a ’negotiating reserve’ on the 
issue.
It is worth noting that though Britain was isolated in its refusal to accept 
until the last moment, even in principle, the need for an EEC merger regulation, all 
member states expressed grave reservations about the details of the Regulation (Owen 
and Dynes, 1989; Whish, 1989; Financial Times, 5 Sep 1988). Member states’ 
delegations held different positions on the three key issues of the Regulation, that is, 
control, scope and criteria. Positions which were the result, at least in the case of the 
three largest member states, of contradictory demands from competing domestic 
interest groups (Armstrong and Bulmer, 1998; Bulmer, 1994; Schwartz, 1993; 
Woolcock et al., 1991; Woolcock, 1989).
While the Germans and British wanted a regulation based on a pure- 
competition criteria, most of the other delegations, including the French, demanded 
a ’trade-off approach’. While the representatives of the three largest countries and 
Spain called for very high thresholds, smaller countries preferred to give the 
regulation much more scope. Last but not least, while the Germans wished to enable 
national competition authorities to intervene in certain merger cases with a 
Community dimension and the British to have the possibility to secure the protection 
of ’legitimate national interests’, the other member states’ governments asked for a 
purer ’one-stop shop’ system (Armstrong and Bulmer, 1998; I 22, 1995; I 19, 1995; 
I 18, 1995; I 14, 1995; I 12, 1995; I 7, 1995; I 6, 1995; Bulmer, 1994; Schwartz, 
1993; Tsoukalis, 1993; Bernini, 1991; Bos et al., 1992; Woolcock et al., 1991; 
Brittan, 1991; Dechery, 1990; Jacobs and Stewart-Clark, 1990; Holzler, 1990; 
Woolcock, 1989; Monopolkommission, 1989; Owen and Dynes, 1989; Europolitique, 
1989; Financial Times, 1989; The Economist, 7 Oct 1989). In other words, there 
were strong disagreements not only between the largest member states’ delegations 
and the representatives of the other member countries, but also among the former. 
Though the British, French and German governments shared a common interest in 
high thresholds, their positions differed when it came to the crucial criteria and 
control issues.
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The resulting text was a compromise between the different approaches 
(Armstrong and Bulmer, 1998; Allen, 1996; I 7, 1995; I 6, 1995; I 12, 1995; 
Bulmer, 1994; Bernini et al., 1991; Venit, 1990; Dechery, 1990; Elland, 1990; 
Holzler, 1990; van Empel, 1990). As Bos et al. (1992: 122) stated, the Regulation 
was ’broadly based on compromise incorporating specific demands of individual 
member states.’ Indeed, this is illustrated by a number of examples which show 
exception to the general rule, i.e. ’the so-called compromises’ (I 12, 1995). These 
articles and Recitals have even come to be named after their main protagonists (Cook 
and Kerse, 1991). The different derogations to the general principle of ’one-stop 
shop’ were the so-called ’German clause’ (Art. 9), ’British clause’ (Art. 21) and 
’Dutch clause’ (Art. 22(3)). Article 24, which refers to the relations with non- 
member countries, was called the ’French clause’ and there were the ’Luxembourg 
clauses’ regarding financial companies in Article 3(5) and Article 5. Recital 12 was 
the ’Italian clause’ and Recital 13 the ’Spanish clause’ (I 22, 1995; I 18, 1995; I 12, 
1995; Financial Times, 21 Sep 1990b).
Last but not least, the lack of consensus on the contents of the Regulation was 
reflected in two further facts. First, an agreement could only be reached after two 
years of hard bargaining between member states’ delegations and the Commission, 
and between the member states amongst themselves. The debates ’were heated and 
often acrimonious’ (Cini and McGowan, 1998: 33). Secondly, the text’s main 
provisions were to be reviewed before the end of the fourth year. Member states ’had 
postponed the most critical issues yet again’ (Schwartz, 1993: 661).
In any case, the realist factor was present in the late 1980s. Germany accepted 
in principle the need for an EEC merger control regulation in November 1987, 
France in June 1988 and though Britain held formal reservations until December 
1989, it never officially opposed such a regulation and fully participated in the 
negotiations. The realist condition for integration was completed in this period.
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C. Conclusion
As condensed in table 5.5, the two conditions which conform with this 
research’s hypothesis were complied within this third period of negotiations on 
European merger regulation. As table 5.6 summarises, all the factors which 
determine the neo-functionalist and realist conditions for integration did occur in the 
late 1980s.
Table 5.5. THIRD PERIOD FINDINGS
CONDITIONS FOR INTEGRATION PRESENT
NEO-FUNCTIONALIST YES
REALIST YES
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TABLE 5.6. FACTORS OCCURRING IN THE LATE 1980s
CONDITIONS* FACTORS PRESENT EVIDENCE
NEO-FUNCTIONALIST
* Pressure supranational 
institutions:
- Commission
- European Parliament
- European Court of Justice
* Eurooean Industrialists in 
favour?
* Functional soillover 
REALIST
* At least two of the three 
largest member states in 
favour?:
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
Arguments for an EEC merger regulation 
(EMR), new confidence, use Articles 85 and 86 
EEC Treaty, flexibility during negotiations, 
’merger team’ composition.
Arguments for EMR, 1988 Resolution, 
complaints to the Council, encouragements to the 
Commission, active participation in the process.
1987 BAT-Reynolds ambiguous ruling.
Arguments for EMR, direct and indirect lobby.
To ensure Art.3(f) EEC Treaty and Single 
Market (all actors involved)
Germany and France in favour. United Kingdom 
did not oppose it. Real negotiations, arguments 
for EMR.
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has evidenced, as exposed in table 5.8, that the factors which 
determine each of the two conditions for integration established in this research’s 
theoretical hypothesis were not present in each of the three periods of negotiations. 
Accordingly, the neo-functionalist and realist conditions were not fulfilled in all the 
periods. As recapitulated in table 5.7, this qualitative analysis has indicated that the 
two conditions for integration only took place in the late 1980s.
Table 5.7. ALL PERIODS FINDINGS
CONDITIONS FOR 
INTEGRATION
PRESENT
1970s
PRESENT 
EARLY 1980s
PRESENT 
LATE 1980s
NEO-FUNCTIONALIST NO NO YES
REALIST NO NO YES
What does it all mean? What is to be made of it all? Chapter six will compare 
the three periods’ analytical results and offer a theoretical interpretation of the 
evidence.
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TABLE 5.8. FACTORS OCCURRING IN THE THREE PERIODS
CONDITIONS* FACTORS PRESENT
1970s
PRESENT 
EARLY 1980s
PRESENT 
LATE 1980s
NEO-FUNCTIONALIST
* Pressure supranational 
institutions:
- Commission YES YES YES
- European Parliament YES YES YES
- European Court of Justice YES YES YES
* European Industrialists in 
favour?
NO NO YES
* Functional snillover YES/NO YES/NO YES
REALIST
* At least two of the three 
lareest member states in 
favour?:
NO NO YES
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CHAPTER 6. INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS
This research’s hypothesis is not disconfirmed by the analysis of the facts: the 
two conditions were only fulfilled in the late 1980s. Neither the neo-functionalist nor 
the realist approach can be discarted as source of explanation of why an agreement 
on EEC merger regulation was possible in 1989 and not before. The idea that these 
two approaches may be complementary cannot be rejected. This chapter will attempt 
to give an interpretation of this analytical result. It will compare the three periods 
findings so as to appraise the role played by each factor in this case study and see 
what links between the two conditions for integration can be established.
6.1. COMPARING THE RESULTS: THE ROLE PLAYED BY EACH FACTOR
Only one factor has been present in the three periods: the pressure of 
supranational institutions. Industrialists and the governments of at least two of the 
three major member states were only in favour of an EEC merger regulation in the 
late 1980s and it was then that they accepted the supranational institutions’ constant 
claim that functional spillover arguments for an EEC merger regulation existed. Two 
of the three neo-functionalist’s factors and the realist one only took place in the last 
period of negotiations. How can one interpret the fact that just one factor was always 
present whilst the others only occurred in the late 1980s?
The supranational institutions factor was never absent because of its role in 
the integration process. These institutions had to convince the governments of at least 
two of the largest member states and European industrialists of the need for an EEC 
merger regulation. For all factors to be present, the Council of Ministers and the 
business community had to admit functional spillover existed and thus be interested 
in EEC merger regulation. This situation only occurred in the late 1980s.
The Commission was the initiator and engine of the process in the three
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periods. In each period, the Commission, with more or less success, devised an 
strategy of pressure to be placed upon industrialists and member states’ governments. 
By and large, the general lines of each period manoeuvring were the same. First, the 
Commission always defended the case for an EEC merger regulation alleging 
functional spillover arguments related with each period context. In the 1970s, a 
merger regulation was needed to ensure the objective of Article 3(f) of the EEC 
Treaty and thus enable the Common Market to function successfully in front of the 
increasing concentration of EC industrial sectors and in the face of the weaknesses 
of Article 86 of the EEC Treaty as a merger control instrument. In the early 1980s, 
it was also the way out of the crisis which staggered Europe. In the late 1980s, 
Article 3(f) of the EEC Treaty and hence the completion of the Single Market were 
endangered by a new European merger wave and the lack of appropiate merger 
control instruments, both at the national and European level, to assess large and, 
especially, cross-border mergers.
Another line of pressure that the Commission used in the three periods was 
a combination of threats and flexibility. In each of the periods, the Commission 
showed or expressed its willingness to modify the contents of its merger control 
regulation proposal. Yet, at the same time, it also threatened, with more or less 
success, member states’ governments and industrialists with developing alternative 
ways of merger control if an EEC merger regulation was not agreed upon. These 
alternative ways were based on instruments less suited for merger control than the 
proposed regulation and the Commission did not need the Council’s approval to use 
them. In the 1970s, the Commission threatened to use Article 86 of the EEC Treaty 
to control mergers. In the late early 1980s, Sutherland added the possibility of 
applying both Articles 85 and 90 of the EEC Treaty to this endeavour. In the late 
1980s, the Commission threatened to extend the use of Articles 86 and 85 of the EEC 
Treaty against mergers. In the three periods, the Commission, to different extents, 
actually put these warnings into practice achieving a measure of merger control under 
Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty.
The idea behind these threats and actions was the same in each period 
(although not the results): to maximise functional spillover so as to persuade
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industrialists and, indirectly, member states’ governments that the costs of not having 
an European merger regulation were greater than the costs of having one. Articles 
85, 86 and 90 of the EEC Treaty are not good instruments of merger control. As a 
result their use to this task implied uncertainty costs for companies wanting to merge. 
Once convinced of the benefits that an EEC merger regulation would have for them, 
the Commission expected businessmen to lobby for it at both the Council, through 
UNICE and other transnational business associations, and each national government, 
through domestic interest groups. Nevertheless, European industrialists only became 
such an indirect source of pressure upon member states’ governments in the late 
1980s. In the 1970s and early 1980s, the European business community opposed an 
EEC merger regulation. Without industrialist support there was no chance of 
agreement; their support was necessary to the success of the Commission’s strategy.
The other two supranational institutions gave, in each period, political and 
judicial support to the Commission’s arguments, threats and actions. The European 
Parliament always backed the Commission, vindicating the same functional spillover 
reasons and providing some useful and constructive ideas and criticism. It even 
encouraged the Commission to threaten the Council with alternative ways of control. 
As to the European Court of Justice, its rulings either sustained the Commission’s 
threats and actions or allowed them. Just like the Commission, it considered an 
expansive reading of the competition provisions of the EEC Treaty as critical to its 
role in moving the Community towards integration. The Commission would not have 
been able to carry out its threats without the Court’s judicial endorsement of its 
interpretations and applications of the Treaty. Judicial support would have been of 
no use had the Commission not exploited the resultant uncertainty it created. In each 
period, the Commission utilised both the European Parliament’s encouragements and 
the European Court of Justice’s rulings to reinforce its pressure.
In other words, each factor played a role in the integration process. The 
Commission was the initiator and the director of the orchestration of pressures to be 
placed upon the Council to prove the need for an EEC merger regulation to 
governments. The existence of functional spillover was the Commission’s argument 
for justifying its demands, threats and actions. The European Parliament encouraged
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the Commission’s manoeuvrings and the European Court of Justice crucially 
authorised them. Business groups also vitally assisted the Commission in urging the 
Council but only when satisfied of the cost of not doing so. Finally, member states’ 
governments, given the different pressures, decided whether or not to sponsor the 
regulation. Only when the governments of two of the three biggest member states 
resolved in favour of an EEC merger regulation did real negotiations start and an 
agreement was eventually reached.
These relationships between the factors are in line with my theoretical 
hypothesis: although both the neo-functionalist and realist approaches contain some 
elements of truth, neither one on its own is sufficient. Neo-functionalism is concerned 
with explaining how previous integration (that is, the existence of supranational 
institutions and of common policies, perceived as successful by different interest 
groups, which need further common policies) helps to achieve further integration. 
Realism believes member states are the only actors who can decide whether or not 
there is going to be further integration. In this case study, the role of neo­
functionalist’s factors is to persuade member states’ governments of the need of an 
EEC merger regulation while member states are the actors who have the power to 
make further integration a reality. To understand the whole process, it is necessary 
to look at both groups of factors.
The network of relationships between factors has been schematised in figure 
1. The Commission, with the support of the European Parliament and the European 
Court of Justice, tried to set both direct and indirect pressure upon the Council in the 
three periods to convince member states’ governments of the existence of functional 
spillover. Yet, only in the late 1980s were supranational institutions able to satisfy 
either industrialists or the Council of the need to have an EEC merger regulation. 
Why was the always present neo-functionalist factor able to convince European 
industrialists and member states’ governments of the existence of functional spillover 
in the late 1980s and not before?
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FIGURE 6.1. FACTORS’ ROLES
DIRECT PRESSURE (Proposals, complaints) 
with support of the European Parliament
COMMISSION ->  FUNCTIONAL SPILLOVER COUNCIL ->  EEC Merger Regulation
INDIRECT PRESSURE (Threats and actions) ->  INDUSTRIALISTS 
with support of the European Court of Justice and 
the European Parliament
6.2. COMPARING THE RESULTS: FACTOR INTENSITY
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Supranational institutions were only able to persuade the business community 
and the governments of at least two of the three largest member states that an EEC 
merger regulation was necessary in the late 1980s. To explain this fact, it is 
necessary to look at the degree of influence supranational institutions were able to 
use before European industrialists and member states’ representatives in each period. 
As it will be shown, although each factor played the same role in each period, the 
intensity or credibility of supranational pressure was different. The degree of 
influence the Commission was able to exert, with the support of both the European 
Parliament and the European Court of Justice, was contingent on its status or self- 
confidence and on the importance given by industrialists and member states’ 
governments to the common market project.
The Commission, initiator and motor of pressure, was viewed differently in 
each period. In the 1970s, the ’empty chair crisis’ had shifted the balance towards 
intergovernmental ism and produced a more cautious Commission. Moreover, DG 
IV was still building up its credibility as a competition authority. By 1980, after 
several years of Euro-sclerosis, the Commission’s aplomb was in general low and, 
after several years under irresolute commissioners with a weak hand in controlling 
member states’ subsidies and ’cartel crisis’, DG IV’s reputation was not at its best. 
The situation started to change for DG IV in the early 1980s under a more 
determined Commissioner, Mr. Andriessen. But it was not until the mid-1980s that 
the Commission and DG IV entered a period of strong self-confidence with Jacques 
Delors as President of the European institution and Peter Sutherland as 
Commissioner in charge of competition policy. Sutherland’s forceful leadership in 
DG IV was sustained by Sir Leon Brittan after 1988, giving this directorate-general 
considerable prestige. Therefore, the Commission and, in particular, DG IV had 
more status and respect in the late 1980s than in the 1970s or early 1980s. In the 
late 1980s, the Commission was seen in a far better position to assume an efficient 
role as merger control body and as more capable to put its threats into practice.
The importance given by the business community and by member states’
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governments of the end goal to be achieved through an EEC merger regulation was 
also stronger in the late 1980s than before. The will to establish a real Common 
Market based on the rule of competition was stronger in the late 1980s than in the 
earlier periods. In the 1960s and early 1970s, although legally committed to the 
establishment of a common market, member states’ governments, with the support 
of most European industrialists, promoted the creation of ’national champions’ in 
order to achieve the efficiencies then associated to sheer bigness. Mergers were 
basically taking place within national borders. State-oriented policies were reinforced 
by the 1970s economic crisis, leaving the common market goal far behind in 
national governments’ scale of priorities. Interventionist and neo-protectionist 
measures dominated the economic policies of member states’ governments in the 
1970s and most part of the early 1980s, and this was encouraged by industrialists. 
There was little progress in completing the Common Market in those years or in 
promoting competition; in fact, fragmentation was becoming more pronounced.
It was not until the mid-1980s that a momentum built up in favour of 
liberalisation and competition. Industrialists and member states’ governments started 
to see the establishment of a real common market as the only remedy for the lack 
of competitiveness of European industry. Both formal and informal attitudes and 
values began to change in most of the Community, although at different speeds in 
the different member states. It was the outset of a convergence of views towards the 
benefits of free-market, deregulation and competition policy which continued to take 
place in the late 1980s, and this produced a much more positive attitude towards 
competition-based economic integration. In fact, it was only in the late 1980s, that 
a merger wave characterised not only by national mergers but also by an increasing 
number of cross-border mergers took place in the EEC.
Industrialists and member states’ governments, therefore, attached a new 
significance to the common market objective in the late 1980s. This meant, on the 
one hand, that rules of fair play became more important both at the national and 
European level. The need to prevent mergers from erecting barriers to trade by 
distorting competition and hence placing the common market goal in jeopardy, was 
stronger in the late 1980s than before. On the other hand, it indicated that the need
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to avoid corporate legal uncertainties was also very compelling. Mergers, in 
particular cross-national, were vital for the preparation of the Single Market, and for 
globalisation in general. Accordingly, the European Commission’s functional 
spillover arguments were more credible and its threats more dangerous. The late 
1980s context offered the Commission’s strategy more opportunities of success than 
in the 1970s or early 1980s.
Stronger leadership together with a more favourable context combined with 
the 1987 European Court of Justice’s BAT-Reynolds ruling to give the Commission 
the chance to make its determination to develop EEC merger control, irrespective 
of a Council’s regulation, more credible than in the two previous periods. In the 
1970s and early 1980s, industrialists and member states’ governments considered the 
danger of a mild Commission using a limited instrument for merger control (i.e. 
Article 86 of the EEC Treaty) on the few large mergers which could result in an 
impact on intra-Community trade, less costly than granting new competition powers 
to the Community. In the late 1980s, the situation had changed.
As early as 1985, Sutherland threatened the possibility of withdrawing the 
European merger regulation proposal. As other DG IV’s Commissioners before him, 
Sutherland proposed to develop an alternative merger control policy at the EC level 
through the Treaty of Rome’s available instruments if member states’ governments 
continued to refuse to start real negotiations on an EEC merger regulation. On this 
occasion the threat was made explicit and included not just Article 86 of the EEC 
Treaty but also Articles 85 and 90. The former would allow the control of mergers 
between companies which are not in a dominant position. The latter would allow the 
Commission to control mergers between public enterprises. This possibility, within 
a context of preparation for the Single European Market and of an international 
process of globalisation, gave an unprecedent picture of uncertainty for European 
industry. It meant that large mergers and, in particular, cross-border operations that 
were taking place in increasing numbers, would have then faced different layers of 
control both at the national and the Community level. In short, multiple jeopardy 
and thus high costs.
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It is worth noting that this uncertainty would have mostly affected British, 
French and German companies. First, because long standing merger control laws 
with an impact on the market place could only be found in their countries. Secondly, 
as France, Germany and the United Kingdom were the biggest economies of the EC, 
they had a higher number of large firms and, as noted in chapter two, merger 
intensity rises with the size-class of firms. The prospect of multiple control was thus 
greater for these companies than for other member countries’ firms.
The European Court of Justice’s 1987 ruling on the BAT-Reynold case added 
to this climate of uncertainty ambiguously allowing the Commission to use the 
competition tools granted by the EEC Treaty to control mergers. The Commission 
took the opportunity and rushed through the opening judicial door. Its application, 
a while after the ruling, of Article 86 of the EEC Treaty to merger cases such as 
British Airways-British Caledonian, and of Article 85 to merger cases such Irish 
Distillers, did not help to calm European industrialists and member states’ 
governments. The Commission’s threats were at last credible and the legal 
uncertainty surrounding mergers unacceptable. A ’one-stop shop’ system of merger 
control was needed to reduce corporate confusion and establish clear limits to the 
Commission’s powers of intervention.
In the late 1980s, and for the first time, business groups actively pressed 
their governments for an EEC merger regulation and real negotiations took place 
among member states’ representatives in the EC. Truly, business groups lobbied 
both at the national and at the European level for the regulation and, instead of 
indifference and scattered meetings at Working Party or Committee of Permanent 
Representatives level, the European merger regulation discussion was brought to 
ministerial level and placed high in the list of priorities of the successive 
Presidencies.
As may be inferred from what precedes, supranational institutions were able 
to persuade both business interest groups and the governments of at least two of the 
largest member states for the need of an European merger regulation only in the late 
1980s because the degree of credibility of the Commission’s determination, of its
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functional spillover arguments and threats, was greater than in the 1970s and early 
1980s. Stronger leadership, the context of industrial restructuring brought about by 
the development of a market philosophy among large companies and national 
governments, as well as the European Court of Justice’s ruling at a critical moment, 
helped the Commission to have greater power of convinction. The costs of not 
having an EEC merger regulation had become superior to the costs of having one. 
A purpose-built regulation, with strict-limits on the powers it conferred, was 
preferable to the prospect of an interventionist Commission enhancing corporate 
uncertainty and its powers of control. Germany and, a while after, France, led the 
negotiations to a successful ending.
6.3. LINKS BETWEEN THE NEO-FUNCTIONALIST AND REALIST 
CONDITIONS
This case study shows that an agreement on an EEC merger regulation was 
possible in 1989 rather than before because, as realism predicts, it was only at that 
moment that the governments of at least two of the three most powerful states were 
in favour of such a regulation. Although a majority of member states’ governments 
accepted the need for an EEC merger regulation in the early 1980s, the governments 
of at least two of the major member states only admitted in the late 1980s that their 
national laws did not provide for an efficient system of control in all merger cases. 
Such a system of control was necessary for the adaptation of their firms to the 
European market, and so the partial transfer of merger control powers to the 
Community was to come ’to the rescue’ of the states, to help them ’survive’ in the 
modern world. Why did national interests became similar more or less 
simultaneously in the late 1980s rather than before? Why was an EEC merger 
regulation needed to ’rescue’ the largest states in the late 1980s rather than before?
At first sight, this convergence of national interests could be explained by the 
shift towards market-oriented policies that had started in the mid-1980s in the 
different member states, particularly in the United Kingdom and France, and that 
had enhanced the importance that national governments gave to competition. But
201
agreement on an EEC merger regulation in 1989 was not the result of consensus on 
neutral economic policy norms or ideology. In fact, the changes in values and 
attitudes were taking place at different speeds in the different member countries, 
national merger laws were not homogeneous, and there were strong disagreements 
among all member states’ representatives as to the type of regulation they wanted. 
Moreover, this pro-competition domestic context did not produce spontaneous 
demands for an EEC merger regulation. The Regulation was not the result of 
autonomous action by national governments. The initiative came from outside the 
domestic settings; it came from the Commission.
To understand why the governments of at least two of the three largest 
member states wanted an EEC merger regulation in the late 1980s but not before, 
it is necessary to include in the analysis the neo-functionalists factors. In this case 
study, following neo-functionalist predictions, it was only in the late 1980s that 
pressure from supranational institutions highlighted that the costs to the EC member 
states’ governments of not having an EEC merger regulation were greater than the 
costs of having it. Only then did the costs of the Commission’s strategy of 
developing an alternative system of merger control become credible and tangible. 
It was only in the late 1980s that the European Court of Justice’s decisions, backed 
by the Commission’s commitments and actions, triggered significant corporate 
reactions. In a context of increasing numbers of large and cross-border mergers 
brought about both by the Single Market prospect and by globalisation, the 
possibility of a more self-confident Commission developing, along with the support 
of the European Court of Justice, a new layer of merger control, created enough 
legal uncertainty for European industrialists to prefer a clear merger regulation. As 
neo-functionalism predicts, therefore, a coalition built up between the supranational 
institutions and industrialists in favour of an EEC merger regulation. There is 
evidence of political spillover with business groups mobilising at the transnational 
level in favour of an EEC merger regulation, and exerting influence on both the 
Council and the member states’ governments.
The pressure on member states’ governments to approve an EEC merger 
regulation came thus from within the European-level itself, the Commission playing
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a crucial role in maximising the spillover effects, with the help of the European 
Parliament and, especially, of the European Court of Justice. The EEC Merger 
Regulation would not have been accepted in the absence of this supranational 
pressure, at least at that moment. Recalcitrant member states’ governments were 
brought about largely by the focusing of attention on the need both for ’one-stop 
shop’ and to set clear limits to the Commission’s powers of intervention. State 
governments wanted to restore at least part of the national sovereignty they were 
losing as a result of the Commission’s increasing activism and to provide their large 
firms with clear merger control rules. The Commission’s case for a clear and 
comprehensive legal and procedural framework had become a strong one.
Nevertheless, the fact that both supranational institutions and business 
interests were able to exert influence upon the position of member states’ 
governments, does not imply that the latter fell victim of their pressure in the late 
1980s. Though the initiatives came from the Commission, governments negotiated 
the details of the EEC Merger Regulation and approved it. Moreover, supranational 
pressure took root because the nature of the domestic political context had changed. 
The success of the Commission’s strategy was helped by member states’ 
governments philosophical endorsement of the market during the late 1980s. State 
governments were more willing to accept the need for undistorted competition and 
for clear rules, or, perhaps more realistically, their opposition was harder to justify 
than in the 1970s or early 1980s. The ambitions of national policies were closer to 
the single market goal and to the EEC Treaty’s objective set out in Article 3(f). In 
another context the Commission’s threats and actions and industrialists pressure 
would not have been as effective.
It may even be argued that without this change in the formal and informal 
values and attitudes of member states’ governments, industrialists’ pressure would 
not have taken place. Indeed, governments endorsement of the market helped trigger 
the late 1980s wave of mergers that led industrialists to react against the legal 
uncertainty that surrounded large and, in particular, cross-border operations. The 
increasing number of cross-border mergers was not only the result of European 
industrialists’ new perception of what was needed to be competitive in a globalised
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economy but also of their belief their governments shared their diagnosis of the 
situation: the Single Market was to become a reality. There had been a neo-liberal 
turn towards the market among member governments. In other words, governments 
interpretation of what was in the national interest affected industrialists’ strategies.
To recapitulate, realists and neo-functionalists factors have each played their 
key role in the process that led to agreement on an EEC merger regulation and their 
presence or absence was inter-related. Without the gradual change in the economic 
philosophy of member states’ governments and large companies, the neo­
functionalist condition would have not been fulfilled. Without supranational pressure, 
the realist condition would have not occurred, at least not at that moment in time. 
Without the German and French sponsorship of the EEC Merger Regulation, real 
negotiations would have not taken place and an agreement would have not been 
reached. The interconnections and interactions among these conditions indicate that 
both are necessary to explain the late 1980s negotiations success and the failure of 
the previous attempts.
CONCLUSIONS
It is only when they are jointly considered that the factors and hence 
conditions examined in this research help provide a sufficient explanation of why an 
agreement on EEC merger regulation was possible in 1989 and not before. 
Comparison of the three periods’ results shows that the three neo-functionalist 
factors -the pressure of supranational institutions and the two spillovers- were able 
to influence the formation of national preferences within the late 1980s favourable 
context provided by national governments philosophical endorsement of market- 
oriented economic policies. It also reveals that the three largest member states’ 
positions determined the outcome. In this case study, there was a ’supranational 
supply’ of policy ideas and different intergovernmental reactions to these ideas 
which, in turn, were followed by further supranational pressure.
Both integrationist and intergovernmental forces had a role in the pre-1990 
development of EEC merger policy. Member states’ governments, interest groups
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and supranational institutions were all key actors in this particular process of 
integration. Neither the realist emphasis upon the role of states nor the neo­
functionalist emphasis upon ’supranational institutionalist dynamics’ (Greenwwod, 
1997: 242) provides, on its own, an adequate explanation of why integration was 
possible in 1989 and not before. The idea that these two perspectives need to be 
combined cannot be dismissed. In short, what this research shows is that it is 
necessary to continue crossing the pre-established boundaries between the two 
theoretical frameworks and explore in depth their possible connections.
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CONCLUSIONS: TOWARDS AN EXTRAPOLATION 
OF FINDINGS
The main theoretical divide in the study of European integration has been 
between realism and neo-functionalism. Most theorising on integration endorses one 
approach or the other. This research, however, has examined whether the neo­
functionalist and realist accounts can be taken as complementary contributions to the 
understanding of the dynamics of European integration. Complementarity implies 
here that neither approach is right. While both theories contain elements of truth 
neither one on its own is sufficient. To capture the complexity of the integration 
phenomenon, insights from both perspectives are needed.
This hypothesis was only tested in relation to a particular case study. 
Nevertheless, by its time-span and differentiated periods of analysis, the EEC 
merger policy case study has enabled a comparison of the results and has shown that 
the idea that the two dominant paradigms need to be combined cannot be dismissed 
since ’an apparent empirical instance of it can be found’ (Eckstein as quoted in 
Sandholtz, 1996: 405). The agreement on an EEC merger regulation in December 
1989 and the failure of previous attempts cannot be completely understood without 
both neo-functionalist or realist factors. Both realism and neo-functionalism are 
necessary for an understanding of this policy evolution before 1990.
The validity of these findings is reinforced by the fact that they point to many 
of the same conclusions as other recent scholars of European integration. These 
research findings indicate that realism, on its own, fails to capture the integration 
dynamics. If the supranational institutions behaviour could be explained in terms of 
satisfying the collective position of member governments in EEC merger policy, 
there would have been no need for procedures that bypassed the Council. In this 
particular case study, supranational institutions always tried to maximise spillovers
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so as to increase both their own competences and more generally the competences 
of ’Europe’. In this endeavour, they employed all the weapons they had, including 
creative interpretations of existing rules.
The supranational institutions were essentially able to develop a measure of 
merger control utilising both Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty and, by doing 
so, to maximise both the functional and political spillover effects. Cross-border 
mergers were not only impaired by separate national legal regimes but also 
conditioned by supranational institutions creative use of existing common rules. 
Industrialists had an incentive to lobby for integration and to seek not only 
transnational contacts but also the help of supranational institutions. Member states’ 
governments, besides their domestic interest groups pressure, had an additional 
reason to espouse an integrative solution: to regain control. National executives 
wanted to establish clear limits to the power of supranational institutions in this area.
Recent realist perspectives tend to recognise that interest groups have a role 
to play in the integration process. Scholars such as Moravcsik (1993) and Milward 
and Sorensen (1993), while still holding on states as central and sovereign actors, 
are turning towards ’liberal’ theories of preference formation to incorporate societal 
influence into national preferences or arguing that nation-states’ legitimacy is 
dependent upon their ability to promote the interests/prosperity of their peoples. 
Moravcsik (1993) has even acknowledged the growing power of the European Court 
of Justice. Nevertheless, these state-centric approaches still under-emphasize or 
disregard both the role of supranational institutions and the importance of their 
relationships with non-state actors. This research indicates that both these factors 
need to be taken into account.
These findings are consistent with many of the conclusions of leading 
contemporary scholars of European integration such as Mark Pollack, Paul Pierson 
and Gary Marks. These three argue that supranational institutions have a capacity 
for autonomous action that realism fails to take into consideration; the institutional 
development in the EC cannot only be understood in functional terms. Pollack’s 
(1998: 247-248) research indicates that the Commission ’does have independent
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preferences’ and that it is ’a competence maximizer’ that exercises ’considerable 
autonomy and influence.’ Pierson (1998: 29) argues that although member states’ 
governments ’retain the legal authority to rein in their "agents’” , over time, 
institutional effects, such as path-dependence and lock-in, constrain their capacities 
to control the course of integration. In his opinion, this is due in part to the fact that 
governments tend to be more interested in the short-term consequences of their 
actions; the long-range consequences of delegating authority to EC organisations are 
often heavily discounted. In his words:
...what one makes of the EC depends on whether one examines a photograph or a moving 
picture. Just as a film often reveals meanings that cannot be discerned from a single 
photograph, a view of Europe’s development over time give us a richer sense o f the nature 
o f the merging polity. At any given time, the diplomatic maneuvering among national 
governments looms large, and an intergovemmentalist perspective makes considerable sense. 
Seen as a historical process, however, the authority o f national governments appears far more 
circumscribed, and both the interventions of other actors and the cumulative constraints of 
rule-based governance more considerable. (Pierson, 1998: 30-31)
Last but not least, Marks (1996a; 1996b) adds that as ’control has slipped 
away from them to supranational institutions’ (Marks et al., 1996a: 342), ’European 
states are losing their grip on the mediation of domestic interest representation in 
international relations’ (Marks et al., 1996a: 341). To explain European policy­
making, it is important to analyse the independent role of both European and 
subnational level actors. According to this scholar, the domestic and European 
arenas are interconnected rather than nested.
Yet, noticing supranational institutions and non-state actors does not entail 
that neo-functionalism can explain how integration proceeds. This research provides 
evidence that neo-functionalism, on its own, also fails to capture the dynamics of 
integration. If the supranational institutions room for independent action had been 
enough, they would have not sought a Council merger regulation or would have had 
no problems in obtaining one. In the case of the EEC Merger Regulation, member 
states were always reluctant to transfer merger control powers to the Community; 
they wanted to preserve national sovereignty in merger policy. In this case study, 
moreover, national governments tended to yield greater influence upon the outcome 
the greater the power they commanded; the largest member states determined the 
outcome. Finally, member states’ governments always pursued their own interests,
208
which they expressed as being the national interest. Agreement among the main 
governments on an EEC merger regulation was only possible when the common end- 
goal, to be achieved through the Regulation, was perceived to be in the national 
interest in the largest member states.
In the 1970s and during most of the early 1980s, the common market goal 
was not the priority of national executives. Despite the legal commitment to establish 
a common market enshrined in the Treaty of Rome, the economic policies of 
member governments were interventionist. In the late 1980s, however, the Single 
Market was the solution to the economic ills of Europe. There was a general 
convergence of attitudes and values towards economic liberalism at a domestic level 
throughout the 1980s which helped see the completion of the Common Market as 
being in the interest of the governments of the largest member states. This 
acceptance of the common market goal at national level led member states’ 
executives to be more sensitive to the problems and demands of the industrialists 
involved in transnational mergers. Moreover, it also helped trigger the late 1980s 
wave of mergers that fuelled industrialists pressure for a merger regulation.
According to these findings, although supranational institutions and interest 
groups have more room of manoeuvre than realist scholars are so far willing to 
accept, their actions are still constrained by member states’ government preferences. 
Classical neo-functionalism needs to take account of the fact that governments are 
always reluctant to delegate new powers to the European level, and that integration 
can only proceed if there is preference convergence among the main member states’ 
governments.
This need to take into consideration member governments’ preferences had 
already been recognised by the fathers of neo-functionalism in the 1970s. As 
mentioned in chapter one, the lack of correlation between their perspective and the 
reality of the 1960s and 1970s led these scholars to reassess their theoretical 
framework. They essentially tried to incorporate elements of intergovernmentalism 
into it.
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Most of the leading contemporary scholars of European integration have 
reached similar conclusions. Pollack (1998) considers that the Commission’s ability 
to act on its own preferences, and to press for ’more Europe’, should not be 
overstated. According to this scholar, this ability of the Commission
...varies widely across issue-areas and over time as a function of the preferences o f the 
member states, the rules governing the sanctioning or overruling o f the Commission, the 
information available to both the Commission and the member governments, and the 
Commission’s ability to strike up alliances with important transnational actors. (Pollack, 
1998: 248)
Both Pierson (1998) and Marks (1996a; 1996b) accept that member states’ 
governments play a central part in policy development within the European Union. 
For them, there is little doubt that member states’ governments remain the most 
powerful decision-makers and that they are capable of constraining the actions of 
supranational and transnational actors.
Perhaps more revealingly, Stone Sweet and Sandholtz (1998: 25), in what 
may be considered the most comprehensive example of post-neofunctionalism, the 
transaction-based theory of integration, recognise that ’intergovernmental bargaining 
is an ubiquitous feature of supranational governance.’ They also accept that ’in the 
bargaining process, executives from the larger states command greater resources and 
tend to wield greater influence on EC policy outcomes than those from the smaller 
states’ (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 1998: 25).
The idea that both neo-functionalism and realism contain elements of truth 
but that neither taken on its own is sufficient to explain the dynamics of European 
integration, cannot be dismissed. The theoretical debate of the 1990s, where the 
lines between classical neo-functionalism and realism tend to be blurred, must be 
brought to its logical conclusion. Further research should focus on building up a 
comprehensive theory of European integration that is neither realist nor neo­
functionalist but includes insights from both these perspectives.
Complementarity is expected to help explain the evolution of areas of policy, 
such as the EEC telecommunications policy or the post-1990 EEC merger policy, 
that present similar but not identical characteristics to the case study used in this 
research. In fact, in the telecommunications case (Sandholtz, 1998), the Commission
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only began to find a receptive audience for its industrial policy proposals in the mid- 
1980s when it was becoming clear that the ’national champions’ strategies to 
promote high-tech industries had failed and that businesses from a multitude of 
sectors needed pan-European telecommunications for their increasingly transnational 
activities. In this favourable context, the Commission was able to exploit the legal 
opening offered by key decisions of the European Court of Justice, issuing, under 
Article 90 of the EEC Treaty, a series of directives that did not require Council 
assent. Integration became the only plausible solution.
As to the post-1990 EEC merger policy evolution, the EEC Merger 
Regulation provided for the re-examination of some of its key provisions before the 
end of 1994, namely, those relating to scope (Article 1) and control (Articles 9 and 
22). In 1993, nevertheless, despite the fact that Community merger control was 
widely regarded as a success, most member states’ governments (notably the British, 
French and German) were reluctant to accept an increase of the scope of the 
Regulation, that is, to a new transfer of merger control powers to the European 
level. In the difficult post-1991 economic and political climate marked by a general 
economic downturn, the dying out of the late 1980s merger wave, the collapse of 
the European Monetary System’s exchange-rate mechanism and the ratification 
problems of the Treaty on the European Union; European Parliament’s and 
Commission’s demands for threshold reduction could only rely on a qualified 
support from the business community. After consulting national authorities, 
companies and industry associations, the Commission proposed, in July 1993, to 
defer any formal proposal to revise the 1989 Regulation until, at the latest, the end 
of 1996. The Council endorsed the postponement in September 1993 and the 
Commission merely introduced, in 1994, some improvements not requiring a change 
in the Regulation.81 (Cini and McGowan, 1998; CEC, 1996a; Allen, 1996; I 4, 
1995; I 5, 1995; I 7, 1995; I 9, 1995; I 10, 1995; I 11, 1995; I 12, 1995; I 13, 
1995; I 14, 1995; I 15, 1995; I 16, 1995; I 17, 1995; I 18, 1995; I 19, 1995; I 20, 
1995; I 21, 1995; I 22, 1994; I 23, 1995; I 2, 1994; CEC, 1994e; Bulmer, 1994;
81 The Commission introduced some procedural innovations (OJ [1994] L 377/1) as well as issued 
guidance statements on certain technical and legal aspects of the EEC Merger Regulation (OJ [1994] C 
385).
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CEC, 1993b; Whish, 1993)
In the mid-late 1990s, economic recuperation was underway, a new merger 
wave was gathering strength, and the Economic and Monetary Union was again a 
priority of member states’ governments. Against this background, most industrialists 
and member states’ governments accepted a review of the 1989 EEC Merger 
Regulation was necessary to avoid the costs of multiple notification and hence to 
ensure a more effective ’one-stop shop’ system of merger control in the Community. 
On 12 September 1996, after seeking the views of all parties concerned, the 
Commission submitted to the Council a formal proposal for amendment (CEC, 1998; 
CEC, 1997a; CEC, 1996a; CEC, 1996c; CEC, 1996d; Cuziat, 1996a; Cuziat, 
1996b).82 Nine months later, on 30 June 1997, the Council adopted Regulation No 
1310/97 amending the 1989 Regulation on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings.83 The reassessed Merger Regulation entered into force on 1 March 
1998 placing more merger cases under Community control but, at the same time, 
simplifying the conditions for a referral to the competition authorities of the member 
states under Article 9 (CEC, 1998; Aribaud, 1997). These new arrangements were 
accompanied both by a new procedural regulation84 and by a set of new explanatory 
notices85 adopted by the Commission, and are to be reconsidered before the 1 July 
2000. Further adjustments in the national-European division of merger control 
powers are to be surmised until the European business community is satisfied with 
the level of ’one-stop shop’ achieved.86
82 OJ [1996] C 376/8.
83 OJ [1997] L 180/1; corrigendum in OJ [1998] L 40/17.
84 OJ [1998] L 61.
85 OJ [1998] C 66.
86 It should be mentioned, nonetheless, that future debate on EEC merger policy may not be focused 
so much on issues of jurisdiction but on the merger policy approach to be followed. Discussion on the 
criteria that should be used in assessing EEC competition policy cases has been revived in the 1990s. While 
some member states would like the Commission to take more into account social, local, regional and 
environmental considerations; Germany, with some support from the United Kingdom, considers that 
Commissioners are too often open to political persuasion jeopardising a pure-competition appraisal of 
mergers, restrictive practices and dominant positions. The Germans are pressing for the creation at 
European level of an agency above political influence that would emulate their Federal Cartel Office, that 
is, for an independent European Cartel Office. (Cini and McGowan, 1998; European Voice, 5 Jun 1997;
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The complementarity hypothesis is, therefore, expected to apply to areas of 
policy that are under the first pillar and are cases of ’low’ or borderline ’high’ 
politics. These are areas of policy that are more prone to be affected by cross-border 
exchanges and by functional spillover than areas of ’high* politics such as foreign 
policy or defence. Areas of policy, also, where the supranational institutions enjoy 
supranational powers, contrary to what happens in the second and third pillars.87 
This does not mean, however, that the complementarity idea cannot be of assistance 
in understanding the evolution of areas of policy with different characteristics. The 
supranational institutions lack of powers in the second and third pillars and the fact 
that no single interest has monopolistic access to issues at the centre of such areas 
of policy (almost entire populations are affected) may help to explain the slow pace 
of integration in foreign policy and defence as well as in justice and home affairs.
Allen, 1996; I 5, 1995; 1 9, 1995; I 10, 1995; 111, 1995; 1 14, 1995; 1 17, 1995; I 18, 1995; 1 20, 1995; 
I 23, 1995; Bishop, 1993; McGowan, 1993; Neven et al, 1993; Ehlermann, 1992; Holzler, 1990)
87 It must be noted that the decision-making procedure is not believed to affect the validity of this 
hypothesis in ’low’ areas of politics. Although the use of qualified-majority voting or of co-decision 
procedures within the first pillar may help the Commission and the European Parliament in their pro- 
integrative endeavour, the preferences of member states’ governments and interest groups are still presumed 
to constrain their actions. Moreover, though the erosion of opportunities for unilateral vetos together with 
a relative decline in their voting power across successive enlargements may be unsettling for the larger 
member states, smaller member states do not actually outvote them in any systematic way (Wallace and 
Hayes-Renshaw, 1997).
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Suchard bid for Rowntree" E. Mcmillan-Scott
23 Jun 1988 "Britain isolated in European merger talks" M. Dynes
8 Jul 1988 "Call for EEC vetting on cross-border mergers; International company 
mergers" D. Harris
8 Nov 1988 "Avoid confrontation over 1992: CBI National Conference"
19 Dec 1988 "Mergers control will be a severe test for Brittan" M. Dynes
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6 Jan 1989 "UK cool on European merger curbs as Brittan takes hot seat" C. 
Narbrough
18 Jan 1989 "Plea for new EEC merger body" M. Pagano
28 Jan 1989 "Brittan urges UK to back ’one-stop’ merger policy" M. Dynes
31 Jan 1989 "Britain ’to fall in line with EEC on merger vetting" M. Dynes
2 Feb 1989 "Euro-drive for size; Comment" D. Brewerton
6 Mar 1989 "Double trouble looms in ’European interest’; Economic view" R. Lord
27 Mar 1989 "The vital clause for Europe; Merger policy" anonymous
1 Apr 1989 "Brittan unveils compromise over merger vetting policy; Sir Leon 
Brittan" anonymous
20 Jun 1989 "Borrie fears dual merger control; European Mergers" G. Searjeant 
6 Jul 1989 "Borrie voices ’grave reservations’ about EC merger control" J. Bell 
27 Nov 1989 "EC pressure on Bonn to accept merger plans" M. Binyon
21 Dec 1989 "Hopes high for accord on EC mergers policy" P. Guilford
22 Dec 1989a "Wider scope for ending narrow view on mergers; Comment" D. 
Brewerton
22 Dec 1989b "EC ministers agree common merger policy" P. Guilford
19 Sept 1990 "EC firm on merger policing" N. Bennett
21 Sept 1990 "Referrals challenge to EC’s new merger role; company mergers" D. 
Harris
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ANNEX A: 
INTERVIEW DATA
INTERVIEW GUIDE (1 hour)88
(SCPR course, 1994; Johnson and Joslyn, 1991; Patton, 1990; Dexter, 1970; 
Richardson et al., 1965)
Thank you very much for seeing me. As you know my name is Patricia 
Garcia-Duran and I am doing research at the London School of Economics on 
European merger policy. The purpose of this interview is to gain information and 
advice that will help me in my research. Basically, the interview is about your 
opinions on the past, present and future evolution of European merger policy.
Everything you say will be confidential and will be used only for the purpose 
of my research. Nothing you say will ever be identified with you personally.
I hope you do not mind if I use a tape recorder...it will allow me to 
concentrate on what you are saying without having to take notes... as you have 
noticed my English is not Shakespearian... Thank you.
Any questions before we begin? As we go through the interview, please feel 
free to ask whatever question you would like to.
The purpose of this interview is to get your opinions about the evolution of 
European merger policy.
Let me first ask you some general background questions such as Which is 
your actual job? Is it in any way related with merger policy at national or European 
level?
PRESENT AND FUTURE
What do you think of the European Merger Regulation?
What would you change in the Regulation?
What impact (if any) has the existence of this Regulation had on the member 
states’ approaches to merger policy?
88 Some questions on the present and future of the European M erger Regulation were included in the 
interview, following textbooks general recommendation and to enable me to complete my research. 
However, in the interview itself, the emphasis was given to the ’past’ questions. Some o f the interview 
questions have been added or are the result of modifications done throughout the fieldwork period when 
information emerged that indicated the value of change.
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In your opinion, how is it that the Commission decided to delay the Merger 
Regulation revision from 1993 to 1996?
PROBE Survey Commission (Multilateral contacts June-July 1993) 
Could you say some more about that 
Different member states positions
Which are the more disputed issues to be revised?
PROBE Control, criteria, thresholds 
Member states positions
In your opinion what would be the result of the upcoming revision of the 
Regulation that will take place in the mid-1990s?
PROBE More debated issues: control, criteria, thresholds
Why do you think so?
In your opinion what will be the member states’ positions in the revision?
PROBE On the three key issues: control, criteria, thresholds
How will the result of this revision be affected by the fact that, instead of 
unanimity, the Commission proposal will just need a qualified majority to be 
accepted?
Why do you think so?
What do you think could be the impact on the revision results of the recent 
entry of Finland, Austria and Sweden?
Why do you think so?
I think a lot of really important things are coming out of what you are saying. 
If I have understood well you consider that ...(summary) Would you like to add 
anything else before we talk about another aspect of European merger policy?
EVOLUTION
So far we have been talking about the present and future of the European 
Merger Regulation. Let me ask you now about the past of this Regulation.
What do you think of the late 1980s negotiations that led to the actual 
European Merger Regulation?
Which were the more controversial issues under discussion?
PROBE Control, criteria, thresholds
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What were the member states’ positions on each of these issues?
PROBE On control, criteria and thresholds
In your opinion what allowed the member states to reach agreement on these 
negotiations?
In your opinion how is it that an agreement was not possible in any of the 
previous four negotiations on a European merger regulation; the negotiations that 
followed the four precedent Commission proposals in 1973, 1982, 1984 and 1986?
Which were the more controversial issues under discussion in those 
negotiations?
PROBE Control, criteria and thresholds
Do you thing there was an evolution of member states’ positions on these
issues?
PROBE Control, Criteria and thresholds 
Entry new member states effects
What sort of evolution? How would you describe this evolution?
How would you explain the evolution of member states’ positions from one 
negotiation to the other?
How would you describe the process leading towards the agreement on a 
merger policy?
So, If I have understood well, in your opinion what we can call conjunctural or 
circumstantial causes..../structural...explain why the European Merger Regulation 
was agreed in 1989 and not before. (Probe)
ADVICE
You have been very helpful. Thank you. Before finishing, however, I would 
like to seek your opinion on a last issue. Who else would you recommend that I talk 
to? Who knows a lot about this topic? (Get full names, addresses, phone numbers, 
faxes, etc. All possible information)
Is there any document or specific bibliography you believe can be of interest 
for my research?
Thank you very much, you have been very helpful. Do you want to add anything or 
ask any questions?
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SUMMARY SHEET89
CONTACT SUMMARY SHEET INTERVIEW No
NAME:
JOB:
DATE:
LOCATION:
Ql-WHAT WERE THE MAIN THEMES OR ISSUES IN THE CONTACT?
Q2-WHICH RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND WHICH VARIABLES IN THE 
INITIAL FRAMEWORK DID THE CONTACT BEAR ON MOST CENTRALLY?
Q3-WHAT NEW HYPOTHESES, SPECULATIONS, OR HUNCHES ABOUT THE 
FIELD SITUATION WERE SUGGESTED BY THE CONTACT?
Q4- WHERE SHOULD I PLACE MOST ENERGY DURING THE NEXT 
CONTACT, AND WHAT KIND OF INFORMATION SHOULD I SOUGHT?
GENERAL COMMENTS:
89 Immediately after each interview this summary sheet was filled in so as to have both a clear idea 
of the data collected and a first evaluation of the interview. It has proven very useful.
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ANNEX B: DOCUMENTARY DATA
ELECTRONIC INFORMATION SOURCES CONSULTED
ABI/INFORM: Business, industry and management database. Includes commercial 
law, economics, finance, public administration, health, etc. Gives bibliographical 
citations and abstracts from journal articles. It covers around 400 core journals, fully 
indexed, and 400 part indexed for business interest. (1971 to present day)
CELEX: Legal database of the European Union. Broadly corresponds to the L series 
of the Official Journal. Contains primary and secondary legislation, preparatory acts, 
reports of cases before the European Court of Justice, national legislative measures 
implementing EC directives, and European Parliamentary questions. (1960s to present 
day)
ECLAS: Bibliographic database comprising all EU publications and other holdings 
of the Commission’s central library in Brussels, (mid-1970s to present day)
ECONLIT: Corresponds to the printed title Journal of Economic Literature and has 
good coverage of EU economic issues. (1980s to present day)
EPOQUE: References to all documents produced by or discussed by the European 
Parliament, (mid-1970s to present day)
EURHISTAR: Catalogue of the European Community archives deposited at the 
European University Institute in Florence. Includes archives of the European 
Community institutions in Brussels and Luxembourg; private papers of politicians 
deposited at the University Institute; and grey literature of the EC. (1960s to present 
day)
FT-PROFILE: Full text news database giving up to date coverage of EU affairs. 
Includes the European Information Service’s bulletin European Report. (1980s to 
present day)
PAIS: Bibliographic database covering the fields of international relations and 
government. Good coverage of EU issues, (mid-1970s to present day)
RAPID: Press database. Contains the full text of all press release material from the 
Spokesman’s Service of the Commission, texts of speeches by members of the 
Commission, and other important documents such as European Council conclusions. 
(1985 to present day)
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REUTERS BUSINESS BRIEFING: Covers general, economic and political news 
stories. Articles are sourced not only from Reuter’s own reports, but also from over 
700 leading newspapers, journals, and news services throughout the world. (1990 to 
present day)
SCAD: Bibliographic database. Includes references to major EU publications and 
policy documents, plus journal articles on EU matters from 1,200 journals. Also 
includes the Spicers database which contains abstracts of items published in the 
Official Journal. (1985 to present day)
UKOP: Catalogue of all United Kingdom government publications, both HMSO and 
departmental publications. Also lists all EU publications, because HMSO acts as the 
sales agency for EU publications in the United Kingdom. (1980s to present day)
I have also conducted Libertas searches at the British Library of Political and 
Economic Science and other libraries of the University of London.
’MANUAL’ SEARCHES
I have browsed earlier issues of several journals and newspapers including90 91:
- The Bulletin of the European Union
- The Economist
- The European Competition Law Review
- European Economy
- The European Law Review
- The Financial Times
- The Journal of Common Market Studies
- La Revue du Marche Commun
go ,
I do not include in this list other journals or publications which were consulted and proved 
unsuccessful such as the press releases of the Council of the European Union.
91 Most of these journals and newspapers were recommended by the interviewees as relevant sources 
of information.
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ANNEX C: DATA DISTRIBUTION
EVIDENCE GATHERED FOR EACH PERIOD92
DATA 1970s E1980s L1980s 1970s-E1980s E1980s-L1980s 3 PERIODS TOTAL
OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS (OJ AND CEC) 25 25 21 - - - 71
ARTICLES AND BOOKS 32 3 51 8 7 70 171
NEWSPAPER ARTICLES 13 5 122 - - - 140
INTERVIEWS - - 10 - - 13” 23
92 As explained in chapter three, the data gathering process was all-encompassing. I tried to find all data available in each period related to the EEC Merger 
Regulation negotiations. These results, therefore, reflect the importance given by the press and by experts of the topic in each of the different periods.
93 Almost all of the 13 interviewees concentrated in the periods of the 1970s and late 1980s negotiations and on the corresponding facts because they considered 
that the early-1980s period was not as important, if at all.
AMOUNT OF EVIDENCE GATHERED FOR EACH CODE
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FILES 1970s
PAGES BYTES
EARLY 1980s 
PAGES BYTES
LATE 1980s 
PAGES BYTES
CONTEXT 64 193.097 25 80.924 18 55.551
NEO-FUNCTIONALIST
Commission 83 239.409 40 119.801 122 347.330
European Parliament 12 29.722 7 19.401 7 19.718
European Court of Justice 22 62.595 7 22.230 27 79.936
European Business 10 29.903 4 13.217 39 112.085
Functional Spillover 11 29.722 4 11.332 22 62.128
REALIST
Member states’ positions 53 151.211 15 44.641 101 315.134
A N N E X  D : C O D IN G  FRAM EW O RK
CODES* LABELS
1. FIRST PERIOD: 1970s
1.1. CONTEXT
1.1.A. Context 1950s (CONT50S)
1.1.A .I. European Coal and Steel Community (CONT50S-ECSC)
1.1.A.2. Treaty of Rome (CONT50S-TofR)
1.1.A.3. Economic thinking (CONT50S-ET)
1.1.A.4. Merger approach (CONT50S-MERGA)
1.1.A.5. Degree of concentration (CONT50S-CONCENT)
1.1.A. 6. Member states merger laws (CONT50S-MSL)
1.1.B. Context 1960s (CONT60S)
1 .1 .B .l. Economic thinking (CONT60S-ET)
1.1.B.2. Merger Approach (CONT60S-MERGA)
1.1.B.3. Degree of concentration-merger wave (CONT60S-CONCENT)
1.1.B.4. Member states merger laws (CONT60S-MSL)
1.1.C. Context 1970s (CONT70S)
1.1.C .l. Economic crisis (CONT70S-ECONOCRISIS)
1.1.C.2. Economic thinking (CONT70S-ET)
1.1.C.3. Merger Approach (CONT70S-MERGA)
1.1.C.4. Degree of concentration-merger wave (CONT70S-CONCENT)
1.1.C.5. Member states merger laws (CONT70S-MSL)
1 .2 . N EO -FU N C T IO N A L IST C O NDITIO N
1.2.1. EC ’supranational* institutions
1.2.1.A. Commission (COMM70S)
1.2.1.A .I. Need European mergers (COMM70S-NEEDMERG)
1.2.1.A.2. Need EEC merger regulation (EMR) (COMM70S-NEEDEMR)
1.2.1.A.3. 1966 Memorandum (COMM70S-66MEMO)
a. Article 85 (COMM70S-66MEMOART85)
b. Article 86 (COMM70S-66MEMOART86)
c. Reactions (COMM70S-R66MEMO)
1.2.1.A.4. Attempts to overcome limitations Article 86
(COMM70S-ATTEMPTS)
1.2.1.A.5. Use Article 86 (COMM70S-USEART86)
a. Continental Can (COMMCC)
1.2.1.A.6. 1973 Proposal (COMM70S-73PROP)
1.2.1.A.7. Commission’s expectations (COMM70S-EXPECT)
1.2.1.A.8. Commission pressure during negotiations
(COMM70S-PRESSNEGOT)
1.2.1.B. European Parliament (EP70S)
1.2.1.B.I. Need EMR (EP70S-NEEDEMR)
1.2.1.B.2. Berckhouwer Report - 1971 Resolution (EP70S-BR)
1.2.1.B.2, Other demands for prior-control (EP70S-OTHERD)
1.2.1.B.4. Resolution on 1973 proposal (EP70S-RES73PROP)
1.2.1.B.5. Post-Resolution pressure (EP70S-POSTRESPRESS)
(I.2.I.B .6. ESC Opinion on 1973 proposal)
1.2.1.C. European Court of Justice (ECJ70S)
1.2.1.C. 1. Pro-integration strategy (ECJ70S-PROINT)
1.2.1.C.2. Continental Can ruling (ECJ70S-CCR)
a. Teleological (ECJ70S-CCR-TELEO)
b. Against Advocate General
(ECJ70S-CCR-ADVGRAL)
c. In favour 66 Memo (ECJ70S-CCR-66MEMO)
1.2.1.C.3. Rulings on Article 86 after Continental Can
(ECJ70S-ACC)
1.2.1.C.4. Other ECJ rulings (ECJ70S-OTHERRUL)
1 .2 .2 . Industrialists (IND70S)
1.2.2.A. Against EMR (IND70S-AGAINSTEMR)
a. UNICE (IND70S-UNICE)
b. Exceptions (IND70S-FAVOUREMR)
1.2.2.B. Article 86 not a problem (IND70S-ART86)
,1.2.3. Functional spillover (FUNCTSPILL70S)
1.2.3. A, Commission arguments for EMR (FUNCTSPILL70S-COMM)
1.2.3.B. European Court of Justice arguments for EMR
(FUNCTSPILL70S-ECJ)
1.2.3.C. European Parliament arguments for EMR
(FUNCTSPILL70S-EP)
1.2.3.D. European Council arguments for EMR
(FUNCTSPILL70S-EURCOUNC)
1.3. REALIST CONDITION
1.3.1. 1972 European Summit (EURCOUNC70S)
1.3.2. Council of Ministers (COUNC70S)
a. Working Party meetings (COUNC70S-WP)
b. Coreper meetings (COUNC70S-COREPER)
c. Key issues (COUNC70S-KEYISSUES)
1.3.3. United Kingdom position on need EMR (UK70S-NEEDEMR)
1.3.4. Germany position on need EMR (GER70S-NEEDEMR)
1.3.5. France position on need EMR (FR70S-NEEDEMR)
1.3.6. Other member states positions on need EMR
(MSS70S-NEEDEMR)
2. SECOND PERIOD: EARLY 1980s
2.1. CONTEXT EARLY 1980s (CONTE80S)
2.1.1. Economic context (CONTE80S-ECONO)
a. Before 1984 (CONTE80S-ECONO-BEF84)
b. After 1984 (CONTE80S-ECON0-AFTER84)
2.1.2. Economic thinking (CONTE80S-ET)
a. Before 1984 (CONTE80S-ET-BEF84)
b. After 1984 (CONTE80S-ET-AFTER84)
c. SEA (SEA)
2.1.3. Merger approach (CONTE80S-MERGA)
a. Before 1984 (CONTE80S-MERGA-BEF84)
b. After 1984 (CONTE80S-MERGA-AFTER84)
2.1.4. Degree of concentration (CONTE80S-CONCENT)
a. Before 1984 (CONTE80S-CONCENT-BEF84)
b. After 1984 (CONTE80S-CONCENT-AFTER84)
2.1.5. Member states merger laws (CONTE80S-MSL)
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2.2. NEO-FUNCTIONALIST CONDITION
2.2.1. EC ’supranational’ institutions
2.2.1.A. Commission (COMME80S)
2.2.1.A .I. Need European mergers
(COMME80S-NEEDMERG)
2.2.1. A.2. Need EMR (COMME80S-NEEDEMR)
2.2.1.A.3. Use Article 86 (COMME80S-USEART86)
2.2.1.A.4. 1981 Amended Proposal (COMME80S-81PROP)
2.2.1.A.5. 1984 Amended Proposal (COMME80S-84PROP)
2.2.1.A.6. Commission’s expectations (COMME80S-EXPECT)
2.2.1. A.7. Commission pressure during negotiations
(COMME80S-PRESSNEGOT)
2.2.1.B. European Parliament (EPE80S)
2.2.1.B .l. Need EMR (EPE80S-NEEDEMR)
2.2.1.B.2. Demands for EEC merger regulation
(EPE80S-EMR)
2.2.1.B.3. Resolution on 1981 proposal (EPE80S-RES81PROP)
2.2.1.B.4. The 1986 advice to the Commission
(EPE80S-1986AD VICE)
(2.2.1.B.5. ESC Opinion on 1981 proposal)
2.2.1.C. European Court of Justice (ECJE80S)
2.2. l.C . 1. Intentionality o f ECJ’s rulings on Article 86
Continental Can (ECJE80S-ACC-INTENTIONALITY)
2.2 .1.C.2. Other ECJ rulings (ECJE80S-OTHERRUL)
2.2.2. Industrialists (INDE80S)
2.2 .2 .A. Against EMR (INDE80S-AGAINSTEMR)
a. UNICE (INDE80S-UNICE)
b. Exceptions (INDE80S-FAVOUREMR)
2.2.2.B. Article 86 creates certain legal uncertainty (INDE80S-ART86)
2.223. Functional spillover (FUNCTSPILLE80S)
2.2.3. A. Commission arguments for EMR
(FUNCTSPILLE80S-COMM)
2.2 .3 .B. European Parliament arguments for EMR
(FUNCTSPELLE80S-EP)
after
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2 .3 . R E A L IST  C O NDITIO N
2.3.1. Council o f Ministers (COUNCE80S)
a. Working Party meetings (COUNCE80S-WP)
b. Coreper meetings (COUNCE80S-COREPER)
c. Key issues (COUNCE80S-KEYISSUES)
1.3.3. United Kingdom position on need EMR (UKE80S-NEEDEMR)
1.3.4. Germany position on need EMR (GERE80S-NEEDEMR)
1.3.5. France position on need EMR (FRE80S-NEEDEMR)
1.3.6. Other member states positions on need EMR
(MSSE80S-NEEDEMR)
3. THIRD PERIOD: LATE 1980s
3.1. CONTEXT LATE 1980s (CONTL80S)
3.1.1. Economic context (CONTL80S-ECONO)
3.1.2. Economic thinking (CONTL80S-ET)
3.1.3. Merger approach (CONTL80S-MERGA)
3.1.4. Degree of concentration-merger wave (CONTL80S-CONCENT)
3.1.5. Member states merger laws (CONTL80S-MSL)
3.2. NEO-FUNCTIONALIST CONDITION
3.2.1. EC ’supranational’ institutions
3.2.1.A. Commission (COMML80S)
3.2.1.A .I. Need European mergers
(COMML80S-NEEDMERG)
3.2.1.A.2. Need EMR (COMML80S-NEEDEMR)
3.2.1.A.3. Use Articles 86 and 85
(COMML80S-USEART86-85)
3.2.1.A.4. 1986 Amended Proposal (COMML80S-86PROP)
3.2.1.A.5. April 1988 Amended Proposal
(COMML80S-APR88PROP)
3 .2 .1 .A .6. N ovem ber 1988 Amended Proposal (C O M M L 80S-
NOV88PROP)
3.2.1.A.7. 1989 proposed amendments
(COMML80S-1989AMEND)
3.2.1.A.8. Commission’s expectations (COMML80S-EXPECT)
3.2.1.A .9. Commission pressure during negotiations
(COMML80S-PRESSNEGOT)
3.2.1.A. 10. Confident Commission
(COMML80S-CONFIDENCE)
3.2.1.B. European Parliament (EPL80S)
3.2.1.B.I. Need EMR (EPL80S-NEEDEMR)
3.2 .1.B.2. Demands for EEC merger regulation
(EPL80S-EMR)
3.2 .1.B.3. Resolution on April 1988 proposal
(EPL80S-RES88PROP)
3.2.1.B.4. Pressure upon the Commission
(EPL80S-PRESSCOMM) 
(3.2.I.B.5. ESC Opinion on April 1988 proposal)
3.2.1.C. European Court of Justice (ECJL80S)
3.2.1.C.I. BAT-Reynolds ruling (ECJL80S-BAT)
3.2 .1.C.2. Interpretation ruling (ECJL80S-BATINT)
a. Wide interpretation
(ECJL80S-B ATINT -WIDE)
b. Narrow interpretation
(ECJL80S-BATINT-NARROW)
3.2.1.C.3. Effect ruling (ECJL80S-BAT-EFFECT)
3.2.1.C.4. Intentionality ruling
(ECJL80S-BAT-INTENTIONALITY)
3.2.2. Industrialists (INDL80S)
3.2.2.A. In favour EMR (INDL80S-INFAVOUREMR)
a. UNICE (INDL80S-UNICE)
b. Others (INDL80S-OTHERS)
3.2.2.B. Lobbying for EMR (INDL80S-LOBBY)
a. At national level (INDL80S-LOBBY-NAT)
b. At European level (INDL80S-LOBBY-EUR)
3.2.3. Functional spillover (FUNCTSPILLL80S)
3.2.3.A. Commission arguments for EMR
(FUNCTSPILLL80S-COMM)
3.2.3.B. European Court of Justice arguments for EMR
(FUNCTSPILLL80S-ECJ)
3.2.3.C. European Parliament arguments for EMR
(FUNCTSPILLL80S-EP)
3.2.3.D. Industrialists arguments for EMR (FUNCTSPILLL80S-IND)
3.2.3.E. Governments arguments for EMR
(FUNCTIONALSPILLL80S-GOV)
3 .3 . R E A L IST  CO N D ITIO N
3.3.1. Council of Ministers (COUNCL80S)
a. Working Party meetings (COUNCL80S-WP)
b. Coreper meetings (COUNCL80S-COREPER)
c. Key issues (COUNCL80S-KEYISSUES)
3.3.3. United Kingdom position on need EMR (UKL80S-NEEDEMR)
3.3.4. Germany position on need EMR (GERL80S-NEEDEMR)
3.3.5. France position on need EMR (FRL80S-NEEDEMR)
3.3.6. Other member states positions on need EMR
(MSSL80S-NEEDEMR)
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MERGER CONTROL SYSTEMS AT NATIONAL LEVEL IN THE 1970s
COUNTRIES WHERE MERGERS ARE NOT 
CONTROLLED AT ALL AND CARTEL AND 
MONOPOLIES ARE ONLY MARGINALLY 
CONTROLLED BY NATIONAL 
LEGISLATION ON COMPETITION
COUNTRIES WHERE MERGERS ARE NOT 
CONTROLLED AT ALL YET CARTEL AND 
MONOPOLIES ARE CONTROLLED BY 
NATIONAL LEGISLATION ON 
COMPETITION
COUNTRIES WHERE MERGERS AND 
CARTEL AND MONOPOLIES ARE 
CONTROLLED BY NATIONAL 
LEGISLATION ON COMPETITION
BELGIUM, DENMARK, ITALY AND 
LUXEMBOURG
THE NETHERLANDS 
[Greece, Portugal and Spain]
GERMANY (1973), BRITAIN (1965), FRANCE 
(1977) AND in terms of its basic aspects, 
IRELAND (1978).
=  PRO-MERGER APPROACH. =  PRO-MERGER APPROACH. = INTERMEDIUM APPROACHES ->  
BETWEEN TRADE-OFF AND PURE- 
COMPETTTION.
94 Own elaboration based on the following sources: CEC (1976, 1977a, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981a, 1982a, 1983a, 1984a, 1985, 1986a, 1987a, 1988a, 1989a, 1990a, 
1996a); Brussels Law Offices (1988); Monopolkommission (1989); Boner and Krueger (1991); Cromie (1991); OECD (1983-1992); Neven et al. (1993); Verloop (1993); 
Whish and Wood (1994); McGowan (1994); Laudati (1995).
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MERGER CONTROL SYSTEMS AT NATIONAL LEVEL IN THE EARLY 1980s
COUNTRIES WHERE MERGERS ARE NOT 
CONTROLLED AT ALL AND CARTEL AND 
MONOPOLIES ARE ONLY MARGINALLY 
CONTROLLED BY NATIONAL 
LEGISLATION ON COMPETITION
COUNTRIES WHERE MERGERS ARE NOT 
CONTROLLED AT ALL YET CARTEL AND 
MONOPOLIES ARE CONTROLLED BY 
NATIONAL LEGISLATION ON 
COMPETITION
COUNTRIES WHERE MERGERS AND 
CARTEL AND MONOPOLIES ARE 
CONTROLLED BY NATIONAL 
LEGISLATION ON COMPETITION
BELGIUM, DENMARK, ITALY AND 
LUXEMBOURG
GREECE AND THE NETHERLANDS [Portugal 
and Spain]
GERMANY, BRITAIN, FRANCE AND, in terms 
of its basic aspects, IRELAND.
=  PRO-MERGER APPROACH. = PRO-MERGER APPROACH. = INTERMEDIUM APPROACHES ->  
BETWEEN TRADE-OFF AND PURE- 
COMPETITION.
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M ER G ER  CO NTRO L SYSTEM S A T N ATIO NAL L E V EL IN  TH E LA TE 1980s95
COUNTRIES WHERE MERGERS ARE NOT 
CONTROLLED AT ALL AND CARTEL AND 
MONOPOLIES ARE ONLY MARGINALLY 
CONTROLLED BY NATIONAL 
LEGISLATION ON COMPETITION
COUNTRIES WHERE MERGERS ARE NOT 
CONTROLLED AT ALL YET CARTEL AND 
MONOPOLIES ARE CONTROLLED BY 
NATIONAL LEGISLATION ON 
COMPETITION
COUNTRIES WHERE MERGERS AND 
CARTEL AND MONOPOLIES ARE 
CONTROLLED BY NATIONAL 
LEGISLATION ON COMPETITION
BELGIUM, DENMARK, ITALY AND 
LUXEMBOURG
GREECE AND THE NETHERLANDS. GERMANY, BRITAIN, FRANCE AND, in terms 
of its basic aspects, IRELAND. And PORTUGAL 
(1988) and SPAIN (1989).
=  PRO-MERGER APPROACH. = PRO-MERGER APPROACH. =  INTERMEDIUM APPROACHES ->
BETWEEN TRADE-OFF AND PURE- 
COMPETITION.
95 The introduction of merger control and the reinforcement of their general competition policy was in preparation in Italy (1990), Belgium (1991) and Greece (1991).
MERGER CONTROL SYSTEMS AT NATIONAL LEVEL AFTER 1989*
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COUNTRIES WHERE MERGERS ARE NOT 
CONTROLLED AT ALL AND CARTEL AND 
MONOPOLIES ARE ONLY MARGINALLY 
CONTROLLED BY NATIONAL 
LEGISLATION ON COMPETITION
COUNTRIES WHERE MERGERS ARE NOT 
CONTROLLED AT ALL YET CARTEL AND 
MONOPOLIES ARE CONTROLLED BY 
NATIONAL LEGISLATION ON 
COMPETITION
COUNTRIES WHERE MERGERS AND 
CARTEL AND MONOPOLIES ARE 
CONTROLLED BY NATIONAL 
LEGISLATION ON COMPETITION
DENMARK AND LUXEMBOURG none GERMANY, FRANCE, BRITAIN, PORTUGAL, 
SPAIN AND, in terms of its basic aspects, 
IRELAND. And ITALY (1990), BELGIUM (1991) 
GREECE (1991) and THE NETHERLANDS 
(1998).
=  PRO-MERGER APPROACH. = PRO-MERGER APPROACH. = INTERMEDIUM APPROACHES ->
BETWEEN TRADE-OFF AND PURE- 
COMPETITION.
96 Of the three new member states, both Austria (1993) and Sweden (1982) have merger control laws and the introduction of such a law is in preparation in Finland.
APPENDIX. TREATY OF AMSTERDAM RENUMBERING
EEC
TREATY
TREATY OF 
AMSTERDAM
Art. 85 Art. 81
Art. 86 Art. 82
Art. 87 Art. 83
Art. 89 Art. 85
Art. 90 Art. 86
Art. 92 Art. 87
Art. 93 Art. 88
Art. 94 Art. 89
Art. 235 Art. 308
